Disaggregated computing for distributed confidential computing environment

ABSTRACT

An apparatus to facilitate disaggregated computing for a distributed confidential computing environment is disclosed. The apparatus includes a programmable integrated circuit (IC) comprising system manager hardware circuitry to: interface, over a network, with a remote application of a client platform, the system manager hardware circuitry to interface with the remote application using a message-based interface; perform resource management of resources of the programmable IC; validate incoming messages to the programmable IC; verify whether a requester is allowed to perform requested actions of the incoming messages that are successfully validated; and manage transfer of data between the programmable IC and the remote application based on successfully verifying the requester.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims the benefit of priority from and is acontinuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 17/133,066 filed onDec. 23, 2020, which claims the benefit of priority from U.S.Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 63/083,565 filed on Sep. 25,2020, the full disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.

FIELD

This disclosure relates generally to data processing and moreparticularly to disaggregated computing for distributed confidentialcomputing environment.

BACKGROUND OF THE DISCLOSURE

Disaggregated computing is on the rise in data centers. Cloud serviceproviders (CSP) are deploying solutions where processing of a workloadis distributed on disaggregated compute resources, such as CPUs, GPUs,and hardware accelerators (including field programmable gate arrays(FPGAs)), that are connected via a network instead of being on the sameplatform and connected via physical links such as peripheral componentinterconnect express (PCIe). Disaggregated computing enables improvedresource utilization and lowers ownership costs by enabling moreefficient use of available resources. Disaggregated computing alsoenables pooling a large number of hardware accelerators for largecomputation making the computation more efficient and better performing.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

So that the manner in which the above recited features of the presentembodiments can be understood in detail, a more particular descriptionof the embodiments, briefly summarized above, may be had by reference toembodiments, some of which are illustrated in the appended drawings. Itis to be noted; however, that the appended drawings illustrate typicalembodiments and are therefore not to be considered limiting of itsscope.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a processing system, according to anembodiment.

FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram of at least one embodiment of acomputing device for secure I/O with an accelerator device.

FIG. 3 is a simplified block diagram of at least one embodiment of anaccelerator device of the computing device of FIG. 2.

FIGS. 4A-4D illustrate computing systems and graphics processorsprovided by embodiments described herein.

FIG. 5 illustrates example graphics software architecture for a dataprocessing system in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 6A is a block diagram illustrating an IP core development system inaccordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 6B illustrates a cross-section side view of an integrated circuitpackage assembly in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 6C illustrates a package assembly that includes multiple units ofhardware logic chiplets connected to a substrate (e.g., base die) inaccordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 6D illustrates a package assembly including interchangeablechiplets in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram illustrating an example system on a chipintegrated circuit in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 8 illustrates a computing device employing a disaggregate computecomponent, according to implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 9 illustrates disaggregate compute component, according to oneimplementation of the disclosure.

FIG. 10 is a schematic of a computing architecture depicting thedifference between a remote direct memory access (RDMA) flow and astandard network interface controller (NIC) flow, according toimplementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 11 illustrates data structures including an RDMA NIC (RNIC) andapplication use to request RDMAs, according to implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 12 illustrates a diagram depicting attack points for RDMA of twoapplications connected over a network, according to implementations ofthe disclosure.

FIG. 13A illustrates a computing environment to establish a trustedexecution environment (TEE) during operation, according toimplementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 13B illustrates a queue implemented with a circular buffer in whichthe elements are protected by authentication tags, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 14 illustrates a diagram depicting an implementation of integrityprotection of RDMA send, according to implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 15 illustrates an operation flow implementing copy of a bufferusing RDMA READ, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 16 illustrates an operation flow of integrity protection of RDMASEND used for messaging and protection of RDMA READ used for data copy,in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 17 illustrates an operation flow using RDMA SEND messages to copy abuffer with RDMA WRITE, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 18 illustrates an operation flow of RDMA WRITE used for protecteddata copy, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIGS. 19A and 19B illustrate an example implementation of the protectionof an RDMA SEND implemented by RNICs, according to implementations ofthe disclosure.

FIG. 20 illustrates an application copying a buffer to an advertisedbuffer using RDMA WRITE, according to implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 21 is a flow diagram depicting a process for protected RDMA fordistributed confidential computing in accordance with implementations ofthe disclosure.

FIG. 22 is a block diagram depicting a conventional GPU stack inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 23 is a block diagram depicting a GPU remoting architecture inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 24A depicts a graph representing a set of command buffers withassociated data structures in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 24B illustrates a manifest for data relocation and command bufferpatching in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 25 illustrates relocation of data and command buffers using amanifest, according to implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 26 is a flow diagram illustrating a method for providing datarelocation and command buffer patching for graphics processing unit(GPU) remoting, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 27 illustrates a diagram depicting application programminginterface (API) forwarding, according to implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 28 illustrates the GPU remoting stack implementing GPU remoting todriver-managed GPUs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 29 is a flow diagram depicting a process for GPU remoting todriver-managed GPUs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 30 illustrates an autonomous GPU remoting stack, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 31 illustrates a diagram depicting another implementation of API,according to implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 32 illustrates a diagram depicting driver-managed GPU remoting,according to implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 33 is a flow diagram depicting a process for remoting to autonomousGPUs in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 34 depicts a network architecture for field programmable gate array(FPGA) management in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 35 illustrates a network architecture of central entity managementof a rack of FPGAs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 36 depicts a network environment for protected management ofnetwork-connected FPGAs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 37 depicts a network environment for protected management ofnetwork-connected FPGAs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure.

FIG. 38 depicts one example of a data structure with PCIe configurationinformation for protected management of network-connected FPGAs, inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 39 illustrates a network environment for performing an RDMA Sendoperation, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 40 illustrates MMIO transfers between an orchestration server and aremote FPGA, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 41 illustrates a network environment for extending a secure datatransfer interface between FPGA and secure enclave for ProtectedRemote-MMIO, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 42 depicts a flow diagram illustrating a method for protectedmanagement of network-connected FPGAs, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 43 illustrates a diagram depicting an example flow of a policymanager enforcing a time-based policy, according to implementations ofthe disclosure.

FIG. 44 depicts a flow diagram illustrating a method enforcement of CSPpolicy for FPGA usage by tenant bitstream, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 45 illustrates a conventional network environment for FPGAmanagement.

FIG. 46 illustrates a network environment for sharing FPGAs on variousservers without a local CPU managing the FPGAs, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 47 illustrates a network environment for an autonomous FPGA inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 48 illustrates a network environment for an autonomous FPGA usingan orchestration server to facilitate attestation and session setup, inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 49 illustrates a high-level architecture for an autonomous FPGA, inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 50 illustrates an autonomous FPGA with a data and control pathinternal interface from an FPGA system manager (FSM), in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure.

FIG. 51 is a flow diagram illustrating a method for autonomous FPGAs, inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Disaggregated computing is on the rise in data centers. Cloud serviceproviders (CSP) are deploying solutions where processing of a workloadis distributed on disaggregated compute resources, such as CPUs, GPUs,and hardware accelerators (including field programmable gate arrays(FPGAs)), that are connected via a network instead of being on the sameplatform and connected via physical links such as peripheral componentinterconnect express (PCIe). Disaggregated computing enables improvedresource utilization and lowers ownership costs by enabling moreefficient use of available resources. Disaggregated computing alsoenables pooling a large number of hardware accelerators for largecomputation making the computation more efficient and better performing.

In the following description, numerous specific details are set forth toprovide a more thorough understanding. However, it may be apparent toone of skill in the art that the embodiments described herein may bepracticed without one or more of these specific details. In otherinstances, well-known features have not been described to avoidobscuring the details of the present embodiments.

Various embodiments are directed to techniques for disaggregatedcomputing for a distributed confidential computing environment, forinstance.

System Overview

While the concepts of the present disclosure are susceptible to variousmodifications and alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof havebeen shown by way of example in the drawings and will be describedherein in detail. It should be understood, however, that there is nointent to limit the concepts of the present disclosure to the particularforms disclosed, but on the contrary, the intention is to cover allmodifications, equivalents, and alternatives consistent with the presentdisclosure and the appended claims.

References in the specification to “one embodiment,” “an embodiment,”“an illustrative embodiment,” etc., indicate that the embodimentdescribed may include a particular feature, structure, orcharacteristic, but every embodiment may or may not necessarily includethat particular feature, structure, or characteristic. Moreover, suchphrases are not necessarily referring to the same embodiment. Further,when a particular feature, structure, or characteristic is described inconnection with an embodiment, it is submitted that it is within theknowledge of one skilled in the art to effect such feature, structure,or characteristic in connection with other embodiments whether or notexplicitly described. Additionally, it should be appreciated that itemsincluded in a list in the form of “at least one A, B, and C” can mean(A); (B); (C); (A and B); (A and C); (B and C); or (A, B, and C).Similarly, items listed in the form of “at least one of A, B, or C” canmean (A); (B); (C); (A and B); (A and C); (B and C); or (A, B, and C).

The disclosed embodiments may be implemented, in some cases, inhardware, firmware, software, or any combination thereof. The disclosedembodiments may also be implemented as instructions carried by or storedon a transitory or non-transitory machine-readable (e.g.,computer-readable) storage medium, which may be read and executed by oneor more processors. A machine-readable storage medium may be embodied asany storage device, mechanism, or other physical structure for storingor transmitting information in a form readable by a machine (e.g., avolatile or non-volatile memory, a media disc, or other media device).

In the drawings, some structural or method features may be shown inspecific arrangements and/or orderings. However, it should beappreciated that such specific arrangements and/or orderings may not beutilized. Rather, in some embodiments, such features may be arranged ina different manner and/or order than shown in the illustrative figures.Additionally, the inclusion of a structural or method feature in aparticular figure is not meant to imply that such feature is utilized inall embodiments and, in some embodiments, may not be included or may becombined with other features.

Referring now to FIG. 1, a block diagram of a processing system 100,according to an embodiment. System 100 may be used in a single processordesktop system, a multiprocessor workstation system, or a server systemhaving a large number of processors 102 or processor cores 107. In oneembodiment, the system 100 is a processing platform incorporated withina system-on-a-chip (SoC) integrated circuit for use in mobile, handheld,or embedded devices such as within Internet-of-things (IoT) devices withwired or wireless connectivity to a local or wide area network.

In one embodiment, system 100 can include, couple with, or be integratedwithin: a server-based gaming platform; a game console, including a gameand media console; a mobile gaming console, a handheld game console, oran online game console. In some embodiments the system 100 is part of amobile phone, smart phone, tablet computing device or mobileInternet-connected device such as a laptop with low internal storagecapacity. Processing system 100 can also include, couple with, or beintegrated within: a wearable device, such as a smart watch wearabledevice; smart eyewear or clothing enhanced with augmented reality (AR)or virtual reality (VR) features to provide visual, audio or tactileoutputs to supplement real world visual, audio or tactile experiences orotherwise provide text, audio, graphics, video, holographic images orvideo, or tactile feedback; other augmented reality (AR) device; orother virtual reality (VR) device. In some embodiments, the processingsystem 100 includes or is part of a television or set top box device. Inone embodiment, system 100 can include, couple with, or be integratedwithin a self-driving vehicle such as a bus, tractor trailer, car, motoror electric power cycle, plane or glider (or any combination thereof).The self-driving vehicle may use system 100 to process the environmentsensed around the vehicle.

In some embodiments, the one or more processors 102 each include one ormore processor cores 107 to process instructions which, when executed,perform operations for system or user software. In some embodiments, atleast one of the one or more processor cores 107 is configured toprocess a specific instruction set 109. In some embodiments, instructionset 109 may facilitate Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC), ReducedInstruction Set Computing (RISC), or computing via a Very LongInstruction Word (VLIW). One or more processor cores 107 may process adifferent instruction set 109, which may include instructions tofacilitate the emulation of other instruction sets. Processor core 107may also include other processing devices, such as a Digital SignalProcessor (DSP).

In some embodiments, the processor 102 includes cache memory 104.Depending on the architecture, the processor 102 can have a singleinternal cache or multiple levels of internal cache. In someembodiments, the cache memory is shared among various components of theprocessor 102. In some embodiments, the processor 102 also uses anexternal cache (e.g., a Level-3 (L3) cache or Last Level Cache (LLC))(not shown), which may be shared among processor cores 107 using knowncache coherency techniques. A register file 106 can be additionallyincluded in processor 102 and may include different types of registersfor storing different types of data (e.g., integer registers, floatingpoint registers, status registers, and an instruction pointer register).Some registers may be general-purpose registers, while other registersmay be specific to the design of the processor 102.

In some embodiments, one or more processor(s) 102 are coupled with oneor more interface bus(es) 110 to transmit communication signals such asaddress, data, or control signals between processor 102 and othercomponents in the system 100. The interface bus 110, in one embodiment,can be a processor bus, such as a version of the Direct Media Interface(DMI) bus. However, processor busses are not limited to the DMI bus, andmay include one or more Peripheral Component Interconnect buses (e.g.,PCI, PCI express), memory busses, or other types of interface busses. Inone embodiment the processor(s) 102 include an integrated memorycontroller 116 and a platform controller hub 130. The memory controller116 facilitates communication between a memory device and othercomponents of the system 100, while the platform controller hub (PCH)130 provides connections to I/O devices via a local I/O bus.

The memory device 120 can be a dynamic random-access memory (DRAM)device, a static random-access memory (SRAM) device, flash memorydevice, phase-change memory device, or some other memory device havingsuitable performance to serve as process memory. In one embodiment thememory device 120 can operate as system memory for the system 100, tostore data 122 and instructions 121 for use when the one or moreprocessors 102 executes an application or process. Memory controller 116also couples with an optional external graphics processor 118, which maycommunicate with the one or more graphics processors 108 in processors102 to perform graphics and media operations. In some embodiments,graphics, media, and or compute operations may be assisted by anaccelerator 112 which is a coprocessor that can be configured to performa specialized set of graphics, media, or compute operations. Forexample, in one embodiment the accelerator 112 is a matrixmultiplication accelerator used to optimize machine learning or computeoperations. In one embodiment the accelerator 112 is a ray-tracingaccelerator that can be used to perform ray-tracing operations inconcert with the graphics processor 108. In one embodiment, an externalaccelerator 119 may be used in place of or in concert with theaccelerator 112.

In one embodiment, the accelerator 112 is a field programmable gatearray (FPGA). An FPGA refers to an integrated circuit (IC) including anarray of programmable logic blocks that can be configured to performsimple logic gates and/or complex combinatorial functions, and may alsoinclude memory elements. FPGAs are designed to be configured by acustomer or a designer after manufacturing. FPGAs can be used toaccelerate parts of an algorithm, sharing part of the computationbetween the FPGA and a general-purpose processor. In some embodiments,accelerator 112 is a GPU or an application-specific integrated circuit(ASIC). In some implementations, accelerator 112 is also referred to asa compute accelerator or a hardware accelerator.

In some embodiments a display device 111 can connect to the processor(s)102. The display device 111 can be one or more of an internal displaydevice, as in a mobile electronic device or a laptop device or anexternal display device attached via a display interface (e.g.,DisplayPort, etc.). In one embodiment the display device 111 can be ahead mounted display (HMD) such as a stereoscopic display device for usein virtual reality (VR) applications or augmented reality (AR)applications.

In some embodiments the platform controller hub 130 enables peripheralsto connect to memory device 120 and processor 102 via a high-speed I/Obus. The I/O peripherals include, but are not limited to, an audiocontroller 146, a network controller 134, a firmware interface 128, awireless transceiver 126, touch sensors 125, a data storage device 124(e.g., non-volatile memory, volatile memory, hard disk drive, flashmemory, NAND, 3D NAND, 3D XPoint, etc.). The data storage device 124 canconnect via a storage interface (e.g., SATA) or via a peripheral bus,such as a Peripheral Component Interconnect bus (e.g., PCI, PCIexpress). The touch sensors 125 can include touch screen sensors,pressure sensors, or fingerprint sensors. The wireless transceiver 126can be a Wi-Fi transceiver, a Bluetooth transceiver, or a mobile networktransceiver such as a 3G, 4G, 5G, or Long-Term Evolution (LTE)transceiver. The firmware interface 128 enables communication withsystem firmware, and can be, for example, a unified extensible firmwareinterface (UEFI). The network controller 134 can enable a networkconnection to a wired network. In some embodiments, a high-performancenetwork controller (not shown) couples with the interface bus 110. Theaudio controller 146, in one embodiment, is a multi-channel highdefinition audio controller. In one embodiment the system 100 includesan optional legacy I/O controller 140 for coupling legacy (e.g.,Personal System 2 (PS/2)) devices to the system. The platform controllerhub 130 can also connect to one or more Universal Serial Bus (USB)controllers 142 connect input devices, such as keyboard and mouse 143combinations, a camera 144, or other USB input devices.

It may be appreciated that the system 100 shown is one example and notlimiting, as other types of data processing systems that are differentlyconfigured may also be used. For example, an instance of the memorycontroller 116 and platform controller hub 130 may be integrated into adiscreet external graphics processor, such as the external graphicsprocessor 118. In one embodiment the platform controller hub 130 and/ormemory controller 116 may be external to the one or more processor(s)102. For example, the system 100 can include an external memorycontroller 116 and platform controller hub 130, which may be configuredas a memory controller hub and peripheral controller hub within a systemchipset that is in communication with the processor(s) 102.

For example, circuit boards (“sleds”) can be used on which componentssuch as CPUs, memory, and other components are placed are designed forincreased thermal performance. In some examples, processing componentssuch as the processors are located on a top side of a sled while nearmemory, such as DIMMs, are located on a bottom side of the sled. As aresult of the enhanced airflow provided by this design, the componentsmay operate at higher frequencies and power levels than in typicalsystems, thereby increasing performance. Furthermore, the sleds areconfigured to blindly mate with power and data communication cables in arack, thereby enhancing their ability to be quickly removed, upgraded,reinstalled, and/or replaced. Similarly, individual components locatedon the sleds, such as processors, accelerators, memory, and data storagedrives, are configured to be easily upgraded due to their increasedspacing from each other. In the illustrative embodiment, the componentsadditionally include hardware attestation features to prove theirauthenticity.

A data center can utilize a single network architecture (“fabric”) thatsupports multiple other network architectures including Ethernet andOmni-Path. The sleds can be coupled to switches via optical fibers,which provide higher bandwidth and lower latency than typical twistedpair cabling (e.g., Category 5, Category 5e, Category 6, etc.). Due tothe high bandwidth, low latency interconnections and networkarchitecture, the data center may, in use, pool resources, such asmemory, accelerators (e.g., graphics processing unit (GPUs), graphicsaccelerators, FPGAs, ASICs, neural network and/or artificialintelligence accelerators, etc.), and data storage drives that arephysically disaggregated, and provide them to compute resources (e.g.,processors) on an as needed basis, enabling the compute resources toaccess the pooled resources as if they were local.

A power supply or source can provide voltage and/or current to system100 or any component or system described herein. In one example, thepower supply includes an AC to DC (alternating current to directcurrent) adapter to plug into a wall outlet. Such AC power can berenewable energy (e.g., solar power) power source. In one example, powersource includes a DC power source, such as an external AC to DCconverter. In one example, power source or power supply includeswireless charging hardware to charge via proximity to a charging field.In one example, power source can include an internal battery,alternating current supply, motion-based power supply, solar powersupply, or fuel cell source.

FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagrams of an additional processing systemarchitecture provided by embodiments described herein. A computingdevice 200 for secure I/O with an accelerator device includes aprocessor 220 and an accelerator device 236, such as afield-programmable gate array (FPGA). In use, as described furtherbelow, a trusted execution environment (TEE) established by theprocessor 220 securely communicates data with the accelerator 236. Datamay be transferred using memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) transactions or directmemory access (DMA) transactions. For example, the TEE may perform anMMIO write transaction that includes encrypted data, and the accelerator236 decrypts the data and performs the write. As another example, theTEE may perform an MMIO read request transaction, and the accelerator236 may read the requested data, encrypt the data, and perform an MMIOread response transaction that includes the encrypted data. As yetanother example, the TEE may configure the accelerator 236 to perform aDMA operation, and the accelerator 236 performs a memory transfer,performs a cryptographic operation (i.e., encryption or decryption), andforwards the result. As described further below, the TEE and theaccelerator 236 generate authentication tags (ATs) for the transferreddata and may use those ATs to validate the transactions. The computingdevice 200 may thus keep untrusted software of the computing device 200,such as the operating system or virtual machine monitor, outside of thetrusted code base (TCB) of the TEE and the accelerator 236. Thus, thecomputing device 200 may secure data exchanged or otherwise processed bya TEE and an accelerator 236 from an owner of the computing device 200(e.g., a cloud service provider) or other tenants of the computingdevice 200. Accordingly, the computing device 200 may improve securityand performance for multi-tenant environments by allowing secure use ofaccelerator devices.

The computing device 200 may be embodied as any type of device capableof performing the functions described herein. For example, the computingdevice 200 may be embodied as, without limitation, a computer, a laptopcomputer, a tablet computer, a notebook computer, a mobile computingdevice, a smartphone, a wearable computing device, a multiprocessorsystem, a server, a workstation, and/or a consumer electronic device. Asshown in FIG. 2, the illustrative computing device 200 includes aprocessor 220, an I/O subsystem 224, a memory 230, and a data storagedevice 232. Additionally, in some embodiments, one or more of theillustrative components may be incorporated in, or otherwise form aportion of, another component. For example, the memory 230, or portionsthereof, may be incorporated in the processor 220 in some embodiments.

The processor 220 may be embodied as any type of processor capable ofperforming the functions described herein. For example, the processor220 may be embodied as a single or multi-core processor(s), digitalsignal processor, microcontroller, or other processor orprocessing/controlling circuit. As shown, the processor 220illustratively includes secure enclave support 222, which allows theprocessor 220 to establish a trusted execution environment known as asecure enclave, in which executing code may be measured, verified,and/or otherwise determined to be authentic. Additionally, code and dataincluded in the secure enclave may be encrypted or otherwise protectedfrom being accessed by code executing outside of the secure enclave. Forexample, code and data included in the secure enclave may be protectedby hardware protection mechanisms of the processor 220 while beingexecuted or while being stored in certain protected cache memory of theprocessor 220. The code and data included in the secure enclave may beencrypted when stored in a shared cache or the main memory 230. Thesecure enclave support 222 may be embodied as a set of processorinstruction extensions that allows the processor 220 to establish one ormore secure enclaves in the memory 230. For example, the secure enclavesupport 222 may be embodied as Intel® Software Guard Extensions (SGX)technology.

The memory 230 may be embodied as any type of volatile or non-volatilememory or data storage capable of performing the functions describedherein. In operation, the memory 230 may store various data and softwareused during operation of the computing device 200 such as operatingsystems, applications, programs, libraries, and drivers. As shown, thememory 230 may be communicatively coupled to the processor 220 via theI/O subsystem 224, which may be embodied as circuitry and/or componentsto facilitate input/output operations with the processor 220, the memory230, and other components of the computing device 200. For example, theI/O subsystem 224 may be embodied as, or otherwise include, memorycontroller hubs, input/output control hubs, sensor hubs, hostcontrollers, firmware devices, communication links (i.e., point-to-pointlinks, bus links, wires, cables, light guides, printed circuit boardtraces, etc.) and/or other components and subsystems to facilitate theinput/output operations. In some embodiments, the memory 230 may bedirectly coupled to the processor 220, for example via an integratedmemory controller hub. Additionally, in some embodiments, the I/Osubsystem 224 may form a portion of a system-on-a-chip (SoC) and beincorporated, along with the processor 220, the memory 230, theaccelerator device 236, and/or other components of the computing device200, on a single integrated circuit chip. Additionally, oralternatively, in some embodiments the processor 220 may include anintegrated memory controller and a system agent, which may be embodiedas a logic block in which data traffic from processor cores and I/Odevices converges before being sent to the memory 230.

As shown, the I/O subsystem 224 includes a direct memory access (DMA)engine 226 and a memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) engine 228. The processor 220,including secure enclaves established with the secure enclave support222, may communicate with the accelerator device 236 with one or moreDMA transactions using the DMA engine 226 and/or with one or more MMIOtransactions using the MMIO engine 228. The computing device 200 mayinclude multiple DMA engines 226 and/or MMIO engines 228 for handlingDMA and MMIO read/write transactions based on bandwidth between theprocessor 220 and the accelerator 236. Although illustrated as beingincluded in the I/O subsystem 224, it should be understood that in someembodiments the DMA engine 226 and/or the MMIO engine 228 may beincluded in other components of the computing device 200 (e.g., theprocessor 220, memory controller, or system agent), or in someembodiments may be embodied as separate components.

The data storage device 232 may be embodied as any type of device ordevices configured for short-term or long-term storage of data such as,for example, memory devices and circuits, memory cards, hard diskdrives, solid-state drives, non-volatile flash memory, or other datastorage devices. The computing device 200 may also include acommunications subsystem 234, which may be embodied as any communicationcircuit, device, or collection thereof, capable of enablingcommunications between the computing device 200 and other remote devicesover a computer network (not shown). The communications subsystem 234may be configured to use any one or more communication technology (e.g.,wired or wireless communications) and associated protocols (e.g.,Ethernet, Bluetooth®, WiMAX, 3G, 4G LTE, etc.) to effect suchcommunication.

The accelerator device 236 may be embodied as a field-programmable gatearray (FPGA), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), acoprocessor, or other digital logic device capable of performingaccelerated functions (e.g., accelerated application functions,accelerated network functions, or other accelerated functions).Illustratively, the accelerator device 236 is an FPGA, which may beembodied as an integrated circuit including programmable digital logicresources that may be configured after manufacture. The FPGA mayinclude, for example, a configurable array of logic blocks incommunication over a configurable data interchange. The acceleratordevice 236 may be coupled to the processor 220 via a high-speedconnection interface such as a peripheral bus (e.g., a PCI Express bus)or an inter-processor interconnect (e.g., an in-die interconnect (IDI)or QuickPath Interconnect (QPI)), or via any other appropriateinterconnect. The accelerator device 236 may receive data and/orcommands for processing from the processor 220 and return results datato the processor 220 via DMA, MIMIO, or other data transfertransactions.

As shown, the computing device 200 may further include one or moreperipheral devices 238. The peripheral devices 238 may include anynumber of additional input/output devices, interface devices, hardwareaccelerators, and/or other peripheral devices. For example, in someembodiments, the peripheral devices 238 may include a touch screen,graphics circuitry, a graphical processing unit (GPU) and/or processorgraphics, an audio device, a microphone, a camera, a keyboard, a mouse,a network interface, and/or other input/output devices, interfacedevices, and/or peripheral devices.

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)

Referring now to FIG. 3, an illustrative embodiment of afield-programmable gate array (FPGA) 300 is shown. As shown, the FPGA300 is one potential embodiment of an accelerator device 236 describedwith respect to FIG. 2. The illustratively FPGA 300 includes a secureMMIO engine 302, a secure DMA engine 304, one or more acceleratorfunctional units (AFUs) 306, and memory/registers 308. As describedfurther below, the secure MMIO engine 302 and the secure DMA engine 304perform in-line authenticated cryptographic operations on datatransferred between the processor 220 (e.g., a secure enclaveestablished by the processor) and the FPGA 300 (e.g., one or more AFUs306). In some embodiments, the secure MMIO engine 302 and/or the secureDMA engine 304 may intercept, filter, or otherwise process data trafficon one or more cache-coherent interconnects, internal buses, or otherinterconnects of the FPGA 300.

Each AFU 306 may be embodied as logic resources of the FPGA 300 that areconfigured to perform an acceleration task. Each AFU 306 may beassociated with an application executed by the computing device 100 in asecure enclave or other trusted execution environment. Each AFU 306 maybe configured or otherwise supplied by a tenant or other user of thecomputing device 100. For example, each AFU 306 may correspond to abitstream image programmed to the FPGA 300. As described further below,data processed by each AFU 306, including data exchanged with thetrusted execution environment, may be cryptographically protected fromuntrusted components of the computing device 100 (e.g., protected fromsoftware outside of the trusted code base of the tenant enclave). EachAFU 306 may access or otherwise process stored in the memory/registers308, which may be embodied as internal registers, cache, SRAM, storage,or other memory of the FPGA 300. In some embodiments, the memory 308 mayalso include external DRAM or other dedicated memory coupled to the FPGA300.

Computing Systems and Graphics Processors

FIGS. 4A-4D illustrate computing systems and graphics processorsprovided by embodiments described herein. The elements of FIGS. 4A-4Dhaving the same reference numbers (or names) as the elements of anyother figure herein can operate or function in any manner similar tothat described elsewhere herein, but are not limited to such.

In some implementations, a GPU is communicatively coupled tohost/processor cores to accelerate, for example, graphics operations,machine-learning operations, pattern analysis operations, and/or variousgeneral-purpose GPU (GPGPU) functions. The GPU may be communicativelycoupled to the host processor/cores over a bus or another interconnect(e.g., a high-speed interconnect such as PCIe or NVLink). Alternatively,the GPU may be integrated on the same package or chip as the cores andcommunicatively coupled to the cores over an internal processorbus/interconnect (i.e., internal to the package or chip). Regardless ofthe manner in which the GPU is connected, the processor cores mayallocate work to the GPU in the form of sequences ofcommands/instructions contained in a work descriptor. The GPU then usesdedicated circuitry/logic for efficiently processing thesecommands/instructions.

FIG. 4A is a block diagram of an embodiment of a processor 400 havingone or more processor cores 402A-402N, an integrated memory controller414, and an integrated graphics processor 408. Processor 400 can includeadditional cores up to and including additional core 402N represented bythe dashed lined boxes. Each of processor cores 402A-402N includes oneor more internal cache units 404A-404N. In some embodiments eachprocessor core also has access to one or more shared cached units 406.The internal cache units 404A-404N and shared cache units 406 representa cache memory hierarchy within the processor 400. The cache memoryhierarchy may include at least one level of instruction and data cachewithin each processor core and one or more levels of shared mid-levelcache, such as a Level 2 (L2), Level 3 (L3), Level 4 (L4), or otherlevels of cache, where the highest level of cache before external memoryis classified as the LLC. In some embodiments, cache coherency logicmaintains coherency between the various cache units 406 and 404A-404N.

In some embodiments, processor 400 may also include a set of one or morebus controller units 416 and a system agent core 410. The one or morebus controller units 416 manage a set of peripheral buses, such as oneor more PCI or PCI express busses. System agent core 410 providesmanagement functionality for the various processor components. In someembodiments, system agent core 410 includes one or more integratedmemory controllers 414 to manage access to various external memorydevices (not shown).

In some embodiments, one or more of the processor cores 402A-402Ninclude support for simultaneous multi-threading. In such embodiment,the system agent core 410 includes components for coordinating andoperating cores 402A-402N during multi-threaded processing. System agentcore 410 may additionally include a power control unit (PCU), whichincludes logic and components to regulate the power state of processorcores 402A-402N and graphics processor 408.

In some embodiments, processor 400 additionally includes graphicsprocessor 408 to execute graphics processing operations. In someembodiments, the graphics processor 408 couples with the set of sharedcache units 406, and the system agent core 410, including the one ormore integrated memory controllers 414. In some embodiments, the systemagent core 410 also includes a display controller 411 to drive graphicsprocessor output to one or more coupled displays. In some embodiments,display controller 411 may also be a separate module coupled with thegraphics processor via at least one interconnect, or may be integratedwithin the graphics processor 408.

In some embodiments, a ring-based interconnect unit 412 is used tocouple the internal components of the processor 400. However, analternative interconnect unit may be used, such as a point-to-pointinterconnect, a switched interconnect, or other techniques, includingtechniques well known in the art. In some embodiments, graphicsprocessor 408 couples with the ring interconnect 412 via an I/O link413.

The example I/O link 413 represents at least one of multiple varietiesof I/O interconnects, including an on package I/O interconnect whichfacilitates communication between various processor components and ahigh-performance embedded memory module 418, such as an eDRAM module. Insome embodiments, each of the processor cores 402A-402N and graphicsprocessor 408 can use embedded memory modules 418 as a shared Last LevelCache.

In some embodiments, processor cores 402A-402N are homogenous coresexecuting the same instruction set architecture. In another embodiment,processor cores 402A-402N are heterogeneous in terms of instruction setarchitecture (ISA), where one or more of processor cores 402A-402Nexecute a first instruction set, while at least one of the other coresexecutes a subset of the first instruction set or a differentinstruction set. In one embodiment, processor cores 402A-402N areheterogeneous in terms of microarchitecture, where one or more coreshaving a relatively higher power consumption couple with one or morepower cores having a lower power consumption. In one embodiment,processor cores 402A-402N are heterogeneous in terms of computationalcapability. Additionally, processor 400 can be implemented on one ormore chips or as an SoC integrated circuit having the illustratedcomponents, in addition to other components.

FIG. 4B is a block diagram of hardware logic of a graphics processorcore 419, according to some embodiments described herein. Elements ofFIG. 4B having the same reference numbers (or names) as the elements ofany other figure herein can operate or function in any manner similar tothat described elsewhere herein, but are not limited to such. Thegraphics processor core 419, sometimes referred to as a core slice, canbe one or multiple graphics cores within a modular graphics processor.The graphics processor core 419 is an example of one graphics coreslice, and a graphics processor as described herein may include multiplegraphics core slices based on target power and performance envelopes.Each graphics processor core 419 can include a fixed function block 430coupled with multiple sub-cores 421A-421F, also referred to assub-slices, that include modular blocks of general-purpose and fixedfunction logic.

In some embodiments, the fixed function block 430 includes ageometry/fixed function pipeline 431 that can be shared by all sub-coresin the graphics processor core 419, for example, in lower performanceand/or lower power graphics processor implementations. In variousembodiments, the geometry/fixed function pipeline 431 includes a 3Dfixed function, a video front-end unit, a thread spawner and threaddispatcher, and a unified return buffer manager, which manages unifiedreturn buffers.

In one embodiment the fixed function block 430 also includes a graphicsSoC interface 432, a graphics microcontroller 433, and a media pipeline434. The graphics SoC interface 432 provides an interface between thegraphics processor core 419 and other processor cores within a system ona chip integrated circuit. The graphics microcontroller 433 is aprogrammable sub-processor that is configurable to manage variousfunctions of the graphics processor core 419, including thread dispatch,scheduling, and pre-emption. The media pipeline 434 includes logic tofacilitate the decoding, encoding, pre-processing, and/orpost-processing of multimedia data, including image and video data. Themedia pipeline 434 implement media operations via requests to compute orsampling logic within the sub-cores 421-421F.

In one embodiment the SoC interface 432 enables the graphics processorcore 419 to communicate with general-purpose application processor cores(e.g., CPUs) and/or other components within an SoC, including memoryhierarchy elements such as a shared last level cache memory, the systemRAM, and/or embedded on-chip or on-package DRAM. The SoC interface 432can also enable communication with fixed function devices within theSoC, such as camera imaging pipelines, and enables the use of and/orimplements global memory atomics that may be shared between the graphicsprocessor core 419 and CPUs within the SoC. The SoC interface 432 canalso implement power management controls for the graphics processor core419 and enable an interface between a clock domain of the graphic core419 and other clock domains within the SoC. In one embodiment the SoCinterface 432 enables receipt of command buffers from a command streamerand global thread dispatcher that are configured to provide commands andinstructions to each of one or more graphics cores within a graphicsprocessor. The commands and instructions can be dispatched to the mediapipeline 434, when media operations are to be performed, or a geometryand fixed function pipeline (e.g., geometry and fixed function pipeline431, geometry and fixed function pipeline 437) when graphics processingoperations are to be performed.

The graphics microcontroller 433 can be configured to perform variousscheduling and management tasks for the graphics processor core 419. Inone embodiment the graphics microcontroller 433 can perform graphicsand/or compute workload scheduling on the various graphics parallelengines within execution unit (EU) arrays 422A-422F, 424A-424F withinthe sub-cores 421A-421F. In this scheduling model, host softwareexecuting on a CPU core of an SoC including the graphics processor core419 can submit workloads one of multiple graphic processor doorbells,which invokes a scheduling operation on the appropriate graphics engine.Scheduling operations include determining which workload to run next,submitting a workload to a command streamer, pre-empting existingworkloads running on an engine, monitoring progress of a workload, andnotifying host software when a workload is complete. In one embodimentthe graphics microcontroller 433 can also facilitate low-power or idlestates for the graphics processor core 419, providing the graphicsprocessor core 419 with the ability to save and restore registers withinthe graphics processor core 419 across low-power state transitionsindependently from the operating system and/or graphics driver softwareon the system.

The graphics processor core 419 may have greater than or fewer than theillustrated sub-cores 421A-421F, up to N modular sub-cores. For each setof N sub-cores, the graphics processor core 419 can also include sharedfunction logic 435, shared and/or cache memory 436, a geometry/fixedfunction pipeline 437, as well as additional fixed function logic 438 toaccelerate various graphics and compute processing operations. Theshared function logic 435 can include logic units associated with theshared function logic (e.g., sampler, math, and/or inter-threadcommunication logic) that can be shared by each N sub-cores within thegraphics processor core 419. The shared and/or cache memory 436 can be alast-level cache for the set of N sub-cores 421A-421F within thegraphics processor core 419, and can also serve as shared memory that isaccessible by multiple sub-cores. The geometry/fixed function pipeline437 can be included instead of the geometry/fixed function pipeline 431within the fixed function block 430 and can include the same or similarlogic units.

In one embodiment the graphics processor core 419 includes additionalfixed function logic 438 that can include various fixed functionacceleration logic for use by the graphics processor core 419. In oneembodiment the additional fixed function logic 438 includes anadditional geometry pipeline for use in position only shading. Inposition-only shading, two geometry pipelines exist, the full geometrypipeline within the geometry/fixed function pipeline 438, 431, and acull pipeline, which is an additional geometry pipeline which may beincluded within the additional fixed function logic 438. In oneembodiment the cull pipeline is a trimmed down version of the fullgeometry pipeline. The full pipeline and the cull pipeline can executedifferent instances of the same application, each instance having aseparate context. Position only shading can hide long cull runs ofdiscarded triangles, enabling shading to be completed earlier in someinstances. For example, and in one embodiment, the cull pipeline logicwithin the additional fixed function logic 438 can execute positionshaders in parallel with the main application and generally generatesresults faster than the full pipeline, as the cull pipeline fetches andshades the position attribute of the vertices, without performingrasterization and rendering of the pixels to the frame buffer. The cullpipeline can use the generated results to compute visibility informationfor all the triangles without regard to whether those triangles areculled. The full pipeline (which in this instance may be referred to asa replay pipeline) can consume the visibility information to skip theculled triangles to shade the visible triangles that are finally passedto the rasterization phase.

In one embodiment the additional fixed function logic 438 can alsoinclude machine-learning acceleration logic, such as fixed functionmatrix multiplication logic, for implementations including optimizationsfor machine learning training or inferencing.

Within each graphics sub-core 421A-421F includes a set of executionresources that may be used to perform graphics, media, and computeoperations in response to requests by graphics pipeline, media pipeline,or shader programs. The graphics sub-cores 421A-421F include multiple EUarrays 422A-422F, 424A-424F, thread dispatch and inter-threadcommunication (TD/IC) logic 423A-423F, a 3D (e.g., texture) sampler425A-425F, a media sampler 406A-406F, a shader processor 427A-427F, andshared local memory (SLM) 428A-428F. The EU arrays 422A-422F, 424A-424Feach include multiple execution units, which are general-purposegraphics processing units capable of performing floating-point andinteger/fixed-point logic operations in service of a graphics, media, orcompute operation, including graphics, media, or compute shaderprograms. The TD/IC logic 423A-423F performs local thread dispatch andthread control operations for the execution units within a sub-core andfacilitate communication between threads executing on the executionunits of the sub-core. The 3D sampler 425A-425F can read texture orother 3D graphics related data into memory. The 3D sampler can readtexture data differently based on a configured sample state and thetexture format associated with a given texture. The media sampler406A-406F can perform similar read operations based on the type andformat associated with media data. In one embodiment, each graphicssub-core 421A-421F can alternately include a unified 3D and mediasampler. Threads executing on the execution units within each of thesub-cores 421A-421F can make use of shared local memory 428A-428F withineach sub-core, to enable threads executing within a thread group toexecute using a common pool of on-chip memory.

FIG. 4C illustrates a graphics processing unit (GPU) 439 that includesdedicated sets of graphics processing resources arranged into multi-coregroups 440A-440N. While the details of a single multi-core group 440Aare provided, it may be appreciated that the other multi-core groups440B-440N may be equipped with the same or similar sets of graphicsprocessing resources.

As illustrated, a multi-core group 440A may include a set of graphicscores 443, a set of tensor cores 444, and a set of ray tracing cores445. A scheduler/dispatcher 441 schedules and dispatches the graphicsthreads for execution on the various cores 443, 444, 445. A set ofregister files 442 store operand values used by the cores 443, 444, 445when executing the graphics threads. These may include, for example,integer registers for storing integer values, floating point registersfor storing floating point values, vector registers for storing packeddata elements (integer and/or floating point data elements) and tileregisters for storing tensor/matrix values. In one embodiment, the tileregisters are implemented as combined sets of vector registers.

One or more combined level 1 (L1) caches and shared memory units 447store graphics data such as texture data, vertex data, pixel data, raydata, bounding volume data, etc., locally within each multi-core group440A. One or more texture units 447 can also be used to performtexturing operations, such as texture mapping and sampling. A Level 2(L2) cache 453 shared by all or a subset of the multi-core groups440A-440N stores graphics data and/or instructions for multipleconcurrent graphics threads. As illustrated, the L2 cache 453 may beshared across a plurality of multi-core groups 440A-440N. One or morememory controllers 448 couple the GPU 439 to a memory 449 which may be asystem memory (e.g., DRAM) and/or a dedicated graphics memory (e.g.,GDDR6 memory).

Input/output (I/O) circuitry 450 couples the GPU 439 to one or more I/Odevices 452 such as digital signal processors (DSPs), networkcontrollers, or user input devices. An on-chip interconnect may be usedto couple the I/O devices 454 to the GPU 439 and memory 449. One or moreI/O memory management units (IOMMUs) 451 of the I/O circuitry 450 couplethe I/O devices 452 directly to the system memory 449. In oneembodiment, the IOMMU 451 manages multiple sets of page tables to mapvirtual addresses to physical addresses in system memory 449. In thisembodiment, the I/O devices 452, CPU(s) 446, and GPU(s) 439 may sharethe same virtual address space.

In one implementation, the IOMMU 451 supports virtualization. In thiscase, it may manage a first set of page tables to map guest/graphicsvirtual addresses to guest/graphics physical addresses and a second setof page tables to map the guest/graphics physical addresses tosystem/host physical addresses (e.g., within system memory 449). Thebase addresses of each of the first and second sets of page tables maybe stored in control registers and swapped out on a context switch(e.g., so that the new context is provided with access to the relevantset of page tables). While not illustrated in FIG. 4C, each of the cores443, 444, 445 and/or multi-core groups 440A-440N may include translationlookaside buffers (TLBs) to cache guest virtual to guest physicaltranslations, guest physical to host physical translations, and guestvirtual to host physical translations.

In one embodiment, the CPUs 446, GPUs 439, and I/O devices 452 areintegrated on a single semiconductor chip and/or chip package. Theillustrated memory 449 may be integrated on the same chip or may becoupled to the memory controllers 448 via an off-chip interface. In oneimplementation, the memory 449 comprises GDDR6 memory which shares thesame virtual address space as other physical system-level memories,although the underlying principles of implementations of the disclosureare not limited to this specific implementation.

In one embodiment, the tensor cores 444 include a plurality of executionunits specifically designed to perform matrix operations, which are thecompute operations used to perform deep learning operations. Forexample, simultaneous matrix multiplication operations may be used forneural network training and inferencing. The tensor cores 444 mayperform matrix processing using a variety of operand precisionsincluding single precision floating-point (e.g., 32 bits),half-precision floating point (e.g., 16 bits), integer words (16 bits),bytes (8 bits), and half-bytes (4 bits). In one embodiment, a neuralnetwork implementation extracts features of each rendered scene,potentially combining details from multiple frames, to construct ahigh-quality final image.

In deep learning implementations, parallel matrix multiplication workmay be scheduled for execution on the tensor cores 444. The training ofneural networks, in particular, utilizes a significant number matrix dotproduct operations. In order to process an inner-product formulation ofan N×N×N matrix multiply, the tensor cores 444 may include at least Ndot-product processing elements. Before the matrix multiply begins, oneentire matrix is loaded into tile registers and at least one column of asecond matrix is loaded each cycle for N cycles. Each cycle, there are Ndot products that are processed.

Matrix elements may be stored at different precisions depending on theparticular implementation, including 16-bit words, 8-bit bytes (e.g.,INT8) and 4-bit half-bytes (e.g., INT4). Different precision modes maybe specified for the tensor cores 444 to ensure that the most efficientprecision is used for different workloads (e.g., such as inferencingworkloads which can tolerate quantization to bytes and half-bytes).

In one embodiment, the ray tracing cores 445 accelerate ray tracingoperations for both real-time ray tracing and non-real-time ray tracingimplementations. In particular, the ray tracing cores 445 include raytraversal/intersection circuitry for performing ray traversal usingbounding volume hierarchies (BVHs) and identifying intersections betweenrays and primitives enclosed within the BVH volumes. The ray tracingcores 445 may also include circuitry for performing depth testing andculling (e.g., using a Z buffer or similar arrangement). In oneimplementation, the ray tracing cores 445 perform traversal andintersection operations in concert with the image denoising techniquesdescribed herein, at least a portion of which may be executed on thetensor cores 444. For example, in one embodiment, the tensor cores 444implement a deep learning neural network to perform denoising of framesgenerated by the ray tracing cores 445. However, the CPU(s) 446,graphics cores 443, and/or ray tracing cores 445 may also implement allor a portion of the denoising and/or deep learning algorithms.

In addition, as described above, a distributed approach to denoising maybe employed in which the GPU 439 is in a computing device coupled toother computing devices over a network or high speed interconnect. Inthis embodiment, the interconnected computing devices share neuralnetwork learning/training data to improve the speed with which theoverall system learns to perform denoising for different types of imageframes and/or different graphics applications.

In one embodiment, the ray tracing cores 445 process all BVH traversaland ray-primitive intersections, saving the graphics cores 443 frombeing overloaded with thousands of instructions per ray. In oneembodiment, each ray tracing core 445 includes a first set ofspecialized circuitry for performing bounding box tests (e.g., fortraversal operations) and a second set of specialized circuitry forperforming the ray-triangle intersection tests (e.g., intersecting rayswhich have been traversed). Thus, in one embodiment, the multi-coregroup 440A can simply launch a ray probe, and the ray tracing cores 445independently perform ray traversal and intersection and return hit data(e.g., a hit, no hit, multiple hits, etc.) to the thread context. Theother cores 443, 444 are freed to perform other graphics or compute workwhile the ray tracing cores 445 perform the traversal and intersectionoperations.

In one embodiment, each ray tracing core 445 includes a traversal unitto perform BVH testing operations and an intersection unit whichperforms ray-primitive intersection tests. The intersection unitgenerates a “hit”, “no hit”, or “multiple hit” response, which itprovides to the appropriate thread. During the traversal andintersection operations, the execution resources of the other cores(e.g., graphics cores 443 and tensor cores 444) are freed to performother forms of graphics work.

In one particular embodiment described below, a hybrid rasterization/raytracing approach is used in which work is distributed between thegraphics cores 443 and ray tracing cores 445.

In one embodiment, the ray tracing cores 445 (and/or other cores 443,444) include hardware support for a ray tracing instruction set such asMicrosoft's DirectX Ray Tracing (DXR) which includes a DispatchRayscommand, as well as ray-generation, closest-hit, any-hit, and missshaders, which enable the assignment of unique sets of shaders andtextures for each object. Another ray tracing platform which may besupported by the ray tracing cores 445, graphics cores 443 and tensorcores 444 is Vulkan 1.1.85. Note, however, that the underlyingprinciples of implementations of the disclosure are not limited to anyparticular ray tracing ISA.

In general, the various cores 445, 444, 443 may support a ray tracinginstruction set that includes instructions/functions for ray generation,closest hit, any hit, ray-primitive intersection, per-primitive andhierarchical bounding box construction, miss, visit, and exceptions.More specifically, one embodiment includes ray tracing instructions toperform the following functions:

Ray Generation—Ray generation instructions may be executed for eachpixel, sample, or other user-defined work assignment.

Closest Hit—A closest hit instruction may be executed to locate theclosest intersection point of a ray with primitives within a scene.

Any Hit—An any hit instruction identifies multiple intersections betweena ray and primitives within a scene, potentially to identify a newclosest intersection point.

Intersection—An intersection instruction performs a ray-primitiveintersection test and outputs a result.

Per-primitive Bounding box Construction—This instruction builds abounding box around a given primitive or group of primitives (e.g., whenbuilding a new BVH or other acceleration data structure).

Miss—Indicates that a ray misses all geometry within a scene, orspecified region of a scene.

Visit—Indicates the children volumes a ray can traverse.

Exceptions—Includes various types of exception handlers (e.g., invokedfor various error conditions).

FIG. 4D is a block diagram of general purpose graphics processing unit(GPGPU) 470 that can be configured as a graphics processor and/orcompute accelerator, according to embodiments described herein. TheGPGPU 470 can interconnect with host processors (e.g., one or moreCPU(s) 446) and memory 471, 472 via one or more system and/or memorybusses. In one embodiment the memory 471 is system memory that may beshared with the one or more CPU(s) 446, while memory 472 is devicememory that is dedicated to the GPGPU 470. In one embodiment, componentswithin the GPGPU 470 and device memory 472 may be mapped into memoryaddresses that are accessible to the one or more CPU(s) 446. Access tomemory 471 and 472 may be facilitated via a memory controller 468. Inone embodiment the memory controller 468 includes an internal directmemory access (DMA) controller 469 or can include logic to performoperations that would otherwise be performed by a DMA controller.

The GPGPU 470 includes multiple cache memories, including an L2 cache453, L1 cache 454, an instruction cache 455, and shared memory 456, atleast a portion of which may also be partitioned as a cache memory. TheGPGPU 470 also includes multiple compute units 460A-460N. Each computeunit 460A-460N includes a set of vector registers 461, scalar registers462, vector logic units 463, and scalar logic units 464. The computeunits 460A-460N can also include local shared memory 465 and a programcounter 466. The compute units 460A-460N can couple with a constantcache 467, which can be used to store constant data, which is data thatmay not change during the run of kernel or shader program that executeson the GPGPU 470. In one embodiment the constant cache 467 is a scalardata cache and cached data can be fetched directly into the scalarregisters 462.

During operation, the one or more CPU(s) 446 can write commands intoregisters or memory in the GPGPU 470 that has been mapped into anaccessible address space. The command processors 457 can read thecommands from registers or memory and determine how those commands canbe processed within the GPGPU 470. A thread dispatcher 458 can then beused to dispatch threads to the compute units 460A-460N to perform thosecommands. Each compute unit 460A-460N can execute threads independentlyof the other compute units. Additionally, each compute unit 460A-460Ncan be independently configured for conditional computation and canconditionally output the results of computation to memory. The commandprocessors 457 can interrupt the one or more CPU(s) 446 when thesubmitted commands are complete.

Graphics Software Architecture

FIG. 5 illustrates an example graphics software architecture for a dataprocessing system 500 according to some embodiments. In someembodiments, software architecture includes a 3D graphics application510, an operating system 520, and at least one processor 530. In someembodiments, processor 530 includes a graphics processor 532 and one ormore general-purpose processor core(s) 534. The graphics application 510and operating system 520 each execute in the system memory 550 of thedata processing system.

In some embodiments, 3D graphics application 510 contains one or moreshader programs including shader instructions 512. The shader languageinstructions may be in a high-level shader language, such as theHigh-Level Shader Language (HLSL) of Direct3D, the OpenGL ShaderLanguage (GLSL), and so forth. The application also includes executableinstructions 514 in a machine language suitable for execution by thegeneral-purpose processor core 534. The application also includesgraphics objects 516 defined by vertex data.

In some embodiments, operating system 520 is a Microsoft® Windows®operating system from the Microsoft Corporation, a proprietary UNIX-likeoperating system, or an open source UNIX-like operating system using avariant of the Linux kernel. The operating system 520 can support agraphics API 522 such as the Direct3D API, the OpenGL API, or the VulkanAPI. When the Direct3D API is in use, the operating system 520 uses afront-end shader compiler 524 to compile any shader instructions 512 inHLSL into a lower-level shader language. The compilation may be ajust-in-time (JIT) compilation or the application can perform shaderpre-compilation. In some embodiments, high-level shaders are compiledinto low-level shaders during the compilation of the 3D graphicsapplication 510. In some embodiments, the shader instructions 512 areprovided in an intermediate form, such as a version of the StandardPortable Intermediate Representation (SPIR) used by the Vulkan API.

In some embodiments, user mode graphics driver 526 contains a back-endshader compiler 527 to convert the shader instructions 512 into ahardware specific representation. When the OpenGL API is in use, shaderinstructions 512 in the GLSL high-level language are passed to a usermode graphics driver 526 for compilation. In some embodiments, user modegraphics driver 526 uses operating system kernel mode functions 528 tocommunicate with a kernel mode graphics driver 529. In some embodiments,kernel mode graphics driver 529 communicates with graphics processor 532to dispatch commands and instructions.

IP Core Implementations

One or more aspects of at least one embodiment may be implemented byrepresentative code stored on a machine-readable medium which representsand/or defines logic within an integrated circuit such as a processor.For example, the machine-readable medium may include instructions whichrepresent various logic within the processor. When read by a machine,the instructions may cause the machine to fabricate the logic to performthe techniques described herein. Such representations, known as “IPcores,” are reusable units of logic for an integrated circuit that maybe stored on a tangible, machine-readable medium as a hardware modelthat describes the structure of the integrated circuit. The hardwaremodel may be supplied to various customers or manufacturing facilities,which load the hardware model on fabrication machines that manufacturethe integrated circuit. The integrated circuit may be fabricated suchthat the circuit performs operations described in association with anyof the embodiments described herein.

FIG. 6A is a block diagram illustrating an IP core development system600 that may be used to manufacture an integrated circuit to performoperations according to an embodiment. The IP core development system600 may be used to generate modular, re-usable designs that can beincorporated into a larger design or used to construct an entireintegrated circuit (e.g., an SOC integrated circuit). A design facility630 can generate a software simulation 610 of an IP core design in ahigh-level programming language (e.g., C/C++). The software simulation610 can be used to design, test, and verify the behavior of the IP coreusing a simulation model 612. The simulation model 612 may includefunctional, behavioral, and/or timing simulations. A register transferlevel (RTL) design 615 can then be created or synthesized from thesimulation model 612. The RTL design 615 is an abstraction of thebehavior of the integrated circuit that models the flow of digitalsignals between hardware registers, including the associated logicperformed using the modeled digital signals. In addition to an RTLdesign 615, lower-level designs at the logic level or transistor levelmay also be created, designed, or synthesized. Thus, the particulardetails of the initial design and simulation may vary.

The RTL design 615 or equivalent may be further synthesized by thedesign facility into a hardware model 620, which may be in a hardwaredescription language (HDL), or some other representation of physicaldesign data. The HDL may be further simulated or tested to verify the IPcore design. The IP core design can be stored for delivery to a 3rdparty fabrication facility 665 using non-volatile memory 640 (e.g., harddisk, flash memory, or any non-volatile storage medium). Alternatively,the IP core design may be transmitted (e.g., via the Internet) over awired connection 650 or wireless connection 660. The fabricationfacility 665 may then fabricate an integrated circuit that is based atleast in part on the IP core design. The fabricated integrated circuitcan be configured to perform operations in accordance with at least oneembodiment described herein.

FIG. 6B illustrates a cross-section side view of an integrated circuitpackage assembly 670, according to some embodiments described herein.The integrated circuit package assembly 670 illustrates animplementation of one or more processor or accelerator devices asdescribed herein. The package assembly 670 includes multiple units ofhardware logic 672, 674 connected to a substrate 680. The logic 672, 674may be implemented at least partly in configurable logic orfixed-functionality logic hardware, and can include one or more portionsof any of the processor core(s), graphics processor(s), or otheraccelerator devices described herein. Each unit of logic 672, 674 can beimplemented within a semiconductor die and coupled with the substrate680 via an interconnect structure 673. The interconnect structure 673may be configured to route electrical signals between the logic 672, 674and the substrate 680, and can include interconnects such as, but notlimited to bumps or pillars. In some embodiments, the interconnectstructure 673 may be configured to route electrical signals such as, forexample, input/output (I/O) signals and/or power or ground signalsassociated with the operation of the logic 672, 674. In someembodiments, the substrate 680 is an epoxy-based laminate substrate. Thesubstrate 680 may include other suitable types of substrates in otherembodiments. The package assembly 670 can be connected to otherelectrical devices via a package interconnect 683. The packageinterconnect 683 may be coupled to a surface of the substrate 680 toroute electrical signals to other electrical devices, such as amotherboard, other chipset, or multi-chip module.

In some embodiments, the units of logic 672, 674 are electricallycoupled with a bridge 682 that is configured to route electrical signalsbetween the logic 672, 674. The bridge 682 may be a dense interconnectstructure that provides a route for electrical signals. The bridge 682may include a bridge substrate composed of glass or a suitablesemiconductor material. Electrical routing features can be formed on thebridge substrate to provide a chip-to-chip connection between the logic672, 674.

Although two units of logic 672, 674 and a bridge 682 are illustrated,embodiments described herein may include more or fewer logic units onone or more dies. The one or more dies may be connected by zero or morebridges, as the bridge 682 may be excluded when the logic is included ona single die. Alternatively, multiple dies or units of logic can beconnected by one or more bridges. Additionally, multiple logic units,dies, and bridges can be connected together in other possibleconfigurations, including three-dimensional configurations.

FIG. 6C illustrates a package assembly 690 that includes multiple unitsof hardware logic chiplets connected to a substrate 680 (e.g., basedie). A graphics processing unit, parallel processor, and/or computeaccelerator as described herein can be composed from diverse siliconchiplets that are separately manufactured. In this context, a chiplet isan at least partially packaged integrated circuit that includes distinctunits of logic that can be assembled with other chiplets into a largerpackage. A diverse set of chiplets with different IP core logic can beassembled into a single device. Additionally, the chiplets can beintegrated into a base die or base chiplet using active interposertechnology. The concepts described herein enable the interconnection andcommunication between the different forms of IP within the GPU. IP corescan be manufactured using different process technologies and composedduring manufacturing, which avoids the complexity of converging multipleIPs, especially on a large SoC with several flavors IPs, to the samemanufacturing process. Enabling the use of multiple process technologiesimproves the time to market and provides a cost-effective way to createmultiple product SKUs. Additionally, the disaggregated IPs are moreamenable to being power gated independently, components that are not inuse on a given workload can be powered off, reducing overall powerconsumption.

The hardware logic chiplets can include special purpose hardware logicchiplets 672, logic or I/O chiplets 674, and/or memory chiplets 675. Thehardware logic chiplets 672 and logic or I/O chiplets 674 may beimplemented at least partly in configurable logic or fixed-functionalitylogic hardware and can include one or more portions of any of theprocessor core(s), graphics processor(s), parallel processors, or otheraccelerator devices described herein. The memory chiplets 675 can beDRAM (e.g., GDDR, HBM) memory or cache (SRAM) memory.

Each chiplet can be fabricated as separate semiconductor die and coupledwith the substrate 680 via an interconnect structure 673. Theinterconnect structure 673 may be configured to route electrical signalsbetween the various chiplets and logic within the substrate 680. Theinterconnect structure 673 can include interconnects such as, but notlimited to bumps or pillars. In some embodiments, the interconnectstructure 673 may be configured to route electrical signals such as, forexample, input/output (I/O) signals and/or power or ground signalsassociated with the operation of the logic, I/O and memory chiplets.

In some embodiments, the substrate 680 is an epoxy-based laminatesubstrate. The substrate 680 may include other suitable types ofsubstrates in other embodiments. The package assembly 690 can beconnected to other electrical devices via a package interconnect 683.The package interconnect 683 may be coupled to a surface of thesubstrate 680 to route electrical signals to other electrical devices,such as a motherboard, other chipset, or multi-chip module.

In some embodiments, a logic or I/O chiplet 674 and a memory chiplet 675can be electrically coupled via a bridge 687 that is configured to routeelectrical signals between the logic or I/O chiplet 674 and a memorychiplet 675. The bridge 687 may be a dense interconnect structure thatprovides a route for electrical signals. The bridge 687 may include abridge substrate composed of glass or a suitable semiconductor material.Electrical routing features can be formed on the bridge substrate toprovide a chip-to-chip connection between the logic or I/O chiplet 674and a memory chiplet 675. The bridge 687 may also be referred to as asilicon bridge or an interconnect bridge. For example, the bridge 687,in some embodiments, is an Embedded Multi-die Interconnect Bridge(EMIB). In some embodiments, the bridge 687 may simply be a directconnection from one chiplet to another chiplet.

The substrate 680 can include hardware components for I/O 691, cachememory 692, and other hardware logic 693. A fabric 685 can be embeddedin the substrate 680 to enable communication between the various logicchiplets and the logic 691, 693 within the substrate 680. In oneembodiment, the I/O 691, fabric 685, cache, bridge, and other hardwarelogic 693 can be integrated into a base die that is layered on top ofthe substrate 680. The fabric 685 may be a network on a chipinterconnect or another form of packet switched fabric that switchesdata packets between components of the package assembly.

In various embodiments a package assembly 690 can include fewer orgreater number of components and chiplets that are interconnected by afabric 685 or one or more bridges 687. The chiplets within the packageassembly 690 may be arranged in a 3D or 2.5D arrangement. In general,bridge structures 687 may be used to facilitate a point to pointinterconnect between, for example, logic or I/O chiplets and memorychiplets. The fabric 685 can be used to interconnect the various logicand/or I/O chiplets (e.g., chiplets 672, 674, 691, 693). with otherlogic and/or I/O chiplets. In one embodiment, the cache memory 692within the substrate can act as a global cache for the package assembly690, part of a distributed global cache, or as a dedicated cache for thefabric 685.

FIG. 6D illustrates a package assembly 694 including interchangeablechiplets 695, according to an embodiment. The interchangeable chiplets695 can be assembled into standardized slots on one or more basechiplets 696, 698. The base chiplets 696, 698 can be coupled via abridge interconnect 697, which can be similar to the other bridgeinterconnects described herein and may be, for example, an EMIB. Memorychiplets can also be connected to logic or I/O chiplets via a bridgeinterconnect. I/O and logic chiplets can communicate via an interconnectfabric. The base chiplets can each support one or more slots in astandardized format for one of logic or I/O or memory/cache.

In one embodiment, SRAM and power delivery circuits can be fabricatedinto one or more of the base chiplets 696, 698, which can be fabricatedusing a different process technology relative to the interchangeablechiplets 695 that are stacked on top of the base chiplets. For example,the base chiplets 696, 698 can be fabricated using a larger processtechnology, while the interchangeable chiplets can be manufactured usinga smaller process technology. One or more of the interchangeablechiplets 695 may be memory (e.g., DRAM) chiplets. Different memorydensities can be selected for the package assembly 694 based on thepower, and/or performance targeted for the product that uses the packageassembly 694. Additionally, logic chiplets with a different number oftype of functional units can be selected at time of assembly based onthe power, and/or performance targeted for the product. Additionally,chiplets containing IP logic cores of differing types can be insertedinto the interchangeable chiplet slots, enabling hybrid processordesigns that can mix and match different technology IP blocks.

Example System on a Chip Integrated Circuit

FIG. 7 illustrates an example integrated circuits and associatedgraphics processors that may be fabricated using one or more IP cores,according to various embodiments described herein. In addition to whatis illustrated, other logic and circuits may be included, includingadditional graphics processors/cores, peripheral interface controllers,or general-purpose processor cores.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram illustrating an example system on a chipintegrated circuit 700 that may be fabricated using one or more IPcores, according to an embodiment. Example integrated circuit 700includes one or more application processor(s) 705 (e.g., CPUs), at leastone graphics processor 710, and may additionally include an imageprocessor 715 and/or a video processor 720, any of which may be amodular IP core from the same or multiple different design facilities.Integrated circuit 700 includes peripheral or bus logic including a USBcontroller 725, UART controller 730, an SPI/SDIO controller 735, and anI²S/I²C controller 740. Additionally, the integrated circuit can includea display device 745 coupled to one or more of a high-definitionmultimedia interface (HDMI) controller 750 and a mobile industryprocessor interface (MIPI) display interface 755. Storage may beprovided by a flash memory subsystem 760 including flash memory and aflash memory controller. Memory interface may be provided via a memorycontroller 765 for access to SDRAM or SRAM memory devices. Someintegrated circuits additionally include an embedded security engine770.

Disaggregate Computing for Distributed Confidential ComputingEnvironment

As previously described, disaggregated computing is on the rise in datacenters. Cloud service providers (CSP) are deploying solutions whereprocessing of a workload is distributed on disaggregated computeresources, such as CPUs, GPUs, and hardware accelerators (includingfield programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)), that are connected via anetwork instead of being on the same platform and connected via physicallinks such as peripheral component interconnect express (PCIe).Disaggregated computing enables improved resource utilization and lowersownership costs by enabling more efficient use of available resources.Disaggregated computing also enables pooling a large number of hardwareaccelerators for large computation making the computation more efficientand better performing.

Embodiments provide for novel techniques for disaggregate computing fordistributed confidential computing environments. These novel techniquesare used to provide for the above-noted improved computation efficiencyand performance in computing architectures seeking to implementdisaggregate computing. Implementations of the disclosure provideprotected remote direct memory access (RDMA) for distributedconfidential computing, provide data relocation and command bufferpatching for GPU remoting, provide remoting to driver-managed GPUs,provide remoting to autonomous GPUs, provide protected management ofnetwork-connected FPGAs, provide enforcement of CSP policy for FPGAusage by a tenant bitstream, and/or provide autonomous FPGAs, asdiscussed further below with respect to FIGS. 8-51.

FIG. 8 illustrates a computing device 800 employing a disaggregatecompute component 810 according to one implementation of the disclosure.Computing device 800 represents a communication and data processingdevice including or representing (without limitations) smart voicecommand devices, intelligent personal assistants, home/office automationsystem, home appliances (e.g., washing machines, television sets, etc.),mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, tablet computers, etc.), gamingdevices, handheld devices, wearable devices (e.g., smartwatches, smartbracelets, etc.), virtual reality (VR) devices, head—mounted display(HMDs), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, laptop computers, desktopcomputers, server computers, set—top boxes (e.g., Internet based cabletelevision set—top boxes, etc.), global positioning system (GPS)—baseddevices, automotive infotainment devices, etc.

In some embodiments, computing device 800 includes or works with or isembedded in or facilitates any number and type of other smart devices,such as (without limitation) autonomous machines or artificiallyintelligent agents, such as a mechanical agents or machines, electronicsagents or machines, virtual agents or machines, electromechanical agentsor machines, etc. Examples of autonomous machines or artificiallyintelligent agents may include (without limitation) robots, autonomousvehicles (e.g., self-driving cars, self-flying planes, self-sailingboats, etc.), autonomous equipment self-operating construction vehicles,self-operating medical equipment, etc.), and/or the like. Further,“autonomous vehicles” are not limed to automobiles but that they mayinclude any number and type of autonomous machines, such as robots,autonomous equipment, household autonomous devices, and/or the like, andany one or more tasks or operations relating to such autonomous machinesmay be interchangeably referenced with autonomous driving.

Further, for example, computing device 800 may include a computerplatform hosting an integrated circuit (“IC”), such as a system on achip (“SOC” or “SOC”), integrating various hardware and/or softwarecomponents of computing device 800 on a single chip.

As illustrated, in one embodiment, computing device 800 may include anynumber and type of hardware and/or software components, such as (withoutlimitation) graphics processing unit (“GPU” or simply “graphicsprocessor”) 816 (such as the graphics processors described above withrespect to any one of FIGS. 1-7), graphics driver (also referred to as“GPU driver”, “graphics driver logic”, “driver logic”, user—mode driver(UMD), user—mode driver framework (UMDF), or simply “driver”) 815,central processing unit (“CPU” or simply “application processor”) 812(such as the processors or CPUs described above with respect to FIGS.1-7), hardware accelerator 814 (such as an FPGA, ASIC, a re-purposedCPU, or a re-purposed GPU, for example), memory 808, network devices,drivers, or the like, as well as input/output (110) sources 804, such astouchscreens, touch panels, touch pads, virtual or regular keyboards,virtual or regular mice, ports, connectors, etc. Computing device 800may include operating system (OS) 806 serving as an interface betweenhardware and/or physical resources of the computing device 800 and auser.

It is to be appreciated that a lesser or more equipped system than theexample described above may be utilized for certain implementations.Therefore, the configuration of computing device 800 may vary fromimplementation to implementation depending upon numerous factors, suchas price constraints, performance requirements, technologicalimprovements, or other circumstances.

Embodiments may be implemented as any or a combination of: one or moremicrochips or integrated circuits interconnected using a parent board,hardwired logic, software stored by a memory device and executed by amicroprocessor, firmware, an application specific integrated circuit(ASIC), and/or a field programmable gate array (FPGA). The terms“logic”, “module”, “component”, “engine”, “circuitry”, “element”, and“mechanism” may include, by way of example, software, hardware and/or acombination thereof, such as firmware.

In one embodiment, as illustrated, disaggregate compute component 810may be hosted by memory 808 in communication with I/O source(s) 804,such as microphones, speakers, etc., of computing device 800. In anotherembodiment, disaggregate compute component 810 may be part of or hostedby operating system 806. In yet another embodiment, disaggregate computecomponent 810 may be hosted or facilitated by graphics driver 815. Inyet another embodiment, disaggregate compute component 810 may be hostedby or part of a hardware accelerator 814; for example, disaggregatecompute component 810 may be embedded in or implemented as part of theprocessing hardware of hardware accelerator 814, such as in the form ofdisaggregate compute component 840. In yet another embodiment,disaggregate compute component 810 may be hosted by or part of graphicsprocessing unit (“GPU” or simply graphics processor”) 816 or firmware ofgraphics processor 816; for example, disaggregate compute component maybe embedded in or implemented as part of the processing hardware ofgraphics processor 816, such as in the form of disaggregate computecomponent 830. Similarly, in yet another embodiment, disaggregatecompute evaluation component 810 may be hosted by or part of centralprocessing unit (“CPU” or simply “application processor”) 812; forexample, disaggregate compute evaluation component 820 may be embeddedin or implemented as part of the processing hardware of applicationprocessor 812, such as in the form of disaggregate compute component820. In some embodiments, disaggregate compute component 810 may beprovided by one or more processors including one or more of a graphicsprocessor, an application processor, and another processor, wherein theone or more processors are co-located on a common semiconductor package.

It is contemplated that embodiments are not limited to certainimplementation or hosting of disaggregate compute component 810 and thatone or more portions or components of disaggregate compute component 810may be employed or implemented as hardware, software, or any combinationthereof, such as firmware. In one embodiment, for example, thedisaggregate compute component may be hosted by a machine learningprocessing unit which is different from the GPU. In another embodiment,the disaggregate compute component may be distributed between a machinelearning processing unit and a CPU. In another embodiment, thedisaggregate compute component may be distributed between a machinelearning processing unit, a CPU and a GPU. In another embodiment, thedisaggregate compute component may be distributed between a machinelearning processing unit, a CPU, a GPU, and a hardware accelerator.

Computing device 800 may host network interface device(s) to provideaccess to a network, such as a LAN, a wide area network (WAN), ametropolitan area network (MAN), a personal area network (PAN),Bluetooth, a cloud network, a mobile network (e.g., 3rd Generation (3G),4th Generation (4G), etc.), an intranet, the Internet, etc. Networkinterface(s) may include, for example, a wireless network interfacehaving antenna, which may represent one or more antenna(s). Networkinterface(s) may also include, for example, a wired network interface tocommunicate with remote devices via network cable, which may be, forexample, an Ethernet cable, a coaxial cable, a fiber optic cable, aserial cable, or a parallel cable.

Embodiments may be provided, for example, as a computer program productwhich may include one or more machine-readable media having storedthereon machine executable instructions that, when executed by one ormore machines such as a computer, network of computers, or otherelectronic devices, may result in the one or more machines carrying outoperations in accordance with embodiments described herein. Amachine-readable medium may include, but is not limited to, floppydiskettes, optical disks, CD-ROMs (Compact Disc-Read Only Memories), andmagneto-optical disks, ROMs, RAMS, EPROMs (Erasable Programmable ReadOnly Memories), EEPROMs (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read OnlyMemories), magnetic or optical cards, flash memory, or other type ofmedia/machine-readable medium suitable for storing machine-executableinstructions.

Moreover, embodiments may be downloaded as a computer program product,wherein the program may be transferred from a remote computer (e.g., aserver) to a requesting computer (e.g., a client) by way of one or moredata signals embodied in and/or modulated by a carrier wave or otherpropagation medium via a communication link (e.g., a modem and/ornetwork connection).

Throughout the document, term “user” may be interchangeably referred toas “viewer”, “observer”, “speaker”, “person”, “individual”, “end-user”,and/or the like. It is to be noted that throughout this document, termslike “graphics domain” may be referenced interchangeably with “graphicsprocessing unit”, “graphics processor”, or simply “GPU” and similarly,“CPU domain” or “host domain” may be referenced interchangeably with“computer processing unit”, “application processor”, or simply “CPU”.

It is to be noted that terms like “node”, “computing node”, “server”,“server device”, “cloud computer”, “cloud server”, “cloud servercomputer”, “machine”, “host machine”, “device”, “computing device”,“computer”, “computing system”, and the like, may be usedinterchangeably throughout this document. It is to be further noted thatterms like “application”, “software application”, “program”, “softwareprogram”, “package”, “software package”, and the like, may be usedinterchangeably throughout this document. Also, terms like “job”,“input”, “request”, “message”, and the like, may be used interchangeablythroughout this document.

FIG. 9 illustrates disaggregate compute component 810 of FIG. 8,according to one implementation of the disclosure. For brevity, many ofthe details already discussed with reference to FIG. 8 are not repeatedor discussed hereafter. In one embodiment, disaggregate computecomponent 810 may be the same as any of disaggregate compute components810, 820, 830, 840 described with respect to FIG. 8 and may include anynumber and type of components, such as (without limitations): protectedRDMA component 901; data relocation and command buffer patchingcomponent 902; remoting component 903; protected management component904; FPGA usage policy component 905; and autonomous FPGA component 906.

Computing device 800 is further shown to include user interface 919(e.g., graphical user interface (GUI) based user interface, Web browser,cloud-based platform user interface, software application-based userinterface, other user or application programming interfaces (APIs),etc.). Computing device 800 may further include I/O source(s) 804 havinginput component (s) 931, such as camera(s) 942 (e.g., Intel® RealSense™camera), sensors, microphone(s) 941, etc., and output component(s) 933,such as display device(s) or simply display(s) 944 (e.g., integraldisplays, tensor displays, projection screens, display screens, etc.),speaker devices(s) or simply speaker(s), etc.

Computing device 800 is further illustrated as having access to and/orbeing in communication with one or more database(s) 925 and/or one ormore of other computing devices over one or more communication medium(s)930 (e.g., networks such as a proximity network, a cloud network, theInternet, etc.).

In some embodiments, database(s) 925 may include one or more of storagemediums or devices, repositories, data sources, etc., having any amountand type of information, such as data, metadata, etc., relating to anynumber and type of applications, such as data and/or metadata relatingto one or more users, physical locations or areas, applicable laws,policies and/or regulations, user preferences and/or profiles, securityand/or authentication data, historical and/or other details, and/or thelike.

As aforementioned, computing device 800 may host I/O sources 804including input component(s) 931 and output component(s) 933. In oneembodiment, input component(s) 931 may include a sensor array including,but not limited to, microphone(s) 941 (e.g., ultrasound microphones),camera(s) 942 (e.g., two-dimensional (2D) cameras, three-dimensional(3D) cameras, infrared (IR) cameras, depth-sensing cameras, etc.),capacitors, radio components, radar components, scanners, and/oraccelerometers, etc. Similarly, output component(s) 933 may include anynumber and type of display device(s) 944, projectors, light-emittingdiodes (LEDs), speaker(s) 943, and/or vibration motors, etc.

As aforementioned, terms like “logic”, “module”, “component”, “engine”,“circuitry”, “element”, and “mechanism” may include, by way of example,software or hardware and/or a combination thereof, such as firmware. Forexample, logic may itself be or include or be associated with circuitryat one or more devices, such as disaggregate compute component 820,disaggregate compute component 830, and/or disaggregate computecomponent 840 hosted by application processor 812, graphics processor816, and/or hardware accelerator 814, respectively, of FIG. 8 having tofacilitate or execute the corresponding logic to perform certain tasks.

For example, as illustrated, input component (s) 931 may include anynumber and type of microphone(s) 941, such as multiple microphones or amicrophone array, such as ultrasound microphones, dynamic microphones,fiber optic microphones, laser microphones, etc. It is contemplated thatone or more of microphone(s) 941 serve as one or more input devices foraccepting or receiving audio inputs (such as human voice) into computingdevice 800 and converting this audio or sound into electrical signals.Similarly, it is contemplated that one or more of camera(s) 942 serve asone or more input devices for detecting and capturing of image and/orvideos of scenes, objects, etc., and provide the captured data as videoinputs into computing device 800.

Embodiments provide for novel techniques for disaggregate computing fordistributed confidential computing environments. These novel techniquescan be used to provide for the above-noted improved computationefficiency and performance in computing architectures seeking toimplement disaggregated computing. Implementations of the disclosureutilize a disaggregate compute component 810 to provide protected remotedirect memory access (RDMA) for distributed confidential computing,provide data relocation and command buffer patching for GPU remoting,provide remoting to driver-managed GPUs, provide remoting to autonomousGPUs, provide protected management of network connected FPGAs, provideenforcement of CSP policy for FPGA usage by a tenant bitstream, and/orprovide autonomous FPGAs.

With respect to FIG. 9, the disaggregate compute component 810 includesprotected RDMA component 901 to provide for protected remote directmemory access (RDMA) for distributed confidential computing; datarelocation and command buffer patching component 902 to provide for datarelocation and command buffer patching for GPU remoting; remotingcomponent 903 to provide for remoting to driver-managed GPUs andremoting to autonomous GPUs; protected management component 904 toprovide for protected management of network connected FPGAs; FPGA usagepolicy component 905 to provide for enforcement of CSP policy for FPGAusage by a tenant bitstream; and autonomous FPGA component 906 toprovide for autonomous FPGAs. Further details of the protected RDMAcomponent 901; data relocation and command buffer patching component902; remoting component 903; protected management component 904; FPGAusage policy component 905; and autonomous FPGA component 906 aredescribed below with respect to FIGS. 10-51.

Protected RDMA for Distributed Confidential Computing

In some embodiments, an apparatus, system, or process is to provideprotected RDMA for distributed confidential computing. In oneimplementation, protected RDMA component 901 described with respect toFIG. 9 provides the protected RDMA for distributed confidentialcomputing.

RDMA refers to a direct memory access (DMA) from memory of one computingdevice into memory of another computing device without involving eithercomputer devices' OSes. RDMA directly copies data between local andremote memory of the computing devices without calling the kerneldrivers. Received buffers do not have to be copied twice and the kerneldoes not use CPU clock cycles for RDMA buffer copy. As such, RDMAenables faster data transfer through networks and reduces the overheadto the CPU because an application and an RDMA Network InterfaceController (RDMA NIC or RNIC) interface directly. In traditionalnetworking, such as sockets, TCP/IP, and Ethernet, the kernelintermediates the interface between the application and the RNIC,resulting in an additional copy of data buffers.

RDMA offers technical advantages including, but not limited to, reducingcontext switching between user space and kernel space in the OS,eliminating the extra buffer copy, and reducing CPU cycles consumed bythe kernel (in host). RDMA also reduces interrupts because it coalescesprocessing of packets to an interrupt for completion of a RDMA transfer.The RNIC also offloads network transport processing (e.g., TCP/IP) fromthe host.

RDMA finds use in distributed computation, including disaggregatedcomputing, where the processing elements with the same architecture ordifferent architectures are networked to form a virtual processingplatform. For example, where multiple identical CPUs, or combinations ofdifferent CPU architectures, and accelerators such as GPUs, FPGAs,ASICs, are connected in a network to cooperate on a computation.Distributed systems/platforms allow dynamic configuration and allocationof resources to match the type of computation (instructions/algorithm)and performance requirements of the application/workload. The dynamicallocation improves efficiency of use of networked components. Thishigher utilization of resources translates to cost savings and increasedprofits for the operator of the distributed datacenter.

The data, and sometimes commands, of an application running on adistributed system, are transferred between processing elements tocooperate in the computation. Computation resources (time and logic)used to transfer workloads are counted as overhead of distributedcomputation relative to processing the workload on processing elementson the same platform (directly connected components). RDMA's efficientdata transfer reduces the overhead and latency, enabling betterperformance of distributed computational systems. In turn, this allows awider range and more applications to run in distributed systems withhigher performance.

Protection of computation in distributed platforms is more complex thanin a single platform. Distributed computation exposes data and possiblyalgorithms (IP in the form of commands) when workloads are sharedbetween processing elements.

Current threat models have the kernel and system driver in the TrustedCompute Base (TCB). In some conventional RDMA standards, the data bufferand RDMA structures to control execution in queue pairs (QP) areisolated from other applications by running on a Virtual Machine (VM).The Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) enforces the separation. The VMM canaccess the data buffer and QP, but is trusted and not considered athreat.

Some conventional systems protect DMA of directly-attached devices.However, such conventional systems do not protect DMA of networkeddevices (i.e., RDMA). Such conventional systems expose the application'sdata and the RDMA's data structures in user space to vulnerabilities inthe VMM and kernel drivers. Datacenter operators and datacenter userswant to minimize the threat surface. Conventional systems do not protectnetworked devices (i.e., do not protect RDMA).

Implementations of the disclosure provide for protected RDMA for adistributed confidential computing environment (DCCE). Implementationsof the disclosure provide for the execution of computation in theprocessing elements in trusted execution environments (TEE),cryptographically protect confidentiality, and enable detection ofintegrity violations of RDMA between network-connected TEEs.

In implementations of the disclosure, the data buffer and RDMAstructures in user space are protected from the VMM and other attackers.Integrity verification and encryption in the TEE protects the databuffer in the processing elements and transport. Integrity verificationof the RDMA QP elements between application and RNIC protects RDMAexecution order.

Regular mutual attestation protocols setup the communication medium(e.g., link, transport, channel, etc.) between processing elements andRNICs. Standard key exchange setup the encrypted tunnel for datatransport.

RDMA is a key ingredient used in distributed computation.Implementations of the disclosure protect RDMA so that it can be part ofa full solution that expand confidential computation to distributedplatforms. This enables running confidential workloads on distributedsystems to take advantage of higher utilization (lower cost ofoperation) of distributed systems. Implementations of the disclosureenable datacenter owners and operators to run workloads on distributedplatforms while assuring the owners of the workloads that their data andintellectual property is not viewable by other applications running onthe datacenter nor by the datacenter operators.

Implementations of the disclosure enable workload owners to submitworkloads assured they can be able to detect when the computation hasbeen corrupted. Furthermore, the privacy of data can be preserved evenwhen a software attacker bypasses the protections in the datacenter.

Some conventional computing systems offer confidential computing anddistributed FPGAs, but do not offer confidential computing withdistributed accelerators. Computing system RNICs that implementimplementations of the disclosure may be used in private and publicdatacenters to enable confidential computation using distributedcomputation resources.

FIG. 10 is a schematic of a computing architecture 1000 depicting thedifference between a remote direct memory access (RDMA) flow and astandard network interface controller (NIC) flow, according toimplementations of the disclosure. Computing architecture 1000 includesa hardware layer 1006 including, but not limited to, a networkconnection 1055, such as Ethernet, transmitting information via aninternet communication protocol 1050, such as IPv4 or IPv6, to an OS ofthe computing architecture 1000 via a host interface 1035. The OS of thecomputing architecture 1000 is divided into kernel space 1004 and userspace 1002. The kernel space 1004 include a system driver 1030, OS stack1025, and kernel application 1020. The user space includes an I/Olibrary 1015 and a user application 1010. The example computingarchitecture 1000 of FIG. 10 may include one or more elements, processesand/or devices in addition to, or instead of, those illustrated in FIG.10, and/or may include more than one of any or all of the illustratedelements, processes, and devices.

Computing architecture 1000 emphasizes the difference between a standardNIC flow 1060 and an RDMA NIC flow 1070 through the components ofcomputing architecture 1000. As shown, the standard NIC flow 1060involves both user space 1002 and kernel space 1004 components of the OSfor both of its configuration and data transfer flows. The standard NICflow 1060 also follows a LAN flow 1040 through hardware 1006. The RDMANIC flow 1070 removes the context switching between kernel space 1004and user space 1002 during the data transfer flow and the kernel doesnot handle user data in the RDMA NIC flow 1070. Furthermore, the RDMAflow 1070 follows an RDMA flow 1045 through hardware 1006.

FIG. 11 illustrates a computing architecture 1100 to request RDMAs,according to implementations of the disclosure. Computing architecture1100 includes data structures that an RNIC and an application use inorder to request RDMAs. Computing architecture 1100 depicts an exampleof mapping the data structures in kernel space, user space, and NICmemory. The data structures for RDMA may include, but are not limitedto, a physical buffer list (PBL) 1130, a translation and protectiontable (TPT) 1140, and a plurality of queues including queue pairs (QP)1175, a shared receive queue (RxQ) 1150, and completion queue 1120. TheQP 1175 may include, but is not limited to, a receive queue (Q) 1155 andsend Q 1160. The QP 1175 may be communicably connected to an inboundread request queue 1165 and an outbound read request queue 1170 of anRNIC in NIC space 1180. NIC space 1180 may further be implemented as aprotection domain 1180 that is established by a privileged consumer toassociate one process to its resources.

The buffer 1135 for data and the queue pairs (QP) 1175 used to submitand order execution of RDMA work requests (WR) are implemented in userspace 1185 memory to allow the application 1110 to interface directlywith the RNIC through them. The RNIC has direct access to memory in userspace 1185 to efficiently copy data in the buffer 1135. The QP 1175implemented in memory of the user space 1185 allows the application 1110and RNIC to synchronize work directly through the QPs 1175.

The application 1110 calls the kernel 1115 to setup and resize the QP1175, and registration and deregistration of memory regions (MR, thebuffers). The kernel space 1190 may include the kernel 1115 as well as aprivileged resource manager 1105, page table (extended page table (EPT)1125, and the PBL 1130. After registration, the application 1110 doesnot call the kernel 1115 to copy buffers 1135 using RDMA.

Data separation between the application 1110 that owns the data andother software can be enforced via privileged software, such as a VMM invirtualized environments or the OS in bare metal platforms, as part ofmemory separation between users. Privileged software can access memoryin user space 1185 and assign physical memory pages that map (translate)to the user's (guest) pages.

FIG. 12 depicts a network architecture 1200 with potential attack pointsfor RDMA in accordance with implementations of the disclosure. Networkarchitecture 1200 includes two consumers 1210 a, 1210 b (e.g.,application, accelerator, orchestrator, OS/VMM) connected over a network1205 through QPs 1275 a, 1275 b interfacing via inbound read requestqueues 1265 a, 1265 b and outbound read request queues 1170 a, 1170 b ofNIC space/PD 1180 a, 1180 b. Other components of the computingarchitectures underlying consumers 1210 a, 1210 b illustrated in FIG. 12are the same to their identically-named components of FIG. 11 and thedescription of such similarly-named elements applies here with respectto FIG. 12.

In example network architecture 1200, privileged software or a simplehardware could attack RDMA at:

(1) The interface to the CQ 1220, shared RxQ 1250, and all QPs 1275 a,1275 b. A consumer may submit a work request (WR) and consumecompletions. The RNIC consumes the WR and submits completions. Othersoftware may try to interact with the RNIC, for example, by submittingwork requests and consuming work request completions from anotherapplication. Other software may also interact with the QPs 1275 a, 1275b to submit WRs and with CQ 1220 to consume completions.

(2) Access structures that the RNIC uses to execute RDMA. Suchstructures may include buffer 1235 a, 1235 b, PBL 1230 a, 1230 b, TPT1240 a, 1240 b, share RxQ 1250 1250 a, 1250 b, QPs 1275 a, 1275 b, andcompletion queue 1220 a, 1220 b.

(3) Access memory of user space used for RDMA, such as data buffer 1235a, 1235 b, CQ 1220, shared RxQ 1250, and QPs 12751, 1275 b, in order to:

(a) Read confidential data in the buffer 1235 a, 1235 b, corrupt data inthe buffer 1235 a, 1235 b.

(b) Change (corrupt) work requests and completions by changing theelements in the queues of the QPs 1275 a, 1275 b, removing elements,adding elements, reordering elements in the queues, or moving elementsbetween queues of the QPs 1275 a 1275 b.

(4) Modify the translation of addresses to the buffer 1235 a, 1235 b tomake the RDMA (or consumer 1210 a, 1210 b) access different physicalmemory pages.

(5) A physical attacker may view or modify data in transit in thenetwork 1205.

The consumer 1210 a, 1210 b (e.g., application) can interface directlywith the RNIC's structures in user space/memory, which improvesperformance because it allows reading or writing (pushing or popping)elements in the queues without coordinating with the RNIC. The consumer1210 a, 1210 b (e.g., application) could also access the QP structuresand elements stored in user space the same way it can access the databuffer 1235 a, 1235 b. For this reason, the vulnerabilities of the QP1275 a, 1275 b structure and RNIC interface to QP 1275 a, 1275 b may begrouped as a common vulnerability. An attacker with access to user spacememory can affect execution of RDMA through manipulation of structuresthrough the interface or directly modifying the elements of thestructure.

Implementations of the disclosure address each of these above-notedvulnerabilities, as discussed in further detail below. First, protectionof execution order, queues structures and RNIC interface, and RNICstructures in NIC space by implementations of the disclosure arediscussed. Then, protection of the data buffer by implementations of thedisclosure is discussed. The protection schemes of implementations ofthe disclosure may be described with respect to a trusted executionenvironments established during operation of the computing device.

Referring now to FIG. 13A, in an illustrative embodiment, a computingenvironment 1300 establishes a trusted execution environment (TEE) 1310during operation. In one implementation, the illustrative computingenvironment 1300 may include a processor 1305 to establish the TEE 1310.The computing environment 1300 may be the same as processing system 100described with respect to FIG. 1 and/or computing device 200 describedwith respect to FIG. 2, for example. Processor 1305 may be the same asany of the processors or processing elements discussed above withrespect to FIGS. 1-7, for example. The establishment of the TEE 1310 maybe in line with the discussion above with respect to FIG. 2 ofestablishing a TEE (also referred to as a secure enclave) and suchdiscussion applies similarly here with respect to FIG. 13A.

As illustrated, the TEE 302 further includes a cryptographic engine1313, an RDMA manager 1314, and an authentication tag controller 1315.The various components of the computing environment 1300 may be embodiedas hardware, firmware, software, or a combination thereof. As such, insome embodiments, one or more of the components of the computingenvironment 1300 may be embodied as circuitry or collection ofelectrical devices (e.g., cryptographic engine circuitry 1313, RDMAmanager circuitry 1314, and/or authentication tag controller circuitry1315). It should be appreciated that, in such embodiments, one or moreof the cryptographic engine circuitry 1313, RDMA manager circuitry 1314,and/or authentication tag controller circuitry 1315 may form a portionof the processor 1305, and/or other components of the computing device100. Additionally, in some embodiments, one or more of the illustrativecomponents may form a portion of another component and/or one or more ofthe illustrative components may be independent of one another.

The TEE 1310 may be embodied as a trusted execution environment of thecomputing environment 1300 that is authenticated and protected fromunauthorized access using hardware support of the computing environment1300. Illustratively, the TEE 1310 may be embodied as one or more secureenclaves established using Intel SGX technology. The TEE 1310 may alsoinclude or otherwise interface with one or more drivers, libraries, orother components of the computing environment 1300 to interface with anaccelerator.

The cryptographic engine 1313 is configured to perform a cryptographicoperation associated with an RDMA transaction. For an RDMA transaction,the cryptographic operation includes encrypting a data item to generatean encrypted data item, or decrypting a data item to generate adecrypted data item.

The RDMA manager 1314 is configured to securely write an initializationcommand to initialize a secure RDMA transfer. The RDMA manager 1314 isfurther configured to securely configure a descriptor indicative of amemory buffer and a transfer direction. The transfer direction may besource to sink or sink to source. The RDMA manager 1314 is generallyconfigured to manage an RDMA transfer in accordance with implementationsof the disclosure.

The authentication tag controller 1315 is configured to generate anauthentication tag (AT) in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. The AT may be embodied as any hash, message authenticationcode (MAC), or other value that may be used to authenticate theencrypted data and additional authentication data. The description belowof protection schemes of implementations of the disclosure providefurther details of utilization of the cryptographic engine 1313 andauthentication tag controller 1315 to provide protected RDMA fordistributed confidential computing environments, such as computingenvironment 1300 of FIG. 13A.

Protection of Execution Order, Q Structures and RNIC Interface, RNICStructures in NIC Space

In implementations of the disclosure, protected RDMA may provide forprotection of execution order, queues structures and RNIC interface, andRNIC structures in NIC space. In one implementation, queue structures inuser memory used as part of an RDMA transaction may be protected by anauthentication tag generated by, for example, authentication tagcontroller 1315 of FIG. 13A. For purposes of the discussion below, theauthentication tag is discussed as implemented as a MAC. However, theauthentication tag may be implemented in other forms and is not limitedto implementation as a MAC herein.

In one implementation, the authentication tag, such as a MAC, iscalculated using a key known between application and RNIC (authorizedparties) to detect modifications by unauthorized parties. The RNIC orapplication protects the elements with the generated MAC when adding(pushing) to the Q and verifies integrity when removing (popping) fromthe Q. In one implementation, the Q may refer to any of the queuestructures utilized by the RNIC and/or consumer as part of an RDMAtransaction, such as the QP, shared RxQ, completion Q, for example.

FIG. 13B illustrates a queue (Q) 1350 implemented with a circular bufferin which the elements are protected by authentication tags, inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure. The structure of theQ 1350 and order of elements (Ei) 1360, 1362, 1364 can be protected inorder to prevent changes in order of execution (e.g., preserve the orderof the elements in the Q 1350). The MAC (Mi) 1370, 1372, 1374 may beused to protect the order and prevent moving elements between differentQs 1350.

In one implementation, in addition to the Q entry data 1360, 1362, 1364and the key, a unique identifier (ID) of the Q 1350 can be added to thecalculation of the MAC 1370, 1372, 1374 of an element (or entry) 1360,1362, 1364 to assist with preventing moving elements across different Qs1350. In some implementations, a sequence number may be added to the MACcalculation in order to prevent changing the order of Q elements 1360,1362, 1364 within the Q 1350. In some implementations, the MAC 1370,1372, 1374 of a prior element 1360, 1362, 1364 may be used (instead of asequence number) in order to include information on the order ofelements in the MAC calculation. In both cases, the information used togenerate the MAC 1370, 1372, 1374 should be agreed upon (known to) byboth the RNIC and the consumer (e.g., application).

The MAC may also protect against deletion of the last element(s) on theQ 1350 by including a “valid element flag” in the Q element 1360, 1362,1364. If the implementation uses an alternative method to manage theelements in the Q 1350, for example, by tracking the number of validelements in the Q 1350 or a pointer to the first or last elements 1360,1362, 1364, implementations of the disclosure can request sharing thisinformation between the consumer and the RNIC with integrity protection.This shared length or pointer piece of shared information may again beprotected with a MAC. Similar to the MAC for Q entries, such anintegrity calculation can include information on the associated Q, thepointer, or length, for example.

The structures in RNIC space (e.g., queue structures, etc.) may beprotected in a similar manner with the difference that the RNIC issupposed to access the structures. The RNIC can both calculate andinsert the MAC to push an entry in the Q and validate integrity beforeusing the entry popped from the Q.

Some implementations may elect to not protect the integrity of RNICstructures in RNIC space memory. For example, in some implementations,RNIC space structures are implemented in memory not accessible to other(untrusted) software (e.g., in memory attached to RNIC instead ofborrowed from host memory). In another examples, the memory is notaccessible to simple hardware attackers (e.g., RNIC space memoryintegrated within the same package as the RNIC).

Protection of Data Buffer

The data buffer, such as buffer 1135 described with respect to FIG. 11or buffer 1235 a, 1235 b described with respect to FIG. 12, may also beprotected for integrity with an authentication tag (e.g., MAC)calculated over the full transfer (buffer) or the data is partitionedinto blocks, each protected by an authentication tag (e.g., MAC). In oneimplementation, the authentication tag can be generated by, for example,authentication tag controller 1315 of FIG. 13A. For purposes of thediscussion below, the authentication tag is discussed as implemented asa MAC. However, the authentication tag may be implemented in other formsand is not limited to implementation as a MAC herein.

The MAC calculation may include additional data to protect the RDMAtransfer. For example, the MAC may include some form of identificationof the QP (e.g., QP 1175 or 1275 a, 1275 b of FIGS. 11 and/or 12) and/orQP element that describes the RDMA transaction that references the datain the buffer. In some implementations, the form of identification maybe the identification of the local and/or remote application(s) that arethe intended end points of the RDMA transfer. In some implementations,the form of identification may be a sequence number or unique value toindicate the “freshness” of the data that is used to indicate the orderof use of the buffer and/or prevent unintended re-use of the data in thebuffer in another RDMA transfer. This unique value changes thecalculated value of the MAC so that the same data in the buffer cannotbe used a second time.

In addition to integrity, the data buffer may further be encrypted toprotect confidentiality with the same or different key used to calculatethe MAC. In one implementation, a cryptographic engine, such ascryptographic engine 1313 in a TEE 1310 of FIG. 13A, performs theencryption of the data buffer. The key used to encrypt the data shouldbe shared between the local and remote applications.

The following examples illustrate an Upper Level Protocol (ULP) thatuses encryption of the data buffer and MAC added to the buffer toprotect RDMA transactions including SEND, READ, WRITE.

FIG. 14 illustrates an operation flow 1400 of integrity protection ofRDMA SEND in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.Operation flow 1400 depicts operations of an RDMA transaction among aplurality of different components at a source and a sink. In oneimplementation, the source refers to the component generating outgoingevents and the sink refers to the component receiving incoming events.The source components include a source consumer (consumerSource) 1450(e.g., consumer such as an application, accelerator, orchestrator,OS.VMM, etc.), source memory (sourceMEM) 1420, and a source NIC(sourceNIC) 1430. The sink components include a sink NIC (sinkNIC) 1440,a sink memory (sinkMEM) 1450, and a sink consumer (consumerSink) 1460(e.g., consumer such as an application, accelerator, orchestrator,OS.VMM, etc.).

In one implementation, the RDMA send of operation flow 1400 changes theformat and length of the data buffer and preserves the data transportmechanism. In implementations of the disclosure, the consumerSink 1460indicates to sinkNIC 1440 that the consumerSink 1460 is ready to receivemessages 1401 from the sinkNIC 1440. Thereafter, the consumerSource 1410prepares the data buffer with encrypted and SALTed data and the MAC ofthe data 1402. In implementations of the disclosure, a SALT may be theunique number that is used in calculating the MAC. A SALT refers torandom data that is used as an additional input to a one-way functionthat hashes data, a password or passphrase, for example. Inimplementations of the disclosure, an optional sequence number and MACis added to the buffer as part of writing to the buffer 1402 for theRDMA SEND message posted to the send queue 1403. In this example, theapplications (e.g., consumer such as consumerSource 1410) addinformation to the message to protect integrity. The mechanisms totransport the message buffer in the RNIC are unchanged relative tocurrent implementations of RDMA SEND, as shown in operations 1403, 1404,1405, 1406, 1407, 1408, and 1409.

FIG. 15 illustrates an operation flow 1500 implementing ULP copy of abuffer using RDMA READ in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. The local consumer 1510 with data advertises the data bufferand requests the remote consumer 1520 to read the buffer with RDMA READthrough an RDMA SEND 1530. The remote consumer 1520 schedules an RDMAREAD on its RNIC 1540. When the buffer has been copied 1550, the remoteconsumer 1520 releases the buffer with an RDMA SEND message 1560 withthe status of the buffer copy.

FIG. 16 illustrates an operation flow 1600 of integrity protection ofRDMA SEND used for messaging and protection of RDMA READ used for datacopy, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure. Operationflow 1600 depicts operations of an RDMA transaction among a plurality ofdifferent components at a source and a sink. In one implementation, thecomponents of source and sink illustrated in FIG. 16 are the same asthose discussed with respect to FIG. 14 and as such their descriptionsimilarly applies here.

The consumerSource 1410 (e.g., local application) protects the integrityand confidentiality of its data by encrypting the data in the buffer andadding a MAC, as previously discussed. In this example, the MAC can becalculated over a unique number that is advertised to the consumerSink1460 (e.g., a remote application) with the buffer (STag, TO and length).The buffer also stores the MAC that can travel with the data. Inimplementations of the disclosure, a SALT may be the unique number thatis used to calculate the MAC.

The consumerSource 1410 sends a message 1601 through RDMA SEND toadvertise the buffer and request the copy of the buffer with RDMA READ.The message is protected with RDMA SEND, as described above.

The consumerSink 1460 checks the integrity of the message received withthe RDMA SEND 1602, 1603. In this example, the message sequence numbershould be the expected next number in the sequence of messages exchangedbetween the consumers 1410, 1460 and the MAC calculation should alsomatch. If the consumerSink 1460 deems the message valid, it proceeds torequest the remote RNIC to perform the RDMA READ of the advertisedbuffer 1604.

The remote and local RNIC copy the buffer. Once the transport of data iscompleted and the RNIC notified 1605 the application the data is inmemory, the consumerSink 1460 checks the integrity 1606 of the datapayload by calculating the MAC on the received data and a unique number(e.g., an expected SALT that the remote application advertised to theremote application). If the integrity test passes, the remoteapplication decrypts and consumes the payload 1607, 1609. If theintegrity test fails, an error message can be passed to an error handler1608.

The consumerSink 1460 sends 1610 a protected response message with thestatus of the requested RDMA READ using RDMA SEND. The sequence numberis updated. The response may include an identifier of the requestmessage to match the response status to the request. In someimplementations, the message sequence number may reuse the messagenumber of the request to associate the response to the request. Thereare multiple possible schemes to synchronize the expected messagesbetween the applications.

In some implementations, the local application can test the integrity ofthe received RDMA SEND message that contains the response before takingthe appropriate reaction for the response status.

The examples shown carry the MAC of the data payload with the datapayload. The data buffer increases in length by the length of the MAC.In one implementation, the protocol may carry the MAC of the datapayload on the payload of the (SEND) message. The RDMA SEND payloadincreases in length by the MAC of the data payload that protects theintegrity of the payload and the MAC of the message itself to protectthe integrity of the message. In this case, the length of the datapayload doesn't change if the encryption algorithm used keeps the lengthof cyphertext the same as plaintext.

The protection mechanisms of implementations of the disclosureillustrated on the RDMA READ may also be applied to RDMA WRITE, asdiscussed further below.

FIG. 17 illustrates an operation flow 1700 implementing ULP using RDMASEND messages to copy a buffer with RDMA WRITE, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure. Operation flow 1700 begins with thelocal consumer 1710 requesting the remote consumer 1720 to write to thebuffer with an RDMA SEND 1730. As illustrated, operation flow 1700 omitsthe follow-up RDMA SEND messages exchanged prior to RDMA WRITE 1740 torequest the allocation and to advertise the buffer allocated to receivedata from RDMA WRITE 1740. When the buffer has been copied, the remoteconsumer 1720 releases the buffer with an RDMA SEND message 1750 withthe status of the buffer copy.

FIG. 18 illustrates an operation flow 1800 of RDMA WRITE used forprotected data copy, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. Operation flow 1800 depicts operations of an RDMAtransaction among a plurality of different components at a source and asink. In one implementation, the components of source and sinkillustrated in FIG. 18 are the same as those discussed with respect toFIG. 14 and as such their description similarly applies here.

In operation flow 1800, the consumerSink 1460 indicates to sinkNIC 1440that the consumerSink 1460 is ready to receive messages 1801 from thesinkNIC 1440. Thereafter, the consumerSource 1410 writes data to thebuffer 1802. In implementations of the disclosure, the consumerSource1410 sends an RDMA SEND message 1803, 1804, 1805 protected by themessage sequence number and MAC to request the registration andadvertisement of a writeable memory buffer by the consumerSink 1460(e.g., remote application) 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809. The consumerSink 1460verifies the integrity of the request (not shown), registers the buffer1810 and sends a response 1811 with the handle for the buffer and aunique number (e.g., SALT), or tweak, to calculate the MAC of thepayload.

The consumerSource 1410 encrypts the data and calculates the MAC 1812.In some implementations, a SALT may be used to calculate the MAC and/orencryption. In this example, the consumerSource 1410 uses the SALT totie the data in the buffer to the advertised buffer and to the requestto the buffer. The calculation of the MAC may include differentadditional data depending on which information integrity the applicationwants to protect with the MAC.

After the buffer is transported 1813, the consumerSource 1410 sends amessage 1814 to indicate data is available using similar mechanisms toprotect the RDMA SEND. The consumerSink 1460 verifies the integrity ofthe message (not shown) before decrypting and consuming the message1815.

The protection scheme of implementations of the disclosure has theoption to append the MAC of the data payload to the RDMA WRITE buffer orthe RDMA SEND message payload that informs data was transported. Thelength of the data buffer stays the same or increases by the length ofthe MAC. As described for RDMA READ.

In implementations of the disclosure, the RNIC (e.g., sourceNIC 1403,sinkNIC 1440) may have storage that is protected from untrusted partiesto save the keys used for MAC calculation and for encryption.

Wire Transport, Network

In implementations of the disclosure, the protection schemes discussedabove. can be layered on top of encryption for current solutions. Theprotection scheme described in implementations of the disclosure has theadvantage that with adequate choice of encryption and MAC algorithms andwhat additional data to include in the MAC calculation, the encryptionand integrity protection added to protect the data in the data buffermay also protect data in the network. Some implementations of thedisclosure may elect to not encrypt data twice, and bypass encryption incurrent wire protection schemes (e.g. IPSEC) to save processing andimplementation complexity.

Address Translation

Protection of address translation is implementation specific to theplatform, TEE support and virtualization scheme, etc. Any scheme thatprotects address translation may be used in conjunction withimplementations of the disclosure.

In the absence of a trusted address translation, the methods describedhere still provide a level of protection that may be adequate for someuse cases. Because the encryption of the data buffer prevents dataleakage and the addition of integrity protection enables detection ofcorruption.

Remapping of the data buffer may still allow RDMA to be used to corruptthe memory the RNIC was redirected to write.

Extension to Reduce Utilization of the CPU

Implementations of the disclosure can be extended to offload the RDMAprotection (encryption and MAC calculation) to the RNIC. In the exampleof RDMA transactions described above, implementations of the disclosurereduce to changes to the RNIC to protection of work execution of the Qs.

The implementations described above call for logic to calculate andverify MAC, and storage of MAC keys. As such, the application endpointsimplement the protection protocol, encryption, and MAC and additionaldata to protect integrity (e.g., via a TEE, such as TEE 1310 describedwith respect to FIG. 13A), while the RNIC transport functionalityremains mostly the same.

Implementations of the disclosure may also offload the protectionoverhead described above to the RNIC to reduce processing and changes tothe application endpoints. In this alternative, the application remainsunmodified. This alternative implementation may be appropriate when thedata buffer and the connection between the RNIC and the data buffer arealready protected in the platform by other means.

The trusted compute base (TCB) does not grow because the RNIC alreadyhad to be trusted to verify the integrity of the Q elements(validate/calculate the MAC for Qs).

In the example below, the RNIC that is already trusted to manage thekeys for integrity (MAC calculation) and to verify integrity can alsostore the ephemeral session keys to encrypt the data buffer andimplement most of the logic to encrypt, decrypt, and add information toenable detection of data corruption, and test data integrity of data andmessage payloads.

FIGS. 19A and 19B illustrate an example operation flow 1900 where theprotection of an RDMA SEND is implemented by the RNICs in accordancewith implementations of the disclosure. Operation flow 1900 depictsoperations of an RDMA transaction among a plurality of differentcomponents at a source and a sink. In one implementation, the componentsof source and sink illustrated in FIG. 19 are the same as thosediscussed with respect to FIG. 14 and as such their descriptionsimilarly applies here.

In operation flow 1900, the consumerSink 1460 indicates to sinkNIC 1440that the consumerSink 1460 is ready to receive messages 1901 from thesinkNIC 1440. Thereafter, the consumerSource 1410 writes data to thebuffer 1902. The RNIC sending the message (e.g., sourceNIC 1430) addsthe message sequence number, calculates the MAC and appends or prependsor a combination of both to the message from the application 1903, 1904,1905, 1906.

In this example, the sinkNIC 1440 (e.g., receiving RNIC) writes themessage 1909 in an unnamed buffer and checks the integrity 1910, 1911 ofthe message before posting the completion to the receiving application1912.

The message requests a buffer to write 1913. If the message wascorrupted, the RNIC may send a status response messages to both sendingRNIC and receiving application or, send the integrity error statusmessage to the receiving application for the receiving application tosend a status response message to the sending application.

The receiving application process the message to perform the appropriateresponse. In this example, it registers a memory region 1914, 1915, 1916and response to the request with the information on the buffer 1917through an RDMA SEND message 1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922. In thisexample, the application advertising the buffer manages the uniquenumber (e.g., a SALT) to help detect freshness of the data on thebuffer. This task might also be offloaded to the RNIC. In someimplementations, the RNIC would store and select (e.g., increment) theunique SALT.

The application that requested the memory buffer receives the bufferinformation to start using the buffer 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927,1928.

The paired RNICs 1430, 1440 protect the response message similarly tothe protection to the request message. For example, the paired RNICs canincrement the message sequence number and add and verify the MAC.

FIG. 20 illustrates an operation flow 2000 of a consumer copying abuffer to an advertised buffer using RDMA WRITE, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure. Operation flow 2000 depictsoperations of an RDMA transaction among a plurality of differentcomponents at a source and a sink. In one implementation, the componentsof source and sink illustrated in FIG. 20 are the same as thosediscussed with respect to FIG. 14 and as such their descriptionsimilarly applies here.

In operation flow 2000, the consumerSource 1410 write data for an RDMAtransaction to the buffer 2001. The buffer is posted to the send queue2002 and read 2003. The sourceNIC 1430 does not store the SALT. The SALTis passed to the consumer instead. The consumerSource 1410 includes theSALT in the Work Request when it posts the Work Request in the Q 2002.The RNIC uses the stored transport key and SALT received from theapplication to encrypt the payload and calculate the MAC 2004. ThesourceNIC 1430 then passes the encrypted and integrity-protected data tothe sinkNIC 1440 through an RDMA WRITE 2005, 2006. The RNIC may storethe SALT and not pass it to the application in an alternativeimplementation.

In operation flow 2000, the receiving sinkNIC 1440 tests the integrityof the payload and decrypts the payload after receiving the payload2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. The protocol may be implemented sothat the RNIC or Application checks the integrity and decrypt afterreceiving the message informing of the copy of the data, when thereceiving application is ready to consume the payload or copy thepayload to private memory. The protection of RDMA READ transactions mayalso be offloaded to the RNICs in a similar fashion.

The first set of examples implemented protection on the receiving andsending applications as discussed with respect to FIGS. 14-18 and thesecond set of examples implemented protection on the receiving andsending RNICs as discussed with respect to FIGS. 19-20. The protocol anddata transported in the network does not change whether the additionallogic for protection is implemented on the RNIC or on the application.Implementations of the disclosure may also be provided with anycombination of location to implement protection on the Application orRNIC. For example, on the sending application and receiving RNIC, or onsending RNIC and receiving application.

FIG. 21 is a flow diagram illustrating a method 2100 for protected RDMAfor distributed confidential computing, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure. Method 2100 may be performed byprocessing logic that may comprise hardware (e.g., circuitry, dedicatedlogic, programmable logic, etc.), software (such as instructions run ona processing device), or a combination thereof. More particularly, themethod 2100 may be implemented in one or more modules as a set of logicinstructions stored in a machine- or computer-readable storage mediumsuch as RAM, ROM, PROM, firmware, flash memory, etc., in configurablelogic such as, for example, PLAs, FPGAs, CPLDs, in fixed-functionalitylogic hardware using circuit technology such as, for example, ASIC, CMOSor TTL technology, or any combination thereof.

The process of method 2100 is illustrated in linear sequences forbrevity and clarity in presentation; however, it is contemplated thatany number of them can be performed in parallel, asynchronously, or indifferent orders. Further, for brevity, clarity, and ease ofunderstanding, many of the components and processes described withrespect to FIGS. 10-20 may not be repeated or discussed hereafter. Inone implementation, a processor, such as processor 1305 described withrespect to FIG. 13A may perform method 2100. In some implementations, anauthentication tag controller, such as authentication tag controller1315 described with respect to FIG. 13A may perform method 2100.

Method 2100 begins at block 2110 where a processor may initialize afirst authentication tag calculated using a first key known between asource consumer generating an RDMA request and a source RNIC. In oneimplementation, the first key is to authenticate an interface betweenthe source consumer and the source RNIC. At block 2120, the processormay associate the first authentication tag with the data entry in aqueue as integrity verification for the data entry.

Subsequently, at block 2130, the processor may initialize a secondauthentication tag calculated using a second key known between thesource consumer and a sink consumer of the remote device. In oneimplementation, the sink consumer is to receive the RDMA request. In oneimplementation, the second key is to, depending on the implementation ofencryption and authentication tag calculation, authenticate the data(and messages) exchanged between the networked consumers or RNICs.Lastly, at block 2140, the processor may associate the secondauthentication tag with the data buffer as integrity verification forthe data buffer.

The following examples pertain to further embodiments of protected RDMAfor distributed confidential computing. Example 1 is an apparatus tofacilitate protected RDMA for distributed confidential computing. Theapparatus of Example 1 comprises a source remote direct memory access(RDMA) network interface controller (RNIC); a queue to store a dataentry corresponding to an RDMA request between the source RNIC and asink RNIC of a remote device; a data buffer to store data for an RDMAtransfer corresponding to the RDMA request, the RDMA transfer betweenthe source RNIC and the sink RNIC; and a trusted execution environment(TEE) comprising an authentication tag controller to: initialize a firstauthentication tag calculated using a first key known between a sourceconsumer generating the RDMA request and the source RNIC; associate thefirst authentication tag with the data entry in the queue as integrityverification for the data entry; initialize a second authentication tagcalculated using a second key known between the source consumer and asink consumer of the remote device, the sink consumer receiving the RDMArequest; and associate the second authentication tag with the databuffer as integrity verification for the data buffer.

In Example 2, the subject matter of Example 1 can optionally includewherein the trusted execution environment further comprises acryptographic engine to encrypt contents of the data buffer and thesecond authentication tag that is added to the data buffer. In Example3, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-2 can optionally includefurther comprising one or more processors comprising one or more of aGPU, a central processing unit (CPU), or a hardware accelerator. InExample 4, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-3 can optionallyinclude wherein the queue comprises at least one of a receive queue, asend queue, a shared receive queue, or a completion queue, and whereinthe receive queue and the send queue are part of a queue pair (QP) ofthe RNIC.

In Example 5, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-4 canoptionally include wherein the TEE comprises an application initiatingthe RDMA transfer. In Example 6, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 1-5 can optionally include wherein the TEE comprises the RNIC,and wherein the RNIC comprises the authentication tag controller. InExample 7, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-6 can optionallyinclude wherein the first authentication tag and the secondauthentication tags are message authentication codes (MACs) to provideintegrity protection to the queue and the data buffer for the RDMArequest.

In Example 8, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-7 canoptionally include wherein the queue is implemented as a circularbuffer, with each data entry in the queue protected by the correspondingfirst authentication tag for the data entry. In Example 9, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 1-8 can optionally include wherein atleast one of an identifier of the queue or a sequence number of the dataentry is added to a calculation of the first authentication tag. InExample 10, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-9 can optionallyinclude wherein at least one of an identifier of a queue pair comprisingthe queue, an identifier of an end point application of the RDMArequest, or a sequence number of the data entry is added to acalculation of the first authentication tag. In Example 11, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 1-10 can optionally include wherein anupper level protocol (ULP) is to utilize the encrypted buffer and thesecond authentication tag added to the buffer as part of the RDMArequest, and wherein the RDMA request comprises at least one of an RDMAsend command, an RDMA read command, or an RDMA write command.

Example 12 is a method for facilitating protected RDMA for distributedconfidential computing. The method of Example 12 can includeinitializing, by an authentication tag controller of a trusted executionenvironment (TEE), a first authentication tag calculated using a firstkey known between a source consumer generating a remote direct memoryaccess (RDMA) request and a source RDMA network interface controller(RNIC); associating, by the authentication tag controller, the firstauthentication tag with a data entry in a queue as integrityverification for the data entry; initializing, by the authentication tagcontroller, a second authentication tag calculated using a second keyknown between the source consumer and a sink consumer of a remotedevice, the sink consumer receiving the RDMA request; and associating,by the authentication tag controller, the second authentication tag witha data buffer as integrity verification for the data buffer.

In Example 13, the subject matter of Example 12 can optionally includewherein the trusted execution environment further comprises acryptographic engine to encrypt contents of the data buffer and thesecond authentication tag that is added to the data buffer. In Example14, the subject matter of any one of Examples 12-13 can optionallyinclude wherein the queue comprises at least one of a receive queue, asend queue, a shared receive queue, or a completion queue, and whereinthe receive queue and the send queue are part of a queue pair (QP) ofthe RNIC. In Example 15, the subject matter of any one of Examples 12-14can optionally include wherein the TEE comprises the RNIC, and whereinthe RNIC comprises the authentication tag controller.

In Example 16, the subject matter of any one of Examples 12-15 canoptionally include wherein the first authentication tag and the secondauthentication tags are message authentication codes (MACs) to provideintegrity protection to the queue and the data buffer for the RDMArequest. In Example 17, the subject matter of any one of Examples 12-16can optionally include wherein at least one of an identifier of thequeue or a sequence number of the data entry is added to a calculationof the first authentication tag. In Example 18, the subject matter ofany one of Examples 12-17 can optionally include wherein at least one ofan identifier of a queue pair comprising the queue, an identifier of anend point application of the RDMA request, or a sequence number of thedata entry is added to a calculation of the first authentication tag,and wherein an upper level protocol (ULP) is to utilize the encryptedbuffer and the second authentication tag added to the buffer as part ofthe RDMA request, and wherein the RDMA request comprises at least one ofan RDMA send command, an RDMA read command, or an RDMA write command.

Example 19 is a non-transitory machine readable storage medium forfacilitating protected RDMA for distributed confidential computing. Thenon-transitory computer-readable storage medium of Example 16 havingstored thereon executable computer program instructions that, whenexecuted by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors toperform operations comprising initializing, by an authentication tagcontroller of a trusted execution environment (TEE) comprising the atleast one processor, a first authentication tag calculated using a firstkey known between a source consumer generating a remote direct memoryaccess (RDMA) request and a source RDMA network interface controller(RNIC); associating, by the authentication tag controller, the firstauthentication tag with a data entry in a queue as integrityverification for the data entry; initializing, by the authentication tagcontroller, a second authentication tag calculated using a second keyknown between the source consumer and a sink consumer of a remotedevice, the sink consumer receiving the RDMA request; and associating,by the authentication tag controller, the second authentication tag witha data buffer as integrity verification for the data buffer.

In Example 20, the subject matter of Example 19 can optionally includewherein the trusted execution environment further comprises acryptographic engine to encrypt contents of the data buffer and thesecond authentication tag that is added to the data buffer. In Example21, the subject matter of Examples 19-20 can optionally include whereinthe queue comprises at least one of a receive queue, a send queue, ashared receive queue, or a completion queue, and wherein the receivequeue and the send queue are part of a queue pair (QP) of the RNIC. InExample 22, the subject matter of Examples 19-21 can optionally includewherein the TEE comprises the RNIC, and wherein the RNIC comprises theauthentication tag controller.

In Example 23, the subject matter of Examples 19-22 can optionallyinclude wherein the first authentication tag and the secondauthentication tags are message authentication codes (MACs) to provideintegrity protection to the queue and the data buffer for the RDMArequest. In Example 24, the subject matter of Examples 19-23 canoptionally include wherein at least one of an identifier of the queue ora sequence number of the data entry is added to a calculation of thefirst authentication tag. In Example 25, the subject matter of Examples19-24 can optionally include wherein at least one of an identifier of aqueue pair comprising the queue, an identifier of an end pointapplication of the RDMA request, or a sequence number of the data entryis added to a calculation of the first authentication tag, and whereinan upper level protocol (ULP) is to utilize the encrypted buffer and thesecond authentication tag added to the buffer as part of the RDMArequest, and wherein the RDMA request comprises at least one of an RDMAsend command, an RDMA read command, or an RDMA write command.

Example 26 is an apparatus for facilitating protected RDMA fordistributed confidential computing according to implementations of thedisclosure. The apparatus of Example 26 can comprise means forinitializing, by an authentication tag controller of a trusted executionenvironment (TEE), a first authentication tag calculated using a firstkey known between a source consumer generating a remote direct memoryaccess (RDMA) request and a source RDMA network interface controller(RNIC); means for associating, by the authentication tag controller, thefirst authentication tag with a data entry in a queue as integrityverification for the data entry; means for initializing, by theauthentication tag controller, a second authentication tag calculatedusing a second key known between the source consumer and a sink consumerof a remote device, the sink consumer receiving the RDMA request; andmeans for associating, by the authentication tag controller, the secondauthentication tag with a data buffer as integrity verification for thedata buffer. In Example 27, the subject matter of Example 26 canoptionally include the apparatus further configured to perform themethod of any one of the Examples 13 to 18.

Example 28 is a system for facilitating protected RDMA for distributedconfidential computing, configured to perform the method of any one ofExamples 12-18. Example 29 is an apparatus for facilitating protectedRDMA for distributed confidential computing comprising means forperforming the method of any one of claims 12 to 18. Specifics in theExamples may be used anywhere in one or more embodiments.

Data Relocation and Command Buffer Patching for GPU Remoting

In some implementations, an apparatus, system, or process is to providedata relocation and command buffer patching for GPU remoting. In oneimplementation, data relocation and command buffer patching component902 described with respect to FIG. 9 provides the data relocation andcommand buffer patching for GPU remoting.

Hardware accelerators, such as GPUs, are structured for workloads to besubmitted through command buffers. A command buffer is a sequence ofcommands that, when executed, initialize the environment inside theaccelerator and execute kernels. Commands in a command buffer includereferences to buffers in memory that contain user data, stateinformation, various descriptors, as well as the kernel itself. Thesereferences are pointers to addresses in host memory.

In a remote acceleration scenario such as disaggregated computing, wherethe client application and the remote accelerator are on differentphysical platforms with different address spaces, command bufferscreated on the client platform cannot be directly executed on the remoteaccelerator. In implementations of the disclosure, a technique torelocate and patch command buffers and associated data structures(originally created in client host memory) in remote host memory toenable remote acceleration is provided.

In one implementation, the data relocation and command buffer pathingfor GPU remoting may operate by creating a manifest that contains thesource address and other metadata for each command buffer and datastructure that should be relocated from the client to remote serverplatform. The remote host uses the manifest to allocate memory andtransfer the data structures from client to server host. The remote hostthen patches the command buffer entries to point to local host memoryaddresses allocated in the remote host's allocated memory and thensubmits it to the accelerator. From the accelerator's point of view, thecommand buffers and data structures are in local host memory of theaccelerator and the accelerator is unaware that the command buffer wasoriginally created and submitted from a different physical host machine.

Implementations of the disclosure enable performant remote accelerationby allowing the user space components of an accelerator stack (thatcreates command buffers and other data structures) to run on a remotemachine, without incurring the overhead of frequent networkcommunication in the model where the application runs on the clientmachine and the rest of the stack runs on the remote server machine.

Implementations of the disclosure make remote acceleration transparentto the hardware (e.g., GPU), allowing remote acceleration to be enabledwith current hardware.

In the following description, for ease of illustration, GPU is used asan example of an accelerator to which implementations of the disclosureapply. However, other accelerator implementations may be utilized andnot limited to a GPU implementation.

Background: GPU Remoting Architecture

FIG. 22 is a block diagram depicting a conventional GPU stack 2200 inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure. The term ‘stack’herein may refer to a collection of subsystems or components used tocreate a complete platform. The GPU stack 2200 includes a GPU 2250locally connected to the host 2205. The user space 2202 components ofthe host 2205 include an application 2210, runtime (RT) and user modedriver (UMD) 2220. The RT and UMD 2220 construct the command buffers andvarious data structures referenced by the command buffer. A kernel space2204 of the host machine includes an OS/VMM 2240 interfacing with a hostkernel mode driver 2230.

The KMD 2230 maintains a ring buffer (not shown) that points to thecommand buffers created in user space 2202. When a workload is submittedto the GPU 2250, a Command Streamer (CS) in the GPU 2250 reads the ringbuffer to determine if there are any new work items (command buffers)and if so, executes them. The KMD 2230 is responsible for discoveringthe GPU 2250, enumerating its features, managing its resources such asmemory and scheduling workloads on the GPU.

In implementations of the disclosure, and in contrast to FIG. 22,another model of GPU remoting can be implemented where the GPU stack ispartitioned so that one part of the GPU stack runs on a client platformand the rest of the GPU stack runs on a remote platform that isconnected to the GPU. A brief description of such a GPU remotingarchitecture as shown in FIG. 23.

FIG. 23 is a block diagram depicting a GPU remoting architecture 2300 inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure. The GPU remotingarchitecture 2300 includes a GPU stack that is partitioned such that itsuser space components, including an application 2310, and RT and UMD2320 run on a client platform 2302, while the KMD 2355 controlling theremote GPU 2360 runs on a remote platform 2304. The client platform 2302and server platform 2304 can be connected over a fabric 2370 (e.g.,Ethernet) via NICs 2350 a, 2350 b. To bridge the two parts of the GPUstack, a new middleware layer, referred to herein as a GPU-over-Fabric(GoF) middleware 2330 a, 2330 b, is inserted at the bottom of the clientstack (2330 a) and at the top of the server stack (2330 b). Both clientplatform 2302 and remote platform 2304 may include an OS/VMM 2340 a,2340 b.

This GOF middleware layer 2330 a, 2330 b can serve the followingfunctions: (1) it exposes an abstraction of the remote GPU 2360 to theuserspace components on the client platform 2302; (2) it mediates thetransfer of data between the client platform 2302 and server platform2304, as well as data transfers directly between the client platform2302 and GPU 2360 using different transport protocols, such as RDMA,Infiniband, and so on. As shown in FIG. 23, the dashed lines depict theflow of data between components of the distributed stack, includingcontext information, command buffers, host memory data structures 2380and GPU memory data structures 2390. The physical flow of data over thefabric 2370 takes place via the attached NICs 2350 a, 2350 b.

The middleware 2330 a, 2330 b uses a protocol that supports operationssuch as discovery of the remote GPU 2360, authentication, connection toGPU resources (e.g., memory), and transfer of data to/from the GPU 2360,as well as remote platform 2304. A transport sublayer 2335 a, 2335 b inthe GoF middleware 2330 a, 2330 b communicates commands and data betweenthe client platform 2302 and the remote platform 2304 using a specifictransport (e.g., TCP/IP, RDMA, InfiniBand, etc.).

The GPU remoting solution works as follows. Assume that an orchestratorservice binds a client application 2310 with a remote GPU resource(outside the scope of implementations of the disclosure) of the GPU 2360and middleware 2330 a, 2330 b on both sides set up the networkcommunication channel provided by fabric 2370. The application 2310invokes a runtime API to specify data buffers and kernels that computeon user data. The runtime and UMD 2320 construct command buffers thatinitialize the GPU environment and reference various buffers, kernelsand data structures utilized for execution. The UMD 2320 submits theworkload to the remote GPU server platform 2304 via the GoF middleware2330 a, 2330 b. This may mean that the command buffers and all theassociated data structures are to be relocated to the remote host memoryof the remote platform 2304. As the data structures were constructed inthe client platform 2302, they contain addresses that are not valid onthe remote host platform 2304 and hence they should be patched. Once therelocation and patching are completed in the remote GoF middleware 2330a, 2330 b, the workload is submitted by the remote KMD 2355 to the GPU2360.

Further discussion below details a data structure referred to as themanifest that is used to detail the various data structures that shouldbe relocated and the interdependencies between them, the process ofrelocating the data structures using the manifest, and an explanation ofhow command buffers can be patched before the job is submitted to thelocal GPU on the remote machine.

Manifest

With reference to the manifest, the manifest may refer to a datastructure that includes one entry for each data structure that should berelocated from client host memory to server host memory.

FIG. 24A depicts a graph 2400 representing a set of command buffers withassociated data structures, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. Each node in the graph 2400 represents a region of memorythat contains either a command buffer (e.g., command buffer 1 (CB1)2405, command buffer 2 (CB2) 2410, command buffer 3 (CB3) 2415) orassociated data structure (e.g., state and descriptor heap 1 2420, stateand descriptor heap 2 2430, kernel 1 2425, kernel 2 2435, etc.). Theedges of the graph 2400 describe the dependencies between the nodes ofthe graph 2400. For example, there is an edge from node i to node j inthe graph 2400, if the data structure associated with node i contains amemory reference (address) to node j.

As shown in FIG. 24A, CB1 2405, CB2 2410, and CB3 2415 are commandbuffers. CB1 2405 is the top-level command buffer, which in turn invokesCB2 2410 and CB3 2415. CB2 2410 references a state and descriptor heap(HEAP1) 2420 and a kernel (KERN1) 2425. Similarly, CB3 2415 referencesanother state and descriptor heap (HEAP2) 2430 and a kernel (KERN2)2435. These data structures can be created by the runtime/UMD on theclient machine (such as RT+UMD 2320 described with respect to FIG. 23).

FIG. 24B illustrates a manifest 2450 for data relocation and commandbuffer patching, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.Manifest 2450 may be a data structure representing the nodes and edgesof a graph, such as graph 2400 of FIG. 24A. There is one entry 2455 foreach node in the graph. Each node is identified by an ID 2460 and hasfields for source address 2465 (client host memory address), size 2470,destination 2475 (remote host memory or GPU local memory/address) and alist of any dependencies 2480 (identifiers of nodes in the graph that itreferences).

In order to relocate these data structure corresponding to entries 2455to their target memory locations, the manifest 2450 is transported tothe remote GoF middleware (such as GoF middleware 2330 b described withrespect to FIG. 23). In the next section, it is described how therelocation is accomplished.

Data and Command Buffer Relocation

FIG. 25 illustrates a GPU remoting architecture 2500 depicting therelocation of the data and command buffers using a manifest, inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure. In oneimplementation, GPU remoting architecture 2500 may be the same as GPUremoting architecture 2300 described with respect to FIG. 23. GPUremoting architecture 2500 include a client host memory 2510 of a clientplatform, and server host memory 2520 and GPU local memory 2530 of aremote GPU connected to the remote platform.

In one implementation, a manifest 2450, such as manifest 2450 describedwith respect to FIG. 24B, is depicted as being passed from the clientplatform to the remote platform (e.g., via a GoF middleware layer 2330a, 2330 b as described with respect to FIG. 23). As indicated in themanifest 2450, the command buffers 2405, 2410, 2415 and state anddescriptor heaps 2420, 2430 can be copied to the server host memory2520, while the compute kernels 2425, 2435 can be copied to GPU localmemory 2530 of the remote GPU.

With respect to the transfer of the command buffers and descriptor heapsto remote host memory 2520, the server platform can utilize the manifest2450 to implement this transfer. For example, utilizing the manifest2450, the server platform identifies the data structures that should becopied to its host memory (e.g., CB1 2405, CB2 2410, CB3 2415, state anddescriptor heap 1 2420, state and descriptor heap 2 2430), along withtheir source addresses (on the client machine) and their size asindicated in manifest 2450.

The server platform allocates memory in server host memory 2520 for thedata structures to be transferred and initiates the copies from clientplatform to server host memory 2520. In one implementation, the copiesmay be made using an efficient protocol such as RDMA. In the example,the server platform allocates server host memory 2520 for CB1 2405, CB22410, CB3 2415, HEAP1 2420, and HEAP2 2430. As shown in FIG. 25, thetarget addresses (after allocation) for these data structures are A1′,A2′, A3′, A4′, and A6′, respectively.

Similarly, for data/code (kernels) that should be copied to the GPU'slocal memory 2530, the KMD on the server (e.g., KMD 2355 described withrespect to FIG. 23) allocates the GPU local memory 2530 based on thesizes specified in the manifest 2450. As shown in FIG. 25, the addressesA5′ and A7′ for KERN1 2425 and KERN2 2435 in the manifest 2450 are theGPU virtual addresses assigned to them on the client machine. Thoseaddresses are mapped to the GPU physical addresses based on theallocation by the KMD in the GPU page tables. The server platforminitiates a copy of the GPU-bound data/code (kernels) from the clientplatform (client host memory 2510). Note that a direct copy to GPUmemory can be used to minimize latency. In some implementations, it ispossible to copy these data structures to server host memory 2530 andhave the Command Streamer in the GPU perform the DMA into GPU localmemory. However, in that case, the destination field of those datastructures in the manifest 2450 would indicate “HOST,” not “GPU”.

The final step in this process is the patching of the command buffers toreflect the new addresses associated with the data structures that werecopied to the server. This is described in the next section.

Command Buffer Patching

With reference to FIG. 25, the original command buffers constructed onthe client platform referenced addresses that were valid on thatplatform. For example, CB2 2410 and CB3 2415 reference HEAP1 2420 andHEAP2 2430 at addresses A4 and A6 on the client platform, respectively.After the command buffers and heaps are relocated to the server hostmemory 2520, these references in CB2 and CB3 become invalid. Therefore,such references that become invalid should be patched. In the case ofCB2 2410 and CB3 2415, the new addresses referencing the heaps becomeA4′ and A6′, respectively. Similarly addresses in CB1 2405 that point toCB2 2410 and CB3 2415 should be patched to A2′ and A3′, respectively.

In the example, since the kernels KERN1 2425 and KERN2 2435 are copiedto GPU local memory directly by the server platform, the GPU should notexecute the original copy commands in CB2 2410 and CB3 2415 for theirtransfer. Therefore, those commands can be deleted from the commandbuffers. This completes the patching of the command buffers.

After relocation and patching, the KMD can prepare the context andsubmit the workload to the GPU. The Command Streamer in the GPU can findthe command buffers and associated data structures in either server orGPU local memory and all memory references in those data structureswould be valid. It can then execute the command buffers as if they wereprepared on the local server. In some implementations, for end-to-endsecurity, protecting the integrity of command buffers and otherassociated data structures can be performed.

FIG. 26 is a flow diagram illustrating a method 2600 for providing datarelocation and command buffer patching for GPU remoting, in accordancewith implementations of the disclosure. Method 2600 may be performed byprocessing logic that may comprise hardware (e.g., circuitry, dedicatedlogic, programmable logic, etc.), software (such as instructions run ona processing device), or a combination thereof. More particularly, themethod 2600 may be implemented in one or more modules as a set of logicinstructions stored in a machine- or computer-readable storage mediumsuch as RAM, ROM, PROM, firmware, flash memory, etc., in configurablelogic such as, for example, PLAs, FPGAs, CPLDs, in fixed-functionalitylogic hardware using circuit technology such as, for example, ASIC, CMOSor TTL technology, or any combination thereof.

The process of method 2600 is illustrated in linear sequences forbrevity and clarity in presentation; however, it is contemplated thatany number of them can be performed in parallel, asynchronously, or indifferent orders. Further, for brevity, clarity, and ease ofunderstanding, many of the components and processes described withrespect to FIGS. 22-25 may not be repeated or discussed hereafter. Inone implementation, a processor providing a middleware layer, such asGoF middleware layer 2330 a, 2330 b described with respect to FIG. 23,may perform method 2600.

Method 2600 begins at block 2610 where a processor may receive amanifest corresponding to graph nodes representing regions of memory ofa remote client machine, the graph nodes corresponding to at least onecommand buffer and to associated data structures and kernels of the atleast one command buffer. In one implementation, the manifest indicatesa destination memory location of each of the graph nodes anddependencies of each of the graph nodes. At block 2620, the processormay identify, based on the manifest, the at least one command buffer andthe associated data structures to copy to the host memory.

Subsequently, at block 2630, the processor may identify, based on themanifest, the kernels to copy to local memory of the hardwareaccelerator. Lastly, at block 2640, the processor may patch addresses inthe at least one command buffer copied to the host memory with updatedaddresses of corresponding locations in the host memory.

The following examples pertain to further embodiments of data relocationand command buffer patching for GPU remoting. Example 1 is an apparatusto facilitate data relocation and command buffer patching for GPUremoting. The apparatus of Example 1 comprises a host memory; a hardwareaccelerator; and one or more processors communicably coupled to the hostmemory and the hardware accelerator, the one or more processors tofacilitate: receiving a manifest corresponding to graph nodesrepresenting regions of memory of a remote client machine, the graphnodes corresponding to at least one command buffer and to associateddata structures and kernels of the at least one command buffer used toinitialize the hardware accelerator and execute the kernels, and themanifest indicating a destination memory location of each of the graphnodes and dependencies of each of the graph nodes; identifying, based onthe manifest, the at least one command buffer and the associated datastructures to copy to the host memory; identifying, based on themanifest, the kernels to copy to local memory of the hardwareaccelerator; and patching addresses in the at least one command buffercopied to the host memory with updated addresses of correspondinglocations in the host memory.

In Example 2, the subject matter of Example 1 can optionally includewherein the manifest comprises a data structure storing at least one ofa description, an identifier, a source address, a size, a destination,or a dependency for each of the graph nodes. In Example 3, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 1-2 can optionally include wherein themanifest is received from the remote client machine, and wherein the atleast one command buffer referenced by the manifest comprises commandsto initialize an environment inside the hardware accelerator and executethe kernels. In Example 4, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-3can optionally include wherein the hardware accelerator comprises agraphics processing unit (GPU).

In Example 5, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-4 canoptionally include wherein the remote client machine comprises userspacecomponents of an accelerator stack of the hardware accelerator, andwherein a remainder of the accelerator stack executes on the apparatus.In Example 6, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-5 canoptionally include wherein a middleware component is to expose anabstraction of the apparatus to the userspace components of theaccelerator stack on the remote client machine, and is to mediatetransfer of data between the remote client machine and the hardwareaccelerator.

In Example 7, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-6 canoptionally include wherein the associated data structures comprise oneor more descriptor heaps. In Example 8, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 1-7 can optionally include wherein patching the addressescomprises: identifying the addresses in the at least one command buffer;identifying the updated addresses of the corresponding locations in thehost memory; and replacing the addresses with the updated addresses inthe at least one command buffer copied to the host memory. In Example 9,the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-8 can optionally includewherein the one or more processors comprise one or more of a GPU, acentral processing unit (CPU), or a hardware accelerator.

Example 10 is a method for facilitating data relocation and commandbuffer patching for GPU remoting. The method of Example 10 can includereceiving, by one or more processors communicably coupled to a hostmemory and a hardware accelerator a manifest corresponding to graphnodes representing regions of memory of a remote client machine, thegraph nodes corresponding to at least one command buffer and toassociated data structures and kernels of the at least one commandbuffer used to initialize the hardware accelerator and execute thekernels, and the manifest indicating a destination memory location ofeach of the graph nodes and dependencies of each of the graph nodes;identifying, by the one or more processors based on the manifest, the atleast one command buffer and the associated data structures to copy tothe host memory; identifying, by the one or more processors based on themanifest, the kernels to copy to local memory of the hardwareaccelerator; and patching, by the one or more processors, addresses inthe at least one command buffer copied to the host memory with updatedaddresses of corresponding locations in the host memory.

In Example 11, the subject matter of Example 10 can optionally includewherein the manifest comprises a data structure storing at least one ofa description, an identifier, a source address, a size, a destination,or a dependency for each of the graph nodes. In Example 12, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 10-11 can optionally include wherein themanifest is received from the remote client machine, and wherein the atleast one command buffer referenced by the manifest comprises commandsto initialize an environment inside the hardware accelerator and executethe kernels. In Example 13, the subject matter of any one of Examples10-12 can optionally include wherein the remote client machine comprisesuserspace components of an accelerator stack of the hardwareaccelerator, and wherein a remainder of the accelerator stack executeson the apparatus.

In Example 14, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-13 canoptionally include wherein a middleware component is to expose anabstraction of the apparatus to the userspace components of theaccelerator stack on the remote client machine, and is to mediatetransfer of data between the remote client machine and the hardwareaccelerator. In Example 15, the subject matter of any one of Examples10-14 can optionally include, wherein the associated data structurescomprise one or more descriptor heaps.

In Example 16, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-15 canoptionally include wherein patching the addresses comprises: identifyingthe addresses in the at least one command buffer; identifying theupdated addresses of the corresponding locations in the host memory; andreplacing the addresses with the updated addresses in the at least onecommand buffer copied to the host memory.

Example 17 is a non-transitory machine readable storage medium forfacilitating data relocation and command buffer patching for GPUremoting. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of Example17 having stored thereon executable computer program instructions that,when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or moreprocessors to perform operations comprising receive, by the at least oneprocessor communicably coupled to a host memory and a hardwareaccelerator a manifest corresponding to graph nodes representing regionsof memory of a remote client machine, the graph nodes corresponding toat least one command buffer and to associated data structures andkernels of the at least one command buffer used to initialize thehardware accelerator and execute the kernels, and the manifestindicating a destination memory location of each of the graph nodes anddependencies of each of the graph nodes; identify, by the at least oneprocessor based on the manifest, the at least one command buffer and theassociated data structures to copy to the host memory; identify, by theat least one processor based on the manifest, the kernels to copy tolocal memory of the hardware accelerator; and patch, by the at least oneprocessor, addresses in the at least one command buffer copied to thehost memory with updated addresses of corresponding locations in thehost memory.

In Example 18, the subject matter of Example 17 can optionally includewherein the manifest comprises a data structure storing at least one ofa description, an identifier, a source address, a size, a destination,or a dependency for each of the graph nodes. In Example 19, the subjectmatter of Examples 17-18 can optionally include wherein the manifest isreceived from the remote client machine, and wherein the at least onecommand buffer referenced by the manifest comprises commands toinitialize an environment inside the hardware accelerator and executethe kernels. In Example 20, the subject matter of Examples 17-19 canoptionally include wherein patching the addresses comprises: identifyingthe addresses in the at least one command buffer; identifying theupdated addresses of the corresponding locations in the host memory; andreplacing the addresses with the updated addresses in the at least onecommand buffer copied to the host memory.

Example 21 is an apparatus for facilitating data relocation and commandbuffer patching for GPU remoting according to implementations of thedisclosure. The apparatus of Example 21 can comprise means forreceiving, by one or more processors communicably coupled to a hostmemory and a hardware accelerator a manifest corresponding to graphnodes representing regions of memory of a remote client machine, thegraph nodes corresponding to at least one command buffer and toassociated data structures and kernels of the at least one commandbuffer used to initialize the hardware accelerator and execute thekernels, and the manifest indicating a destination memory location ofeach of the graph nodes and dependencies of each of the graph nodes;means for identifying, by the one or more processors based on themanifest, the at least one command buffer and the associated datastructures to copy to the host memory; means for identifying, by the oneor more processors based on the manifest, the kernels to copy to localmemory of the hardware accelerator; and means for patching, by the oneor more processors, addresses in the at least one command buffer copiedto the host memory with updated addresses of corresponding locations inthe host memory. In Example 22, the subject matter of Example 21 canoptionally include the apparatus further configured to perform themethod of any one of the Examples 11 to 16.

Example 23 is a system for facilitating data relocation and commandbuffer patching for GPU remoting, configured to perform the method ofany one of Examples 10-16. Example 24 is an apparatus for facilitatingdata relocation and command buffer patching for GPU remoting comprisingmeans for performing the method of any one of claims 10 to 16. Specificsin the Examples may be used anywhere in one or more embodiments.

GPU Remoting

In some embodiments, an apparatus, system, or process is to provide GPUremoting to driver-managed GPUs and/or to autonomous GPUs. In oneimplementation, remoting component 903 described with respect to FIG. 9provides the remoting to driver-managed GPUs. In one implementation,remoting component 903 described with respect to FIG. 9 provides theremoting to autonomous GPUs.

There is a strong trend toward disaggregating compute resources, such asGPU and/or other hardware accelerators, in cloud datacenters.Disaggregation enables Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) to utilize theiraccelerator resources more efficiently and lowers their cost. By poolingGPUs and making them available to client applications on demand, CSPs donot have to overprovision individual server platforms to meet peakdemand. GPU disaggregation also improves the performance of certainapplications, like machine learning (ML) training, because a workloadcan use as many GPUs as possible to improve performance, rather than beconstrained by the number of GPUs attached to a specific platform.

To make a remote GPU accessible to a client application running on adifferent platform, the GPU stack should be distributed over twoplatforms—one on which the client application is run and the other towhich the GPU is physically attached. The solution for GPU remotingshould ensure that the performance overhead due to network communicationlatency between the two platforms is minimized. In addition, theremoting architecture should be able to support secure offloading ofworkloads from the client platform to the remote GPU. Otherconsiderations might include minimizing the changes to GPU hardware forremoting, as well as support for a variety of different GPU stacks(e.g., OpenCL, OpenGL, Vulkan, DX12, DPC++ etc.)

Conventional GPU Architecture

Referring back to FIG. 22, a conventional GPU stack 2200 is depicted. Aspreviously noted, the term stack herein may refer to a collection ofsubsystems or components needed to create a complete platform. GPU stack2200 may include a GPU 2250 locally connected to a host 2205 (e.g., hostcomputing device, host machine, etc.). The host 2205 may be divided intoa user space 2202 and a kernel space 2204. The user space 2202components include an application 2210, runtime (RT) and user modedriver (UMD) 2220. The RT and UMD 2220 can construct command buffers andvarious data structures referenced by the command buffer in order tointeract with the GPU 2250. The kernel space 220 can include a host KMD2230 and an OS/VMM 2240. The KMD 2230 is responsible for discovering theGPU 2250, enumerating its features, managing its resources, such asmemory, and scheduling workloads on the GPU 2250. The KMD 2230 maintainsa ring buffer (not shown) that points to the command buffers created inuser space 2202, along with other context information, such as pagetables, that translate graphics virtual addresses to physical addresses.

When a workload is submitted to the GPU 2250, a Command Streamer (CS)(not shown) in the GPU 2250 reads the ring buffer to determine if thereare any new work items. When the CS finds new jobs, it executes thecommands in the corresponding command buffers. When the command bufferis executed, the GPU environment is initialized in preparation for thekernel to run, memory buffers that should be in GPU local memory arecopied from host memory, and finally, the kernel is dispatched to SIMDexecution cores. After the kernel has completed execution, an interruptis posted to notify the application 2210 that the results are availablefor processing.

GPU Remoting to Driver-Managed GPUS

In one implementation, an apparatus, system, or process is to provideGPU remoting to driver-managed GPUs. For example, remoting component 903described with respect to FIG. 9 provides the remoting to driver-managedGPUs. Implementations of the disclosure provide a solution for GPUremoting that involves partitioning the GPU stack to run all of theuserspace components (e.g., application, runtime, UMDs) on one platform,and connecting the userspace components over a network to adriver-managed remote GPU on a different platform. Implementations ofthe GPU remoting to driver-managed GPUs as described herein offersbetter performance than conventional solutions, while also meeting otherrequirements for security and support of various userspace GPU stackswithin a single framework.

The conventional approach to partitioning the GPU stack for remoteacceleration has been API forwarding. FIG. 27 illustrates a GPU stackimplementing API forwarding in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. GPU stack 2700 is depicted as running the application 2710on one platform, the client platform 2702, and the rest of the GPU stack2700 on another platform, the remote platform 2704. Client platform 2702includes an OS 2740, while remote platform 2704 includes OS 2770. Whenthe application 2710 makes API calls 2705 to the GPU runtime layer 2750,it is intercepted and forwarded to the remote platform 2704, where theruntime 2750 (which previously would have been implemented in clientplatform 2702 as RT/VIVID 2720 in a non-remote implementation) and KMD2760 (which previously would have been implemented in client platform2702 as KMD 2730 in a non-remote implementation) service the application2710 and interface with the GPU 2780 that is connected to the remoteplatform 2704. The RT and UMD 2750 prepare context 2715, while the KMD2760 schedules the context 2725 to the GPU 2780.

While approaches such as API forwarding might suffice for some classesof applications that are not latency sensitive, it suffers from a numberof drawbacks. Some limitations of this approach include, but are notlimited to, high latency incurred due to large volume of runtime APIcalls made over the network to the remote platform and the requirementof all data and commands having to go through the remote CPU beforebeing forwarded to GPU or client CPU, a requirement to have a TrustedExecution Environment (TEE) on the remote platform to secure the dataand computation on the CPU, and having GPU applications run on differentstacks and each stack may utilize its own custom implementation of APIforwarding, since each of these stacks has a different runtime.

Implementations of the disclosure provide for GPU remoting todriver-managed GPUs where the GPU stack is partitioned between userspaceand kernel space components, with the former running on the clientapplication host and the latter on a remote host that is connected tothe GPU. In implementations of the disclosure, a GPU remoting middlewarelayer bridges the two halves of the GPU stack across the network. Userdata, along with command buffers and other data structures, are preparedon the application host and transported to the server, where the kernelmode driver uses them to prepare the context and schedules the workloadon the GPU.

Implementations of the disclosure provide a technical improvement byallowing CSPs to deploy a GPU pooling/remoting solution in clouddatacenters. Furthermore, by natively supporting remoting for varioussoftware stacks, GPUs can become candidates for various Cloud deploymentsolutions that implement scalability, performance, and security.

In implementations of the disclosure, the GPU stack is partitionedbetween the userspace and kernel space components. The userspacecomponents (application, runtime and UMD) run on one platform. Thekernel space component (KMD) run on a remote platform that is physicallyconnected to the GPU. The two halves of the stack are bridged across thefabric by a middleware called, called GPU-over-Fabric (GoF) middleware.

FIG. 28 illustrates the GPU remoting stack 2800 implementing GPUremoting to driver-managed GPUs, in accordance with implementations ofthe disclosure. In one implementation, the GPU stack 2800 is partitionedbetween userspace and kernel space components. The user space componentsinclude the application 2810 and the RT and UMD 2820 running on theclient machine 2802. The kernel space components include the KMD 2855running on a remote host (e.g., GPU server machine 2804) that isconnected to the GPU 2860.

In implementations of the disclosure, a GPU remoting middleware layer,such as GoF middleware (MW) 2830 a, 2830 b bridges the two halves of theGPU stack 2800 across a network. User data along with command buffersand other data structures 2880 are prepared on the client machine 2802and transported to the GPU server machine 2804, where the KMD 2855 usesthem to prepare the context and schedules the workload 2890 on the GPU2860.

The responsibilities of the various components of the GPU remoting stack2800 are as follows. The application 2810 selects the GPU 2860 foracceleration and provides kernels and inputs for the accelerationworkload. The RT/UMD 2820 services API calls from the application 2810and constructs command buffers that can be executed by a CS in the GPU2860. In one implementation, the RT/UMD 2820 compiles GPU kernels (JIT)in source form to instructions in the GPU ISA.

The KMD 2855 manages GPU resources, such as memory, prepares context,and schedules workloads to run on the GPU 2860.

GoF Middleware 2830 a, 2830 b provides a transport-agnostic interfacefor the userspace components to discover and use the remote GPU 2860. Atransport sublayer 2835 a, 2835 b in the GoF middleware 2830 a, 2830 bcommunicates commands and data between the client platform and theserver platform using a specific transport (e.g., TCP/IP, RDMA,InfiniBand, etc.). In one implementation, the GoF middleware 2830 a,2830 b uses a protocol that supports operations, such as discovery ofthe remote GPU, authentication, connection to GPU resources (e.g.,memory), and transfer of data to/from the GPU 2860, as well as GPUserver machine 2804.

Implementations of the disclosure can utilize an integrated NIC 2850 a,2850 b, 2860 for direct transfers between client machine 2802 and GPUlocal memory of GPU 2860 via fabric 2870 (e.g., Ethernet, etc.). AnOS/VMM 2840 a, 2840 b on each of client machine 2802 and GPU servermachine 2804 may manage the utilization of NICs 2850 a, 2850 b, 2860.

A number of challenges for GPU remoting using driver-managed GPUs canarise due to the distributed nature of the GPU remoting stack. Thechallenges can be grouped into the following categories: (1) ControlPath; (2) Data Path; (3) Security; and (4) Performance. These challengesare discussed below in further detail.

(1) Control Path

Device Discovery and Connection: The client application utilizes a wayto discover the remote GPU and its capabilities before it can select itfor accelerating its workload. Information about the model of the GPU isalso utilized to compile compute kernels that can execute on the GPU.

Workload Submission: Since the KMD, which schedules workloads on theGPU, is on a remote platform, the UMD on the client platform should havesome way to submit command buffers and associated data structures acrossthe network to the remote server/GPU.

Event Notification: During execution of the workload by the GPU,asynchronous events (e.g., synchronization operations, interrupts) thatwould normally result in notifications to the local host platform cannow have to be relayed to the userspace software on the remote clientplatform.

(2) Data Path

Access to GPU Resources: GPU local memory resources that would be mappedinto the application's address space can't be directly mapped becausethe application and the userspace software are on a different physicalmachine.

Different Address Spaces: Command buffers and associated data structuresprepared on the client platform use host memory addresses that can nolonger be directly accessed by the remote GPU.

Data Transfer: User data (e.g., compute kernels, input data) should betransported to remote GPU local memory over the network. Similarly,results computed by the GPU should be transferred back to the clienthost.

(3) Security

Confidentiality: Confidentiality of user data and compute kernels(potential IP) should be ensured.

Integrity: To ensure that the results of the computation in the GPU canbe trusted, the user data and kernels, as well as command buffers andother associated data structures that drive the execution of theworkload in the GPU, should be protected.

TEE Availability: TEEs on CPUs are not ubiquitous today. In a GPUremoting system, the CPU controlling a pool of GPUs might not have a TEEto protect sensitive code and data.

(4) Performance

Network Latency: A major source of latency is associated with thetransfer of data, meta data and control information over the fabricbetween the client and server platforms.

Server Latency: Another source of latency is associated with goingthrough the remote host to get to the GPU, since the GPU is managed bythe KMD running on the remote host.

The above challenges can be addressed using the driver-managed GPUremoting techniques described herein, as described as follows:

(1) Control Path: The control of the remote GPU rests with the KMDrunning on the remote host. The KMD is responsible for discovering thedevice, enumerating its features and managing its resources (such asmemory) and scheduling jobs on the GPU. In order to connect the clientapplication to the remote GPU, the following may happen.

First, availability of the GPU should be advertised to an OrchestrationService (in Cloud datacenters the job of matching clients with theaccelerator resources they utilize is done by an OrchestrationService.). The GoF middleware running on the server platform canadvertise the availability of the GPU to the Orchestration Service. Theservice which keeps track of client requests (for GPUs) can then matchan available GPU to a client.

The peer GoF middleware layers on the client and server execute aprotocol that connects the client with the remote GPU. The protocolwould allow the client to discover the features of the GPU, connect toit, authenticate it, and so on.

After acquiring information about the remote GPU, the client GoFmiddleware can build a device model of the GPU, which it then uses torespond to client requests about GPU features and capabilities. Theapplication can use information about the GPU's features to determine ifit wants to offload its workload to the GPU. Having selected a specificremote GPU, information about the specific model of the GPU can enablejust-in-time compilation of compute kernels to the target GPU'sinstruction set.

The runtime and UMD on the client platform prepare the command buffersand other data structures for the GPU Command Streamer and they aretransported from the client to server platform via the GoF middlewarelayer. The GoF layer on the server is a proxy for the application stackon the client platform. It interacts with the KMD and local OS toallocate host memory for data structures received from the client andperforms some processing to ensure that the command buffers and otherdata structures received from the client can be consumed by the GPUCommand Streamer (see next section for some more details). It theninvokes the KMD when it is ready to submit the workload. The context forthe workload is prepared on the remote server by the KMD. The KMDpopulates the graphics page tables that can translate graphics virtualaddresses (used by the compute kernel) to physical addresses; sets upthe ring buffer (which points to the command buffers) and other datastructures that constitute the GPU context; and schedules the workloadwhen the context is ready.

Asynchronous events, such as interrupts, generated during executioninterrupt the driver on the server platform, which notifies the GoFmiddleware on the server. The GoF middleware layer relays thenotifications to its peer on the client, which then propagates it up theuserspace stack to the runtime or application.

(2) Data Path: There two data paths in the system. The command buffersand associated data structures such as state and descriptor heaps haveto copied to remote host memory because they should be pre-processedbefore the job is submitted to the GPU. Compute kernels and user datacan be directly copied to GPU local memory once the correct destinationaddresses are known.

Since command buffers and other data structures are constructed by theruntime/UMD on the client platform, they have client host addressesinside them where they reference external memory regions. Thesestructures have to be relocated to the remote host memory and thecorresponding addresses “patched” in the data structures before the GPUCommand Streamer can process them. The basic idea is to create amanifest listing all the memory regions that have to be copied fromclient host memory to either the remote host or GPU memory. The manifestis transferred to the GoF middleware on the server, which allocates hostmemory to receive the data structures, with the help of the local OS.Then, the server GoF middleware copies the memory regions to server hostmemory 2885. After the copy is completed, the addresses in those datastructures can be modified (patched) 2885 to reflect their new hostmemory locations on the server. Then, the KMD can prepare the contextfor submission to the GPU 2895.

Compute kernels and user data that should be in GPU local memory are notcopied to the remote host memory. GoF middleware on the server canidentify such data structures from the manifest and copy them directlyto GPU local memory. However, it should know the target addresses in GPUlocal memory before it can initiate the copy operations. GoF middlewareon the server can obtain the target addresses for the compute kernelsand user data from the KMD (which manages GPU local memory) and initiatedirect transfer of such data from client host memory to GPU localmemory.

When the workload is eventually submitted, the GPU Command Streamer canread and execute the command buffers from the server's host memory. Alladdresses encountered by the Command Streamer in the command buffers andassociated data structures can be local host memory addresses (becausethey were patched). Since the context (GPU page tables) was prepared bythe KMD and the kernels and data were copied to GPU memory, when theCommand Streamer dispatches the kernel, the GPU's execution units canfind the kernel and its input data in memory, with the addresstranslations in the page tables, ready for execution.

In addition to copying data between host and GPU by commands in thecommand buffer, it is also possible to map GPU local memory to theaddress space of the client application stack. The remoting protocolimplements primitives that can perform the mapping. The mappingoperation returns a handle (to GPU memory) to the application stack.This handle can be used to read/write from/to GPU memory directly.

(3) Security: While security of the GPU remoting solution is not thefocus of this IDF, the following points are worth noting. The userspacecomponents that do most of the data and command buffer processing are onthe client machine and should run inside a TEE (e.g., Intel® SGX) toprotect confidentiality and integrity during execution. When data istransferred to the remote platform, it should be encrypted andintegrity-protected.

Certain data structures, such as command buffers, should not beencrypted because they are processed (patched) by GoF middleware on theserver. However, since they are integrity-protected, the problem ofpatching after the integrity tags have been computed on the client sideshould be solved, as the server platform might not have a TEE. Finally,the GPU itself can isolate its workloads and protect theirconfidentiality and integrity during execution in its memory.

(4) Performance: The GPU remoting system described in implementations ofthe disclosure reduces network latency as well as remote server latency.Since all the user space components run the client host, the highfrequency interactions between the application, runtime and UMD occur ona single platform and does not have to incur network communicationoverhead. The data path is also optimized further by routing datatargeting GPU memory (such as kernels and user data) directly to theGPU, bypassing the remote host. The responsibility of the stack on theremote host is limited to command buffer preprocessing, contextpreparation and scheduling. This reduces the latency associated withoperations performed on the remote server.

FIG. 29 is a flow diagram illustrating a method 2900 for GPU remoting todriver-managed GPUs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. Method 2900 may be performed by processing logic that maycomprise hardware (e.g., circuitry, dedicated logic, programmable logic,etc.), software (such as instructions run on a processing device), or acombination thereof. More particularly, the method 2900 may beimplemented in one or more modules as a set of logic instructions storedin a machine- or computer-readable storage medium such as RAM, ROM,PROM, firmware, flash memory, etc., in configurable logic such as, forexample, PLAs, FPGAs, CPLDs, in fixed-functionality logic hardware usingcircuit technology such as, for example, ASIC, CMOS or TTL technology,or any combination thereof.

The process of method 2900 is illustrated in linear sequences forbrevity and clarity in presentation; however, it is contemplated thatany number of them can be performed in parallel, asynchronously, or indifferent orders. Further, for brevity, clarity, and ease ofunderstanding, many of the components and processes described withrespect to FIG. 27-28 may not be repeated or discussed hereafter. In oneimplementation, a processor providing a middleware layer, such as GoFmiddleware layer 2830 a, 2830 b described with respect to FIG. 28, mayperform method 2900.

Method 2900 begins at block 2910 where a processor may provide a remoteGPU middleware layer to act as a proxy for an application stack on aclient platform separate from a remote device hosting the remote GPUmiddleware layer. At block 2920, the processor may receive, from theclient platform, command buffers and data structures generated by theapplication stack for consumption by a command streamer of a remote GPU.

Subsequently, at block 2930, the processor may communicate with a kernelmode driver to cause host memory of the remote device to be allocatedfor the command buffers and the data structures. Lastly, at block 2940,the processor may invoke, by the remote GPU middleware layer, the kernelmode driver to submit a workload generated by the application stack forprocessing by the remote GPU using the command buffers and the datastructures allocated in the host memory of the remote device.

The following examples pertain to further embodiments of GPU remoting todriver-managed GPUs. Example 1 is an apparatus to facilitate GPUremoting to driver-managed GPUs. The apparatus of Example 1 compriseshost memory; a remote graphics processing unit (GPU); and one or moreprocessors communicably coupled to the host memory and the remote GPU,the one or more processors to: provide a remote GPU middleware layer toact as a proxy for an application stack on a client platform separatefrom the apparatus; communicate, by the remote GPU middleware layer,with a kernel mode driver of the one or more processors to cause thehost memory to be allocated for command buffers and data structuresreceived from the client platform for consumption by a command streamerof the remote GPU; and invoke, by the remote GPU middleware layer, thekernel mode driver to submit a workload generated by the applicationstack, the workload submitted for processing by the remote GPU using thecommand buffers and the data structures allocated in the host memory asdirected by the command streamer.

In Example 2, the subject matter of Example 1 can optionally includewherein the command buffers and data structures are received from aruntime component and user mode driver component of the client platform,and wherein the command buffers and data structures are generated basedon instructions from the application stack. In Example 3, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 1-2 can optionally include wherein thekernel mode driver utilizes the command buffers and data structures toprepare a context of the workload and schedule the workload on theremote GPU. In Example 4, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-3can optionally include wherein the remote GPU middleware layer is toexpose an abstraction of the apparatus to the userspace components ofthe accelerator stack on the remote client machine, and is to mediatetransfer of data between the remote client machine and the hardwareaccelerator.

In Example 5, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-4 canoptionally include wherein the remote GPU middleware layer is atransport-agnostic interface for the application stack on the clientplatform. In Example 6, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-5can optionally include wherein the remote GPU middleware layer comprisesa transport sublayer to communicate command and data between the clientplatform and the apparatus. In Example 7, the subject matter of any oneof Examples 1-6 can optionally include wherein the remote GPU comprisesa network interface controller (NIC) for direct transfers of databetween the client platform and the remote GPU.

In Example 8, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-7 canoptionally include wherein a GPU local memory of the remote GPU ismapped to an address space of the application stack of the clientplatform to allow the application stack to access the GPU local memorydirectly. In Example 9, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-8can optionally include wherein the one or more processors comprise oneor more of a GPU, a central processing unit (CPU), or a hardwareaccelerator.

Example 10 is a method for facilitating d GPU remoting to driver-managedGPUs. The method of Example 10 can include providing, by one or moreprocessors communicably coupled to a host memory and a remote graphicsprocessing unit (GPU), a remote GPU middleware layer to act as a proxyfor an application stack on a client platform separate from theapparatus; communicating, by the remote GPU middleware layer, with akernel mode driver of the one or more processors to cause the hostmemory to be allocated for command buffers and data structures receivedfrom the client platform for consumption by a command streamer of theremote GPU; and invoking, by the remote GPU middleware layer, the kernelmode driver to submit a workload generated by the application stack, theworkload submitted for processing by the remote GPU using the commandbuffers and the data structures allocated in the host memory as directedby the command streamer.

In Example 11, the subject matter of Example 10 can optionally includewherein the command buffers and data structures are received from aruntime component and user mode driver component of the client platform,and wherein the command buffers and data structures are generated basedon instructions from the application stack. In Example 12, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 10-11 can optionally include wherein thekernel mode driver utilizes the command buffers and data structures toprepare a context of the workload and schedule the workload on theremote GPU.

In Example 13, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-12 canoptionally include wherein the remote GPU middleware layer is to exposean abstraction of the apparatus to the userspace components of theaccelerator stack on the remote client machine, and is to mediatetransfer of data between the remote client machine and the hardwareaccelerator. In Example 14, the subject matter of any one of Examples10-13 can optionally include wherein the remote GPU middleware layer isa transport-agnostic interface for the application stack on the clientplatform.

In Example 15, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-14 canoptionally include wherein the remote GPU middleware layer comprises atransport sublayer to communicate command and data between the clientplatform and the apparatus. In Example 16, the subject matter of any oneof Examples 10-15 can optionally include wherein the remote GPUcomprises a network interface controller (NIC) for direct transfers ofdata between the client platform and the remote GPU.

In Example 17, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-16 canoptionally include wherein a GPU local memory of the remote GPU ismapped to an address space of the application stack of the clientplatform to allow the application stack to access the GPU local memorydirectly. In Example 18, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-17can optionally include wherein the one or more processors comprise oneor more of a GPU, a central processing unit (CPU), or a hardwareaccelerator.

Example 19 is a non-transitory machine readable storage medium forfacilitating GPU remoting to driver-managed GPUs. The non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium of Example 19 having stored thereonexecutable computer program instructions that, when executed by one ormore processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operationscomprising provide, by the at least one processor communicably coupledto a host memory and a remote graphics processing unit (GPU), a remoteGPU middleware layer to act as a proxy for an application stack on aclient platform separate from the apparatus; communicate, by the remoteGPU middleware layer, with a kernel mode driver of the one or moreprocessors to cause the host memory to be allocated for command buffersand data structures received from the client platform for consumption bya command streamer of the remote GPU; and invoke, by the remote GPUmiddleware layer, the kernel mode driver to submit a workload generatedby the application stack, the workload submitted for processing by theremote GPU using the command buffers and the data structures allocatedin the host memory as directed by the command streamer.

In Example 20, the subject matter of Example 19 can optionally includewherein the command buffers and data structures are received from aruntime component and user mode driver component of the client platform,and wherein the command buffers and data structures are generated basedon instructions from the application stack. In Example 21, the subjectmatter of Examples 19-20 can optionally include wherein the kernel modedriver utilizes the command buffers and data structures to prepare acontext of the workload and schedule the workload on the remote GPU. InExample 22, the subject matter of Examples 19-21 can optionally includewherein the remote GPU middleware layer is to expose an abstraction ofthe apparatus to the userspace components of the accelerator stack onthe remote client machine, and is to mediate transfer of data betweenthe remote client machine and the hardware accelerator.

In Example 23, the subject matter of Examples 19-22 can optionallyinclude wherein the remote GPU middleware layer is a transport-agnosticinterface for the application stack on the client platform. In Example24, the subject matter of Examples 19-23 can optionally include whereinthe remote GPU middleware layer comprises a transport sublayer tocommunicate command and data between the client platform and theapparatus. In Example 25, the subject matter of Examples 19-24 canoptionally include wherein the remote GPU comprises a network interfacecontroller (NIC) for direct transfers of data between the clientplatform and the remote GPU.

In Example 26, the subject matter of Examples 19-25 can optionallyinclude wherein a GPU local memory of the remote GPU is mapped to anaddress space of the application stack of the client platform to allowthe application stack to access the GPU local memory directly. InExample 27, the subject matter of Examples 19-26 can optionally includewherein the at least one processor comprises one or more of a GPU, acentral processing unit (CPU), or a hardware accelerator.

Example 28 is an apparatus for facilitating GPU remoting todriver-managed GPUs according to implementations of the disclosure. Theapparatus of Example 28 can comprise means for providing, by one or moreprocessors communicably coupled to a host memory and a remote graphicsprocessing unit (GPU), a remote GPU middleware layer to act as a proxyfor an application stack on a client platform separate from theapparatus; means for communicating, by the remote GPU middleware layer,with a kernel mode driver of the one or more processors to cause thehost memory to be allocated for command buffers and data structuresreceived from the client platform for consumption by a command streamerof the remote GPU; and means for invoking, by the remote GPU middlewarelayer, the kernel mode driver to submit a workload generated by theapplication stack, the workload submitted for processing by the remoteGPU using the command buffers and the data structures allocated in thehost memory as directed by the command streamer. In Example 29, thesubject matter of Example 28 can optionally include the apparatusfurther configured to perform the method of any one of the Examples 11to 18.

Example 30 is a system for facilitating GPU remoting to driver-managedGPUs, configured to perform the method of any one of Examples 10-18.Example 31 is an apparatus for facilitating GPU remoting todriver-managed GPUs comprising means for performing the method of anyone of claims 10 to 18. Specifics in the Examples may be used anywherein one or more embodiments.

GPU Remoting to Autonomous GPUS

In some embodiments, an apparatus, system, or process is to provideremoting to autonomous GPUs. In one implementation, remoting component903 described with respect to FIG. 9 provides the remoting to autonomousGPUs.

Implementations of the disclosure provide a solution for remote GPUacceleration that relies on autonomous, self-managing, headless GPUs.The userspace components (e.g., application, runtime, user mode drivers)run on one client platform and connect over the network, directly, to anautonomous GPU, which is not managed by a traditional driver. Thesolution offers better performance than existing solutions (see nextsection), while also meeting other requirements for security and supportof various GPU stacks within a single framework.

As discussed above, one conventional approach to partitioning the GPUstack for remote acceleration is to run the application on one platformand the rest of the stack on a remote platform. When the applicationmakes API calls to the GPU runtime layer, it is intercepted andforwarded to the remote platform where the runtime and driver stackservice the application. This method, called API forwarding, isdiscussed above with respect to FIG. 27.

In a driver-managed GPU remoting approach also discussed above withrespect to FIG. 28, the GPU stack is partitioned between the userspacecomponents, which run on the client machine and the kernel mode driver,which runs on the server that is physically connected to the GPU. Theruntime and UMD prepare the command buffers and associated datastructures on the client and transmit them to the server via a GPUremoting middleware layer. The kernel mode driver prepares the contextand submits the command buffers to the GPU for execution.

The driver-managed GPU remoting approach improves on the API forwardingapproach in several ways. For example, it reduces the latency associatedwith frequent runtime API calls made over the network and transfers somedata (kernels, user data) directly to the GPU.

Implementations of the disclosure provide for another approach to GPUremoting referred to as remoting to autonomous GPUs. In remoting toautonomous GPUs, the GPU userspace stack runs on one platform and isreferred to as the client stack. The client stack connects with theautonomous, remote GPU over the network using a messaging passinginterface. The GPU virtualizes its own resources (e.g., memory, virtualfunctions (VFs), etc.) and exposes them to remote clients, without acontrolling driver. End-to-end security is achieved by GPU attestationand encrypting/integrity-protecting and verifying all data and controlmessages at the two endpoints (client and GPU) inside TEEs.

FIG. 30 illustrates an autonomous GPU remoting stack 3000 in accordancewith implementations of the disclosure. In the remoting to autonomousGPUs approach, the GPU stack 3000 is partitioned at the layer below theuserspace components, which include the application 3010 and RT/UMD2030. The userspace components run on one platform, the client machine3002, and are connected to the remote autonomous GPU 3004 over a network(not shown). A virtual GPU monitor (VGM) 3060 on the autonomous GPU 3060provides for the management of the autonomous GPU 3004, includingmanagement of the GPU resources such as GPU engine and memory 3070, asdescribed further below.

The two halves of the GPU stack 3000 are bridged across the fabric 3070(e.g., Ethernet) by a middleware, such as GoF middleware 3030. Atransport sublayer 3035 a, 3035 b in the GoF middleware 3030 cancommunicate commands and data between the client machine 3002 and theautonomous GPU 3004 using a specific transport (e.g., TCP/IP, RDMA,InfiniBand, etc.). Data communications between client machine 3002 andautonomous GPU 2004 may travel over fabric 3090 via NICs 3050 a, 3050 b.NIC 3050 a may interface with an OS/VMM 3040 of the client machine 3002.

The responsibilities of the various components of the GPU stack 3000 maybe as follows. Application 3010 can select the GPU 3004 foracceleration, provide kernels and inputs for the acceleration workload.RT/UMD 3020 services API calls from the application 3010 and constructscommand buffers that can be executed by a command streamer (CS) (notshown) in the GPU 3004. The RT/UMD 3020 compiles GPU kernels (JIT) insource form to instructions in the GPU 3004 instruction set architecture(ISA).

GoF Middleware: Provides a transport-agnostic interface for theuserspace components to discover and use the remote GPU. A transportsublayer 3035 a, 3035 b in the middleware 3030 communicates commands anddata 3085 between the client machine 3002 and the remote GPU 3004 usinga specific transport (e.g., TCP/IP, RDMA, InfiniBand, etc.). Themiddleware 3030 uses a protocol that supports operations such asdiscovery of the remote GPU 3004, authentication, connection to GPUresources (e.g., memory) and transfer of data 3080 to/from the GPU 3004,as well as remote host.

Remote GPU 3004 is an autonomous, self-virtualizing GPU that manages itsown resources, advertises resource availability and executes workloadsreceived from remote clients.

A number of problems/challenges arise due to the distributed nature ofthe GPU remoting stack. They can be grouped into the followingcategories: (1) Control path; (2) Data path; (3) Security; and (4)Performance. These challenges are discussed below in further detail.

(1) Control Path

Device Discovery and Connection: The client application utilizes a wayto discover the remote GPU and its capabilities before it can select itfor accelerating its workload. Information about the model of the GPU isalso used to compile compute kernels that can execute on the GPU.

Workload Submission: The UMD on the client platform should have some wayto submit command buffers and associated data structures across thenetwork to the remote GPU. There is no kernel mode driver (KMD) runningon a remote host to control the GPU, prepare context and schedule theworkload.

Event Notification: During execution of the workload by the GPU,asynchronous events (e.g., synchronization operations, interrupts) thatwould normally result in notifications to the local host platform cannow have to be relayed directly to the userspace software on the remoteclient platform.

(2) Data Path

Access to GPU Resources: GPU local memory resources that would be mappedinto the application's address space can't be directly mapped becausethe GPU and client platform are not connected locally.

Different Address Spaces: Command buffers and associated data structuresprepared on the client platform use host memory addresses that cannot bedirectly accessed by the remote GPU.

Data Transfer: User data (e.g., compute kernels, input data) should betransported to remote GPU local memory over the network. Similarly,results computed by the GPU should be transferred back to the clienthost.

(3) Security

Confidentiality: Confidentiality of user data and compute kernels(potential IP) should be ensured.

Integrity: To ensure that the results of the computation in the GPU canbe trusted, the integrity of user data and kernels, as well as commandbuffers and other associated data structures that drive the execution ofthe workload in the GPU, should be protected.

GPU Security: Workloads from various remote clients should be isolatedinside the GPU to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of user dataand results computed by the GPU. Access to GPU resources by variousremote clients over the network should be validated to ensure that aclient can access resources assigned to it.

(4) Performance

Network Latency: A major source of latency is associated with thetransfer of data, meta data and control information over the fabricbetween the client and remote GPU.

GPU Latency: Another source of latency is associated with the overheadof managing GPU resources while simultaneously servicing various clientworkloads. The autonomous GPU resource manager should not become abottleneck while handling multiple clients at the same time.

The above challenges can be addressed using the autonomous GPU remotingtechniques described herein. The autonomous GPU differs from aconventional GPU in at least one aspect: it does not utilize a driver tomanage its resources and schedule workloads. It can manage its ownresources (memory, VFs, etc.) and subsumes the responsibilities of a GPUkernel mode driver.

FIG. 31 depicts a GPU stack architecture 3100 for GPU remoting to anautonomous GPU in accordance with implementations of the disclosure. TheGPU stack 3100 is shown that connects with a GPU client 3102 with alocal GPU 3104 over the PCI Express bus 3130. The GPU client 3102includes a GPU userspace stack including the application, RT/UMD and KMD3110. The local GPU 3104 includes GPU hardware 3120 used to processrequests from the GPU userspace stack including the application, RT/UMDand KMD 3110.

FIG. 32 depicts another illustration of a GPU stack architecture 3200for GPU remoting to an autonomous GPU, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure. In GPU stack architecture 3200, theGPU client 3206 having a GPU userspace stack including the applicationand RT/UMD 3240 connects to a remote, autonomous GPU 3208 over a network3290. A GoF middleware 3250 on the GPU client 3206 and the Virtual GPUMonitor (VGM) 3260 on the remote GPU 3208 connect the userspace stack3240 on the GPU client 3206 with the GPU hardware 3270. These componentsof the GoF middleware 3250 and the VGM 3260 abstract details associatedwith the network connection. Such abstraction is referred to as localGPU emulation 3280. The local GPU emulation 3280 allows the GPU client3206 to connect with the remote GPU 3208 using a message passinginterface. This design minimizes the changes to the GPU userspace stack,as well as the hardware 3270 of the autonomous GPU 3208. As such, theclient application 3240 believes it is connected to a local GPU, whilemost of the GPU hardware 3270 is unaware that it is running a workloadfrom a remote host (e.g., the GPU client 3206).

The VGM 3260 is the GPU's 3208 resource manager. The VGM 3260 can beimplemented as a firmware module that runs on a microcontroller insidethe GPU 3208. The VGM 3260 performs the functions such as the following:Exposes a remote device management interface to control the operation ofthe GPU (e.g., reset GPU, upgrade firmware, etc.); Exposes GPUcapabilities and features to its clients over a network interface;Allocates GPU local memory to workloads; Manages GPU page tables tomaintain isolation of workloads in local memory; Allocates andconfigures GPU engines for workloads depending on client requests;Schedules workloads submitted by its remote clients on various GPUengines; and/or Handles asynchronous events (e.g., interrupts) thatimplement communication with an external platform.

Modern GPUs support virtualization. For example, SR-IOV technologyallows a GPU to expose partitions of its resources as virtual functions(VF) to various clients. However, SR-IOV is a PCI Express standard. Inmoving from local to remote GPUs, exposing VFs to clients over thenetwork should be performed. The VGM 3260 can configure and expose VFcapabilities to the GPU's remote clients. Clients can query the device'sVF capabilities using the control interface (see next subsection) andaccess VF resources (e.g., registers, local memory partitions) using theGPU's message passing interface.

Traditional discrete GPUs are connected to their host platforms over aPCI Express link. The host discovers, configures and submits work tosuch a GPU over a register interface. The device registers are mappedinto host system memory and can be accessed through memory read/writeoperations (MMIO).

With GPU remoting to autonomous GPUs, an autonomous GPU is no longerconnected to a controlling host platform. It is available as a resourceto its clients over a fabric (e.g., Ethernet), and as a network endpointit can be accessed using standard networking protocols (TCP/IP, RDMA).In order to communicate with its clients, it exposes a message passinginterface. Commands to discover device features, authenticate it,request resources, and submit workloads are encapsulated in messagesthat are transmitted between the GPU and its clients over the fabric.

The VGM intercepts request messages directed to the GPU and responds tothem. It exposes several interfaces to its remote clients. The responseof the VGM can depend on the type of interface and type of request. Inimplementations of the disclosure, there are four types of messages thatclients can send to the remote GPU. The messages may be as follows.(Note: In the following, it is assumed that the client and GPUcommunicate using the RDMA protocol.)

Read: When the client is to read from GPU memory or registers, the VGMfirst validates the read request and initiates RDMA write operation toclient host memory to transfer the data in response.

Write: When the client is to write to GPU memory, the VGM validates thewrite request and then issues RDMA read operations to remote client hostmemory to copy data into GPU local memory. Messages of this type canalso be used to send commands to the GPU (work submission commands,device management command, etc.).

Queries: These messages are used by the client to discover features ofthe GPU, get status information, and so on.

Protocol: These messages are exchanged between the client and the GPUwhile executing certain protocols. For example, attestation and keyexchange cryptographic protocols consist of a sequence of messagesbetween the client and the GPU.

Under certain conditions, response messages from the GPU to its clientcan also indicate errors. There might be several reasons for errors,including cryptographic errors, invalid parameters in a request,unauthorized requests, and so on.

The autonomous GPU exposes the following interfaces to its clients:Management interface; Control interface; and Data interface. Theseinterfaces are described in more detail below.

The management interface is used to manage certain aspects of the GPU'sbehavior. For example, an authorized operator might want to remotelyreset the GPU, upgrade its firmware, and so on. This device managementinterface can allow authenticated and authorized clients to perform suchtasks on the GPU.

The control interface is used by clients to perform tasks such asconnecting to the GPU, discovering its features, authenticating it,requesting resources (e.g., memory on the GPU), mapping memory regionsinto client's address space, and releasing resources. It is also used bythe GPU to notify the clients of certain asynchronous events, such asinterrupts.

The data interface is used to read/write data between the GPU and itsremote clients.

In the following discussion, it is described how remote clients canconnect to the autonomous GPU and securely offload their workloads withrespect to the control path, the data path, security, and performance.

Control Path:

Device Discovery and Connection: The first step in using a remote,autonomous GPU is to discover it and enumerate its features andavailable resources. In Cloud datacenters, an Orchestration Servicetypically matches clients with available accelerator resources on thenetwork. Using the control interface of the autonomous GPU, theOrchestration Service can discover the GPU and enumerate itscapabilities and resources (VFs, memory, etc.) by sending querymessages. The GPU responds to these messages in much the same way as itdoes today when it responds requests made to PCI configuration spaceregisters. After initial discovery and enumeration, periodic messagesfrom the GPU to the service to keep it up to date about available GPUresources allows the service to allocate the GPU resources to any remoteclient that requests it. Assuming that the orchestration service matchesa client to the GPU, the GoF middleware layer on the client and the VGMexecute a protocol that connects the client with the remote GPU. Theprotocol would allow the client to discover the features of the GPU,connect to it, authenticate it, and so on.

After acquiring information about the remote GPU, the client GoFmiddleware can build a device model of the GPU, which it then uses torespond to client requests about GPU features and capabilities. Theapplication can use information about the GPU's features to determine ifit wants to offload its workload to the GPU. Having selected a specificremote GPU, information about the specific model of the GPU can enablejust-in-time compilation of compute kernels to the target GPU'sinstruction set.

Workload Submission: The runtime and UMD on the client platform preparethe command buffers and other data structures for the GPU CommandStreamer and they have to be transported from the client to the GPU viathe GoF middleware layer. The VGM receives the command buffers and othercontext information that are used to prepare the context before it canbe submitted to the GPU Command Streamer (see section on Data Path fordetails). Once the VGM sets up the context (GPU page tables for theworkload), it interrupts the GPU Scheduler, just like a KMD in atraditional GPU interrupts the Scheduler. The scheduler finds anavailable GPU Command Streamer to dispatch the workload.

Event Notification: Asynchronous events, such as interrupts, generatedduring execution are relayed as messages back to the client machine,where the GoF middleware layer propagates it up the userspace stack tothe runtime or application.

Data Path:

Handling Different Address Spaces: The command buffers and associateddata structures such as descriptor heaps have to copied to GPU localmemory because there is no local host directly connected to the GPU fromwhere the GPU can access those data structures. Similarly computekernels and user data should be copied to GPU local memory once thecorrect destination addresses are known. Since command buffers and otherdata structures are constructed by the runtime/UMD on the clientplatform, they have client host addresses inside them that referenceexternal memory locations. These structures have to be relocated to GPUlocal memory and the corresponding addresses “patched” in the datastructures before the GPU Command Streamer can process them.

As previously discussed, implementations of the disclosure may create amanifest listing all the memory regions that have to be copied fromclient host memory to GPU memory. The manifest is sent to the GPU in aworkload submission message, where the VGM allocates local memory toreceive the data structures. Then, using the manifest, the VGM copiesthe memory regions from client host addresses to GPU memory. After thecopy is completed, the addresses in the command buffers and associateddata structures can be modified (patched) to reflect their new GPU localmemory locations. Finally, the VGM prepares the context (page tables)before the workload is submitted to the GPU Scheduler.

When the workload is eventually submitted, the GPU Command Streamer canread and execute the command buffers from GPU local memory. Alladdresses encountered by the Command Streamer in the command buffers andassociated data structures can be local GPU memory addresses (becausethey were patched by the VGM). Since the context (GPU page tables) wasprepared by the VGM, when the Command Streamer dispatches the kernel,the GPU's execution units can find the kernel and its input data in GPUlocal memory, with the address translations in the page tables, readyfor execution.

Access to GPU Resources: In addition to copying data between client andGPU by commands in the command buffer, it is also possible to map GPUlocal memory to the address space of the client application stack totransfer data directly between the GPU and the client. The GPU remotingprotocol implements primitives that can perform the mapping. The mappingoperation returns a handle (to GPU memory) to the application stack.This handle can be used to read/write from/to GPU memory allocated tothe application directly.

Security:

Attestation and Secure Session Setup: Before a client can securelyoffload its workload to the remote GPU it should authenticate the GPUand the verify its attestation report. The root of trust in the GPUmanages the security credentials (keys, certificates) utilized to dothis. It measures the firmware running on the GPU (including the VGM)during boot and attests to it when a client requests attestation. Aftersuccessful attestation, the client and the GPU execute an authenticatedkey exchange protocol to establish a shared symmetric primary key. Fromthe primary key, separate keys can be derived for encrypting andintegrity-protecting the messages between the client and the GPU for theduration of their session.

Confidentiality and Integrity Protection: All messages between theclient and the GPU are encrypted, integrity-protected andreplay-protected. On the client side, the encryption is done inside aTEE (e.g., Intel® SGX). Similarly, on the GPU side, the messages andresponses are encrypted securely before transmission to the client.Certain data structures, such as command buffers, can include severaldata structures that are linked together by pointers. Such datastructures may have their integrity verified in accordance withintegrity verification techniques.

Access Control and Request Validation: When the GPU receives a message,it is intercepted by the VGM, which decrypts the message and verifiesits integrity. Then, it validates the parameters of the request messageto ensure that the request in the message can be safely executed. Forexample, if a client requests a read/write to a local memory location,the GPU should validate that the address and size associated with thememory operation are such that the read or write is constrained to thememory allocated to that client.

GPU Internal Security: The GPU itself should isolate client workloads inits local memory and protect their confidentiality and integrity duringexecution.

Performance:

The autonomous GPU remoting system described in implementations of thedisclosure reduces overall latency since the client can directlycommunicate with the GPU without going through a remote host thatcontrols the GPU. Since the GPU is autonomous and manages its ownresources and is responsible for scheduling, there is additionaloverhead incurred to perform these tasks (they are traditionallyperformed by the GPU kernel mode driver on a host machine). In order tohandle this additional load without affecting performance, theautonomous GPU might utilize a separate (or more powerful) built-incontroller to perform these additional tasks.

FIG. 33 is a flow diagram illustrating a method 3300 for GPU remoting toautonomous GPUs, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.Method 3300 may be performed by processing logic that may comprisehardware (e.g., circuitry, dedicated logic, programmable logic, etc.),software (such as instructions run on a processing device), or acombination thereof. More particularly, the method 3300 may beimplemented in one or more modules as a set of logic instructions storedin a machine- or computer-readable storage medium such as RAM, ROM,PROM, firmware, flash memory, etc., in configurable logic such as, forexample, PLAs, FPGAs, CPLDs, in fixed-functionality logic hardware usingcircuit technology such as, for example, ASIC, CMOS or TTL technology,or any combination thereof.

The process of method 3300 is illustrated in linear sequences forbrevity and clarity in presentation; however, it is contemplated thatany number of them can be performed in parallel, asynchronously, or indifferent orders. Further, for brevity, clarity, and ease ofunderstanding, many of the components and processes described withrespect to FIG. 30-32 may not be repeated or discussed hereafter. In oneimplementation, a processor, such as an autonomous GPU 3004 describedwith respect to FIG. 30, may perform method 3300.

Method 3300 begins at block 3310 where a processor may provide a virtualGPU monitor (VGM) to interface over a network with a middleware layer ofa client platform, the VGM to interface with the middleware layer usinga message passing interface. At block 3320, the processor may configureand expose, by the VGM, virtual functions (VFs) of a GPU to themiddleware layer of the client platform.

Subsequently, at block 3330, the processor may intercept, by the VGM,request messages directed to the GPU from the middleware layer, therequest messages corresponding to VFs of the GPU to be utilized by theclient platform. Lastly, at block 3340, the processor may generate, bythe VGM, a response to the request messages for the middleware client.

The following examples pertain to further embodiments of GPU remoting toautonomous GPUs. Example 1 is an apparatus to facilitate GPU remoting toautonomous GPUs. The apparatus of Example 1 comprises a graphicsprocessing unit (GPU) to: provide a virtual GPU monitor (VGM) tointerface over a network with a middleware layer of a client platform,the VGM to interface with the middleware layer using a message passinginterface; configure and expose, by the VGM, virtual functions (VFs) ofthe GPU to the middleware layer of the client platform; intercept, bythe VGM, request messages directed to the GPU from the middleware layer,the request messages corresponding to VFs of the GPU to be utilized bythe client platform; and generate, by the VGM, a response to the requestmessages for the middleware client.

In Example 2, the subject matter of Example 1 can optionally includewherein the GPU virtualizes resources of the GPU and exposes theresources to the client platform, the resources comprising at least theVFs and memory of the GPU. In Example 3, the subject matter of any oneof Examples 1-2 can optionally include wherein the GPU is further tofacilitate GPU attestation, GPU encryption, GPU integrity-protection,and verification of data and control messages at the GPU inside of atrusted execution environment (TEE) of the GPU. In Example 4, thesubject matter of any one of Examples 1-3 can optionally include whereinthe client platform comprises userspace component of a GPU stack, theuserspace components comprising an application, a runtime, and user modedriver of the client platform.

In Example 5, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-4 canoptionally include wherein the runtime and user mode driver preparecommand buffers and data structures based on instructions from theapplication. In Example 6, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-5can optionally include wherein the command buffers and the datastructures to initialize the GPU and to dispatch a workload of theapplication on the GPU based on instructions from a command streamer ofthe GPU.

In Example 7, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-6 canoptionally include wherein the client platform comprises a GPUmiddleware layer to abstract details associated with a networkconnection between the client platform and the GPU, and wherein the GPUmiddleware layer to build a device model of the GPU based on theinformation acquired from the GPU via the VGM. In Example 8, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 1-7 can optionally include wherein the VGMexposes a plurality of interfaces to the client platform, the pluralityof interfaces comprises at least one of a management interface, acontrol interface, and a data interface.

Example 9 is a method for facilitating GPU remoting to autonomous GPUs.The method of Example 9 can include providing, by a graphics processingunit (GPU), a virtual GPU monitor (VGM) to interface over a network witha middleware layer of a client platform, the VGM to interface with themiddleware layer using a message passing interface; configuring andexposing, by the VGM, virtual functions (VFs) of the GPU to themiddleware layer of the client platform; intercepting, by the VGM,request messages directed to the GPU from the middleware layer, therequest messages corresponding to VFs of the GPU to be utilized by theclient platform; and generating, by the VGM, a response to the requestmessages for the middleware client.

In Example 10, the subject matter of Example 9 can optionally includewherein the GPU virtualizes resources of the GPU and exposes theresources to the client platform, the resources comprising at least theVFs and memory of the GPU. In Example 11, the subject matter of any oneof Examples 9-10 can optionally include wherein the GPU is further tofacilitate GPU attestation, encrypting, and integrity-protecting, andverifying data and control messages at the GPU inside of a trustedexecution environment (TEE) of the GPU.

In Example 12, the subject matter of any one of Examples 9-11 canoptionally include wherein the client platform comprises userspacecomponent of a GPU stack, the userspace components comprising anapplication, a runtime, and user mode driver of the client platform. InExample 13, the subject matter of any one of Examples 9-12 canoptionally include wherein the runtime and user mode driver preparecommand buffers and data structures based on instructions from theapplication.

In Example 14, the subject matter of any one of Examples 9-13 canoptionally include wherein the command buffers and the data structuresto initialize the GPU and to dispatch a workload of the application onthe GPU based on instructions from a command streamer of the GPU. InExample 15, the subject matter of any one of Examples 9-14 canoptionally include wherein the client platform comprises a GPUmiddleware layer to abstract details associated with a networkconnection between the client platform and the GPU, and wherein the GPUmiddleware layer to build a device model of the GPU based on theinformation acquired from the GPU via the VGM. In Example 16, thesubject matter of any one of Examples 9-15 can optionally includewherein the VGM exposes a plurality of interfaces to the clientplatform, the plurality of interfaces comprises at least one of amanagement interface, a control interface, and a data interface.

Example 17 is a non-transitory machine readable storage medium forfacilitating GPU remoting to autonomous GPUs. The non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium of Example 17 having stored thereonexecutable computer program instructions that, when executed by one ormore processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operationscomprising providing, by a graphics processing unit (GPU) of the atleast one processor, a virtual GPU monitor (VGM) to interface over anetwork with a middleware layer of a client platform, the VGM tointerface with the middleware layer using a message passing interface;configuring and exposing, by the VGM, virtual functions (VFs) of the GPUto the middleware layer of the client platform; intercepting, by theVGM, request messages directed to the GPU from the middleware layer, therequest messages corresponding to VFs of the GPU to be utilized by theclient platform; and generating, by the VGM, a response to the requestmessages for the middleware client.

In Example 18, the subject matter of Example 17 can optionally includewherein the GPU virtualizes resources of the GPU and exposes theresources to the client platform, the resources comprising at least theVFs and memory of the GPU. In Example 19, the subject matter of any oneof Examples 17-18 can optionally include wherein the GPU is further tofacilitate GPU attestation, encrypting, and integrity-protecting, andverifying data and control messages at the GPU inside of a trustedexecution environment (TEE) of the GPU.

In Example 20, the subject matter of any one of Examples 17-19 canoptionally include wherein the client platform comprises userspacecomponent of a GPU stack, the userspace components comprising anapplication, a runtime, and user mode driver of the client platform. InExample 21, the subject matter of any one of Examples 17-20 canoptionally include wherein the runtime and user mode driver preparecommand buffers and data structures based on instructions from theapplication.

In Example 22, the subject matter of any one of Examples 17-21 canoptionally include wherein the command buffers and the data structuresto initialize the GPU and to dispatch a workload of the application onthe GPU based on instructions from a command streamer of the GPU. InExample 23, the subject matter of any one of Examples 17-22 canoptionally include wherein the client platform comprises a GPUmiddleware layer to abstract details associated with a networkconnection between the client platform and the GPU, and wherein the GPUmiddleware layer to build a device model of the GPU based on theinformation acquired from the GPU via the VGM. In Example 24, thesubject matter of any one of Examples 17-23 can optionally includewherein the VGM exposes a plurality of interfaces to the clientplatform, the plurality of interfaces comprises at least one of amanagement interface, a control interface, and a data interface.

Example 25 is an apparatus for facilitating GPU remoting to autonomousGPUs according to implementations of the disclosure. The apparatus ofExample 25 can comprise means for providing, by a graphics processingunit (GPU), a virtual GPU monitor (VGM) to interface over a network witha middleware layer of a client platform, the VGM to interface with themiddleware layer using a message passing interface; means forconfiguring and exposing, by the VGM, virtual functions (VFs) of the GPUto the middleware layer of the client platform; means for intercepting,by the VGM, request messages directed to the GPU from the middlewarelayer, the request messages corresponding to VFs of the GPU to beutilized by the client platform; and means for generating, by the VGM, aresponse to the request messages for the middleware client In Example26, the subject matter of Example 25 can optionally include theapparatus further configured to perform the method of any one of theExamples 10 to 17.

Example 27 is a system for facilitating GPU remoting to autonomous GPUs,configured to perform the method of any one of Examples 9-17. Example 28is an apparatus for facilitating GPU remoting to autonomous GPUscomprising means for performing the method of any one of claims 9 to 17.Specifics in the Examples may be used anywhere in one or moreembodiments.

Protected Management of Network Connected FPGAS

In some embodiments, an apparatus, system, or process is to provideprotected management of network-connected FPGAs. In one implementation,protected management component 904 described with respect to FIG. 9provides the protected management of network-connected FPGAs.

Disaggregated computing is on the rise in data centers. Cloud serviceproviders (CSP) are deploying solutions where processing of a workloadis distributed on disaggregated compute resources, such as CPUs andhardware accelerators (including FPGAs), that are connected via networkinstead of being on the same platform, connected via physical links suchas PCIe. This disaggregated computing enables improved resourceutilization and lowers costs by enabling making more efficient use ofavailable resources. Disaggregated computing also enables pooling alarge number of hardware accelerators for large computation making thecomputation more efficient and performant.

In particular, CSPs are using network-capable FPGAs in their datacenters to allow direct remote communication with the FPGA for efficientdata transfers from a remote CPU. In conventional systems, FPGAs aremanaged by a local host (CPU) to which one or more FPGA may be connectedvia PCIe.

Modern networks have seen significant improvements in performancebringing their speed and latency in accessing a network connected devicecloser to that of a local PCIe connected device. This, combined with thegrowth of disaggregated computing, makes it important to provide asecure and efficient mechanism to allow remote servers to perform fullmanagement of network connected devices without utilizing a local CPU.This allows for centralized and efficient management of the devices atlower cost and has other benefits such as improved scalability, ease ofupgrade, flexibility in configuration, ease of supporting devices frommultiple device vendors etc.

Using PCIe memory mapping in the FPGA and use of PCIe software stackoffers flexibility to configure FPGA for use over PCIe or networkwithout custom designs to support different connectivity types.

FIG. 34 depicts a network architecture 3400 for FPGA management inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure. As shown in thenetwork architecture 3400, a local host, such as local server platform3404, configures and manages an FPGA 3450 over PCIe 3460, while a remoteclient application 3415 hosted by a client CPU 3410 on a client platform3402 submits workload (data) 3452 directly to the FPGA 3450 over a datapath network 3430 using efficient transport protocols, such as RDMA. Inone implementations, NICs 3420, 3454 communicate the workload 3452between the client platform 3402 and the FPGA 3450 using data pathnetwork 3430, for example.

Management of the FPGA 3450 includes enumeration of FPGA features,programming the configuration registers, monitoring status, devicerecovery, etc. Such management may be performed by a management service3442 in communication with FPGA drivers 3444 by reading and writing intoFPGA registers of FPGA 3450 via memory mapped I/O (MMIO). A securitysensitive client, running inside a TEE may submit workload securelyusing secure data transfer protocols such as SSL, TLS or secure RDMA.

In yet another scenario, the CSP may have a central entity to manageracks of FPGAs in a data center that do not have a local host but have adirect network interface to allow remote management of the FPGA devices.FIG. 35 illustrates a network architecture 3500 of central entitymanagement of a rack of FPGAs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. As shown, an FPGA rack 3504 may include a plurality of FPGAs3550, each with a corresponding NIC 3555 for communication to and fromthe associated FPGA 3550. The FPGAs 3550 may have a direct networkinterface 3530 via the NIC 3555 to a NIC 3525 of the client platform3502. The client platform 3502 may include a client CPU 3510 hosting amanagement service 3515 and an FPGA driver 3520 that are both used toperform management of the FPGAs 3550.

In the conventional systems, such as the system depicted in networkarchitecture 3400 of FIG. 34 or network architecture 3500 of FIG. 35, ifthe host software is compromised, it may misconfigure and/or mis-managethe FPGA that could result in security compromise of clientapplication's workload running on the FPGA. This creates an opportunityfor the client application to manage the FPGA directly in a secure andefficient manner and be able to perform the functions as featureenumeration, device configuration, monitoring, recovery etc. via directnetwork interface into the device.

As such, a technical problem encountered by conventional systems is howto enable secure management of remote PCIe-based FPGAs through a directnetwork interface into the device, while reusing the existing PCIedriver stack that would run on the client platform and manage the remoteFPGA as if it were a local FPGA.

Implementations of the disclosure address this technical problem byproviding a technique to issue protected MMIO messages to PCI MMIOconfiguration space on a remote FPGA for management. Implementations ofthe disclosure introduce a component in the FPGA called a ‘Remotemanagement controller’ that parses packetized management commands andissues memory transactions on the internal bus for register read/writessimilar to an MMIO request issued by a local host. The ‘Remotemanagement controller’ also returns response to the remote host such asstatus of register write command or result of register read command.

Implementations of the disclosure further provide for an entity thatruns on the client platform called a ‘Remote-MMIO driver’, whichpacketizes the MMIO commands transparently and sends it to the remoteFPGA via network transport protocol such as RDMA or TCP-IP. This allowsthe remote device to appear as a locally connected PCIe device to theupper layers of the drivers, allowing reuse of existing PCIe driverstack for device management.

Implementations of the disclosure can be applied to several differentuse cases such as: (1) Use by a trusted client application that wants todirectly manage the remote device it may be offloading workload to. Thiswould allow the client app to and exclude the locally connected CPU fromthe trust boundary by issuing device configuration commands directly tothe FPGA. (2) Use by a centralized orchestrator that is responsible forconfiguring and managing standalone FPGAs directly over network.

Implementations of the disclosure address the use case where acentralized orchestrator has a FPGA management service that isresponsible for remotely managing racks of network connected FPGAs asshown in the FIG. 35. This is applicable to bothvirtualized/non-virtualized environments. In either case, theorchestration should run inside a TEE (such as Intel® SGX, Intel® TDX,or AMD® SEV) to ensure the memory is protected during execution thatallow MMIO commands to retain integrity when they are prepared fortransfer to the FPGA.

FIG. 36 depicts a network environment 3600 for protected management ofnetwork-connected FPGAs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. Network environment 3600 includes a central orchestrationserver 3610 that includes an orchestrator, such as FPGA management VM3615, that is running in a virtualized environment. The FPGA managementVM 3615 is protected from privileged software threats by use of a TEE(such as Intel® TDX or AMD® SEV). The central orchestration server 3610may be communicably coupled to a plurality of FPGAs 3650 over network3630. FPGA management VM 3615 may include an FPGA management server 3620to manage the FPGAs 3650 of an FPGA rack 3640 via FPGA drivers 3625 incommunication with FPGAs 3650 over NICs 3627, 3655.

FIG. 37 depicts a network environment 3700 for protected management ofnetwork-connected FPGAs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. depicts a network environment 3700 for protected managementof network-connected FPGAs, in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. Network environment 3700 may be the same as networkenvironment 3600 described with respect to FIG. 36. For example, theserver 3710 may be the same as central orchestration server 3610described with respect to FIG. 36, and VM TEE may be the same as FPGAmanagement VM 3615 described with respect to FIG. 36.

Network environment 3700 further depicts components of an FPGAmanagement VM and an FPGA in order to provide for protected managementof network-connected FPGAs in implementations of the disclosure. Server3710 may be communicably coupled, via network 3780, to a remote FPGA3720, which may be the same as FPGA 3650 described with respect to FIG.36.

In one implementation, VM TEE 37′5 may include FPGA management service3720 (which may be the same as FPGA management service 3620 of FIG. 36)communicably coupled to FPGA drivers 3722 (which may be the same as FPGAdrivers 3625 of FIG. 36). VM TEE 3715 may further include remote-MMIOdriver 3724 and network drivers 3726.

Remote-MMIO driver 3724 may refer to a driver that runs on anorchestrator platform (e.g., VM TEE 3715) in order to manage the remoteFPGA 3730. In one implementation, the remote-MMIO driver 3724 exposesthe remote FPGA device 3730 as a legacy device, such as a legacy PCIedevice, to the upper level FPGA drivers 3722. The remote-MMIO driver3724 has two functions: (1) enumeration, and (2) handling remote MMIOreads/writes.

With respect to enumeration, the remote-MMIO driver 3724 is responsiblefor enumeration of the remote FPGA's 3730 PCIe configuration space anddevice management features. The remote MMIO driver 3724 performs initialenumeration of the network FPGA 3730, similar to the role played by thePCIe driver, with the help of a remote management controller 3750 IP(e.g., soft or hard logic) inside the FPGA 3730. The remote managementcontroller 3750 provides information about PCIe configuration space anddevice details including the size of base address register (BAR) regionsthat are utilized by the FPGA 3730. In some implementations, thisinformation is stored in a FPGA manager configuration/status registers3755 in a management region (e.g., management code) 3735 of the FPGA3730. The remote MMIO driver 3724 also walks through FPGA enumerationdata to determine what features are supported by the FPGA device 3730.The remote-MMIO driver 3724 then loads the corresponding functiondrivers and creates corresponding device files representing theenumerated BAR regions. The remote-MMIO driver 3724 also stores a copyof the MMIO register space of the device.

With respect to handling remote MMIO reads and writes, the remote-MMIOdriver 3724 receives MMIO read and write requests from an upper driverstack and performs remote MMIO reads and writes. The remote MMIO driver3724 does this by converting MMIO requests from a host driver on theorchestrator platform (e.g., VM TEE 3715) into remote MMIO request,packetize them and sends them to the FPGA 3730 directly via networktransport protocol such as RDMA (e.g., if the NIC on the FPGA is RDMAcapable).

MMIOs to remote FPGA cannot be performed using MOV instructions. Assuch, all MMIO requests targeted for remote FPGA should go through theremote-MMIO driver 3724, which exposes well-defined MMIO read/writesinterface to the upper level stack. Remote MMIOs are atomic operations(unlike MOV instruction) and incur network transfer latencies as well asrobustness limitations (e.g. dropped packets). This means that theorchestrator manager should check the response to each MMIO requests toconfirm it was completed successfully. Any failures can be reported backin the status. The failures may include standard failures such asinvalid address, returned by remote management controller or new networkrelated failures. For certain writes, the software may read back theregisters to confirm the MMIO Write was completed.

The remote management controller 3750 is an IP within the FPGA 3730 thatreceives MMIO command packets over the network 3780 and supportsrequests from the remote-MMIO driver 3724. The supported requests mayinclude requests for enumeration of PCIe configuration space and devicemanagement features, and requests for performing MMIO reads/writescoming over the network.

The remote management controller 3750 parses the network MMIO requestand performs the corresponding memory read/writes to the FPGA registers3770, which include configuration registers 3770 maintained as part ofcustomer logic 3765 (e.g., tenant bitstream) maintained in a customerregion (e.g., PR region). For an MMIO writes, the remote managementcontroller 3750 returns a status indicating success or failure of writerequest. In case of MMIO reads, the remote management controller 3750returns the read response over network to the requesting server.

The design of the remote management controller 3750 can include amessage parser that can initiate requested register read/write requestsover the internal bus, and a buffer for storing RDMA messages.

Implementations of the disclosure further include a data structurehaving PCI configuration layout and BAR size information. This datastructure is populated at the time of design and synthesis by an FPGAbitstream designer, for example. FIG. 38 depicts one example of a datastructure 3800 with PCIe configuration information for protectedmanagement of network-connected FPGAs, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure.

In implementations of the disclosure, the mechanism for protectedtransfer of MMIO request and response between the orchestrator serverand the FPGA can be done via TLS, secure-RDMA, and so on.Implementations of the disclosure do not dictate use of a specifictransport mechanism and a variety of transport mechanisms may beimplemented.

As noted previously, RDMA is an efficient protocol for remote datatransfer that moves data from of memory of one compute device to memoryof another compute device that are network connected, bypassing kernelstack and with zero copy. This is accomplished by means of a dedicatedRDMA IP or a RDMA capable NIC on the device as well as on the host toassist with the transfers. RDMA protocol supports different transfertransactions such as RDMA Send, RDMA Read and RDMA Write.

In implementations of the disclosure, the orchestrator manager andremote FPGA can first establish an RDMA connection by configuring RDMANICs on the two ends. The configuration should happen securely and allthe configuration messages between the CPU and the FPGA should beintegrity protected using a shared secret key. The shared secret key maybe established using one of the standard attestation and key exchangeprotocols such a Diffie Hellman or SPDM 1.1. In the discussion herein,it is assumed that two sides have configured RDMA securely and are ableto perform protected data transfers that provides confidentially,integrity and replay protection.

Implementations of the disclosure utilize RDMA Sends to transfer thepacketized MMIO commands. RDMA Send messages are analogous to transfersover sockets in which data is sent over the network as a message to anuntagged buffer on the recipient side. It is up to the recipient todecide where the message gets stored.

FIG. 39 illustrates a network environment 3900 for performing an RDMASend operation, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure.Network environment 3900 includes a network payload 3950 communicatedvia an RDMA Send between a host 3910 and an FPGA 3960, in accordancewith implementations of the disclosure. Host 3910 includes anapplication 3920, a UMD 3930, and an RDMA NIC 3940. UMD 3930 maintainsqueue for RDMA transactions, including a send queue (SQ) 3922, receivequeue (RQ) 3924, and a completion queue (CQ) 3926. FPGA 3960 alsoincludes RDMA transaction queues, including SQ 3962, RQ 3964, and CQ3366. FPGA 3960 also includes an RDMA IP 3980 used for RDMAtransactions, e.g., to receive network payload 3950 communicated via anRDMA transaction.

While RDMA Reads and Writes are directed to specific memory addresses,RDMA Send to an untagged buffer 3945, 3970 allows the host 3910 to senda command-header message with details about where the packet is headedto the FPGA 3960 and vice versa. The FPGA 3960 parses the message,obtains the target address, and forwards the message to the correctmemory location. This effectively sets up a MMIO Read/Write protocolbetween the two endpoints.

The above concept is used for remote-MMIOs in which the Remote-MMIOdriver on the Orchestrator platform and the Remote Management Controlleron the FPGA serve as two endpoints for transferring and receivingmessages encapsulated with MMIO payload over RDMA Send.

The following sections describe the enumeration flows followed by theremote-MMIO Write and Read flows.

Enumeration Flow:

PCIe Configuration Space and BAR regions:

(1) It is assumed that the initial connection/network configurationbetween the two endpoints has already been established. This can be viastandard network handshake mechanisms. The central orchestrator wouldmaintain a database of accelerators and details utilized forestablishing connection.

(2) The remote-MMIO driver 3724 is loaded which issues a message usingRDMA send to the FPGA 3730. The Command field is set to ‘Enum’(Enumeration request).

(3) The remote management controller 3750 receives the message, parsesthe command field and sends the stored blob representing the PCIeconfiguration space. (Every PCIe device should have, by default, a PCIeconfiguration space stored in device as part of the register set).

(4) BAR region sizes and BAR address registers are stored locally by theremote MMIO driver 3724.

(5) The remote MMIO driver 3724 creates device files representing thedifferent BAR regions. This is similar to what the FPGA PCIe driverwould do. The remote MMIO driver 3724 can create a virtual PCIe deviceif the operating system mechanisms allow that. Alternatively, the remoteMMIO driver 3724 can create device files, as described here,representing MMIO regions for the FPGA feature drivers 3722 to access.

Device Management Features

(1) The remote MMIO driver 3724 issues RDMA sends with command field‘MMIO Rd’ to walk the device feature tree.

(2) The remote management controller 3750 parses the command field andissues a memory read request to the respective configuration registerand responds back with the data requested.

(3) The remote MMIO driver 3724 then loads the corresponding FPGAfeature driver 3722, which then performs any sub-feature enumeration orconfiguration using MMIO read/write interfaces.

(4) The feature drivers 3722 expose a management API for an orchestratorapplication to manage the FPGA.

MMIO Write Flow and Read Flow

FIG. 40 illustrates MMIO transfers 4000 between an orchestration server4010 and a remote FPGA 4020 in accordance with implementations of thedisclosure. MMIO transfers 4000 include MMIO write transfer 4030depicted on the left side of FIG. 40, and MMIO read transfer 4060 on theright side of FIG. 40.

Referring to FIG. 40, a MMIO write transfer 4030 includes operations4035, 4040. An example of the packet structure for a MMIO write transferis as follows:

MM_Wr—Command field referring to a MMIO write transfer

Target_offset—Offset address of the target MMIO configuration register

Bar_region—Details about which bar region to send to

Size—Transfer size at granularity of 32 bits/64 bits transfers assupported by the device. Bigger size transfers are divided into 32/64bit transfers by the remote-MMIO manager.

Payload—The MMIO write payload to be written to the configurationregister.

(1) An orchestrator application issues a management request using amanagement API provided by the feature drivers.

(2) The feature drivers issue a MMIO Write request corresponding to theorchestrators request targeted to the device file created duringenumeration.

(3) Remote MMIO driver notes that this device file corresponds to anetwork device and packetizes the MMIO request within a RDMA sendcommand using the format mentioned above. The Remote MMIO driver issuesRDMA send to the FPGA device

(4) Remote management controller receives the message and stores it ininternal buffer. It parses the message fields and forwards a memorywrite request to the configuration register.

(5) On successful write the remote management controller returns an RDMAsend with command field for acknowledgement. On a timeout or any othererror, the RDMA send response is sent with the error field describingthe error.

Referring to FIG. 40, a MMIO read transfer 4060 includes operations4070, 4080. An example of the packet structure for a MMIO read transferis as follows:

MM_Rd—Command field referring to a MMIO read transfer

Target_offset—Offset address of the target MMIO configuration registerto read from.

Bar_region—Details about which bar region to send to

Size—Transfer size at granularity of 32 bits/64 bits transfers assupported by the device. Bigger size transfers are divided into 32/64bit transfers by the Remote Management Controller.

Rkey+VA+offset—Address information about the host buffer

(1) AN orchestrator application issues a management request using themanagement API provided by the feature drivers.

(2) The feature drivers issue a MMIO Read request corresponding to theorchestrators request targeted to the device file created duringenumeration.

(3) Remote MMIO driver notes that this device file corresponds to anetwork device and packetizes the MMIO request within a RDMA sendcommand using the format mentioned above. The Remote MMIO driver issuesRDMA send to the FPGA device

(4) Remote management controller receives the message and stores it ininternal buffer. It parses the message fields and forwards a memory readrequest to the configuration register.

(5) On successful read of the data the remote management controllerreturns a RDMA send with the data payload. On a timeout or any othererror, the RDMA send response is sent with the error field describingthe error.

FIG. 41 details a network environment 4100 for extending a secure datatransfer interface between FPGA and secure enclave for protected remoteMMIO driver, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure. Inone implementations, network environment 4100 is the same as networkenvironment 3700 described with respect to FIG. 37. As such, thedescription of components of network environment 3700 that are similarlynamed to components of network environment 4100 are applicable to thedescription herein of network environment 4100.

In implementations of the disclosure, the feature drivers, such asnetwork drivers 4126, issue MMIO requests to the remote MMIO driver 4124which forwards them using RDMA Send. Also, as the remote managementcontroller 4150 converts the RDMA Send requests over the network 4180 tomemory transactions targeting the configuration registers 4170 withincustomer logic 4165 (e.g., tenant bitstream) of customer region 4160(e.g., PR region), these are intercepted by the MMIO crypto IPs 4128before being forwarded onto the registers 4155, 4170.

Some protocols rely on MMIOs being sent in specific order. In thosecases, if the RDMA Sends are sent over an unreliable protocol (e.g.,UDP) the ordering of the RDMA Sends may not be maintained or individualpackets may be dropped. Also, for reliable transport mechanisms in whichorder is maintained, a protected MMIO may experience high latency s each‘Protected MMIO’ is sent as multiple MMIOs, which results in multipleRDMA sends for this design. A possible optimization in such scenarios isfor the RDMA Send message to contain multiple MMIO requests bundledtogether. For example, for Protected MMIO write, the RDMA send canbundle the MMIO write with Authentication tag data and the MMIO writeconsisting of the actual payload. The remote management controller canissue multiple memory transactions. The max size of MMIO requestsbetween the remote MMIO driver and the remote management controller canbe decided via an initial handshake between this agent over RDMA send.Such optimizations can be done for other cases as well in which afeature driver is attempting to read an entire feature consisting ofmultiple MMIO registers.

FIG. 42 is a flow diagram illustrating a method 4200 for protectedmanagement of network-connected FPGAs, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure. Method 4200 may be performed byprocessing logic that may comprise hardware (e.g., circuitry, dedicatedlogic, programmable logic, etc.), software (such as instructions run ona processing device), or a combination thereof. More particularly, themethod 4200 may be implemented in one or more modules as a set of logicinstructions stored in a machine- or computer-readable storage mediumsuch as RAM, ROM, PROM, firmware, flash memory, etc., in configurablelogic such as, for example, PLAs, FPGAs, CPLDs, in fixed-functionalitylogic hardware using circuit technology such as, for example, ASIC, CMOSor TTL technology, or any combination thereof.

The process of method 4200 is illustrated in linear sequences forbrevity and clarity in presentation; however, it is contemplated thatany number of them can be performed in parallel, asynchronously, or indifferent orders. Further, for brevity, clarity, and ease ofunderstanding, many of the components and processes described withrespect to FIGS. 34-41 may not be repeated or discussed hereafter. Inone implementation, a processor of a server, such as server 3710implementing a remote-MMIO driver 3724 described with respect to FIG.37, may perform method 4200.

Method 4200 begins at block 4210 where a processor may expose an FPGAdevice as a legacy device to an FPGA driver. At block 4220, theprocessor may enumerate the FPGA device using FPGA enumeration dataprovided by a remote management controller of the FPGA device, the FPGAenumeration data comprising a configuration space and device details.

Subsequently, at block 4230, the processor may load function drivers forthe FPGA device in a TEE and create corresponding device files in theTEE based on the FPGA enumeration data. Lastly, at block 4240, theprocessor may handle remote MMIO read and writes to the FPGA device viaa network transport protocol.

The following examples pertain to further embodiments of protectedmanagement of network-connected FPGAs. Example 1 is an apparatus tofacilitate protected management of network-connected FPGAs. Theapparatus of Example 1 comprises a trusted execution environment (TEE)comprising: a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) driver to interfacewith an FPGA device that is remote to the apparatus; and a remotememory-mapped input/output (MMIO) driver to expose the FPGA device as alegacy device to the FPGA driver, the remote MMIO driver to: enumeratethe FPGA device using FPGA enumeration data provided by a remotemanagement controller of the FPGA device, the FPGA enumeration datacomprising a configuration space and device details; load functiondrivers for the FPGA device in the TEE and create corresponding devicefiles in the TEE based on the FPGA enumeration data; and handle remoteMMIO reads and writes to the FPGA device via a network transportprotocol.

In Example 2, the subject matter of Example 1 can optionally includewherein the legacy device comprises a peripheral component interconnectexpress (PCIe) device. In Example 3, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 1-2 can optionally include wherein the FPGA enumeration datacomprises a size of a base address register (BAR) regions utilized bythe FPGA device. In Example 4, the subject matter of any one of Examples1-3 can optionally include wherein the remote MMIO driver creates thecorresponding device files representing the BAR regions of the FPGAdevice.

In Example 5, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-4 canoptionally include wherein the remote MMIO drive to handle remote MMIOreads and writes further comprises: converting a MMIO request, receivedfrom a host driver of the TEE, comprising at least one of the remoteMMIO reads and writes into a remote MMIO request; packetizing the remoteMMIO request; and sending the packetized remote MMIO request to the FPGAdevice directly via the network transport protocol. In Example 6, thesubject matter of any one of Examples 1-5 can optionally include whereinthe network transport protocol comprises remote direct memory access(RDMA).

In Example 7, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-6 canoptionally include wherein the remote management controller of the FPGAis to: receive the packetized remote MMIO request; parse the packetizedremote MMIO request; perform a corresponding memory read or write toregisters of the FPGA device; and return a status message indicatingsuccess or failure of the corresponding memory write or indicating aread response. In Example 8, the subject matter of any one of Examples1-7 can optionally include wherein the remote management controllercomprises a message parser to initiate memory read and write requests tothe FPGA device and a buffer for storing messages.

Example 9 is a method for facilitating protected management ofnetwork-connected FPGAs. The method of Example 9 can includeenumerating, by a remote memory-mapped input/output (MMIO) driver of atrusted execution environment (TEE), a field-programmable gate array(FPGA) device using FPGA enumeration data provided by a remotemanagement controller of the FPGA device, the FPGA enumeration datacomprising a configuration space and device details; loading, by theremote MMIO driver, function drivers for the FPGA device in the TEE andcreate corresponding device files in the TEE based on the FPGAenumeration data; and handling, by the remote MMIO driver, remote MMIOreads and writes to the FPGA device via a network transport protocol,wherein an FPGA driver to interface with an FPGA device.

In Example 10, the subject matter of Example 9 can optionally includewherein the legacy device comprises a peripheral component interconnectexpress (PCIe) device. In Example 11, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 9-10 can optionally include wherein the FPGA enumeration datacomprises a size of a base address register (BAR) regions utilized bythe FPGA device. In Example 12, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 9-11 can optionally include wherein the remote MMIO drivercreates the corresponding device files representing the BAR regions ofthe FPGA device.

In Example 13, the subject matter of any one of Examples 9-12 canoptionally include wherein the remote MMIO drive to handle remote MMIOreads and writes further comprises: converting a MMIO request, receivedfrom a host driver of the TEE, comprising at least one of the remoteMMIO reads and writes into a remote MMIO request; packetizing the remoteMMIO request; and sending the packetized remote MMIO request to the FPGAdevice directly via the network transport protocol. In Example 14, thesubject matter of any one of Examples 9-13 can optionally includewherein the network transport protocol comprises remote direct memoryaccess (RDMA).

In Example 15, the subject matter of any one of Examples 9-14 canoptionally include wherein the remote management controller of the FPGAis to: receive the packetized remote MMIO request; parse the packetizedremote MMIO request; perform a corresponding memory read or write toregisters of the FPGA device; and return a status message indicatingsuccess or failure of the corresponding memory write or indicating aread response. In Example 16, the subject matter of any one of Examples9-15 can optionally include wherein the remote management controllercomprises a message parser to initiate memory read and write requests tothe FPGA device and a buffer for storing messages.

Example 17 is a non-transitory machine readable storage medium forfacilitating protected management of network-connected FPGAs. Thenon-transitory computer-readable storage medium of Example 17 havingstored thereon executable computer program instructions that, whenexecuted by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors toperform operations comprising enumerating, by a remote memory-mappedinput/output (MMIO) driver of a trusted execution environment (TEE)comprising the at least one processor, a field-programmable gate array(FPGA) device using FPGA enumeration data provided by a remotemanagement controller of the FPGA device, the FPGA enumeration datacomprising a configuration space and device details; loading, by theremote MMIO driver, function drivers for the FPGA device in the TEE andcreate corresponding device files in the TEE based on the FPGAenumeration data; and handling, by the remote MMIO driver, remote MMIOreads and writes to the FPGA device via a network transport protocol,wherein an FPGA driver to interface with an FPGA device.

In Example 18, the subject matter of Example 17 can optionally includewherein the legacy device comprises a peripheral component interconnectexpress (PCIe) device. In Example 19, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 17-18 can optionally include wherein the FPGA enumeration datacomprises a size of a base address register (BAR) regions utilized bythe FPGA device. In Example 20, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 17-19 can optionally include wherein the remote MMIO drivercreates the corresponding device files representing the BAR regions ofthe FPGA device.

In Example 21, the subject matter of any one of Examples 17-20 canoptionally include wherein the remote MMIO drive to handle remote MMIOreads and writes further comprises: converting a MMIO request, receivedfrom a host driver of the TEE, comprising at least one of the remoteMMIO reads and writes into a remote MMIO request; packetizing the remoteMMIO request; and sending the packetized remote MMIO request to the FPGAdevice directly via the network transport protocol. In Example 22, thesubject matter of any one of Examples 17-21 can optionally includewherein the network transport protocol comprises remote direct memoryaccess (RDMA).

In Example 23, the subject matter of any one of Examples 17-22 canoptionally include wherein the remote management controller of the FPGAis to: receive the packetized remote MMIO request; parse the packetizedremote MMIO request; perform a corresponding memory read or write toregisters of the FPGA device; and return a status message indicatingsuccess or failure of the corresponding memory write or indicating aread response. In Example 24, the subject matter of any one of Examples17-23 can optionally include wherein the remote management controllercomprises a message parser to initiate memory read and write requests tothe FPGA device and a buffer for storing messages.

Example 25 is an apparatus for facilitating protected management ofnetwork-connected FPGAs according to implementations of the disclosure.The apparatus of Example 25 can comprise means for enumerating, by aremote memory-mapped input/output (MMIO) driver of a trusted executionenvironment (TEE), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) device usingFPGA enumeration data provided by a remote management controller of theFPGA device, the FPGA enumeration data comprising a configuration spaceand device details; means for loading, by the remote MMIO driver,function drivers for the FPGA device in the TEE and create correspondingdevice files in the TEE based on the FPGA enumeration data; and meansfor handling, by the remote MMIO driver, remote MMIO reads and writes tothe FPGA device via a network transport protocol, wherein an FPGA driverto interface with an FPGA device. In Example 26, the subject matter ofExample 25 can optionally include the apparatus further configured toperform the method of any one of the Examples 10 to 16.

Example 27 is a system for facilitating protected management ofnetwork-connected FPGAs, configured to perform the method of any one ofExamples 9-16. Example 28 is an apparatus for facilitating protectedmanagement of network-connected FPGAs comprising means for performingthe method of any one of claims 9 to 16. Specifics in the Examples maybe used anywhere in one or more embodiments.

Enforcement of CSP Policy for FPGA Usage by Tenant Bitstream

In some embodiments, an apparatus, system, or process is to provide forenforcement of CSP policy for FPGA usage by tenant bitstream. In oneimplementation, FPGA usage policy component 905 described with respectto FIG. 9 provides the enforcement of CSPs policy for FPGA usage bytenant bitstream.

In implementations of the disclosure, an FPGA is specifically discussed.However, any type of programmable logic integrated circuit (IC) (alsoreferred to as a programmable IC) may utilize implementations of thedisclosure and implements are not specifically limited to utilization inan FPGA environment. Examples of programmable logic ICs includeprogrammable arrays logic (PALs), programmable logic arrays (PLAs),field programmable logic arrays (FPLAs), electrically programmable logicdevices (EPLDs), electrically erasable programmable logic devices(EEPLDs), logic cell arrays (LCAs), complex programmable logic devices(CPLDs), and field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), just to name a few.However, for ease of discussion and illustration, the specific exampleof an FPGA is described herein.

CSPs offer use of their FPGAs to cloud customers for acceleratingcustomer workloads for applications, such as inferencing, training,analytics and others. The use conditions (i.e., use policy) provided byCSPs may dictate policies such as how long the FPGA is available for thecustomer use, which features the customer is allowed to use (e.g.,networking), how much resources the customer may be allowed to use(e.g., memory, number of partially reconfigurable regions), and so on.The use policy may be different for different customers based onbusiness and financial agreement. A CSP can enforce the use policyduring execution to ensure that a potentially malicious tenant cannotexploit system vulnerabilities to bypass the use policies. Violation ofa use policy has financial implications, such as use of FPGA withoutpaying for additional time, as well as other implications such asadversely impacting resource availability to other tenants, safeoperation of FPGA by exceeding temperature or voltage thresholds, etc.

Implementations of the disclosure define techniques for enforcement ofan FPGA use policy that is resilient to hardware and software tampering.In conventional systems, the enforcement of use policy is managed by thehost OS and driver. For example, if a customer is allowed to use theFPGA for a certain duration, OS service can track the use time and swapout the tenant code from FPGA when the time is up. A limitation of theconventional solutions is that the OS has a large threat surface and anyvulnerability in it can be exploited to bypass CSP's use policy. Thiscan be done by modifying the policy itself or by tampering with thepolicy management code.

Implementations of the disclosure propose a method to bind the usepolicy to customer's control logic (i.e., bitstream) and deliver that tothe FPGA with integrity. Further, implementations of the disclosuredefine techniques to enforce policies inside the FPGA in a robust mannerthat cannot be compromised through system level exploits.

Implementations of the disclosure cryptographically bind FPGA use policyfor a given customer to that customer's bitstream and have the CSP signit, thus providing a way to deliver authenticated andintegrity-protected policy to the FPGA in a multi-tenant environment. Abitstream may refer to a file that includes the programming informationfor an FPGA, for example. The term bitstream is frequently used todescribe the configuration data to be loaded into a FPGA. Inside theFPGA, a policy management module (also referred to as a policy manager)is defined that collaborates with a secure device manager of the FPGA toenforce the use policy without relying on host software, such as a hostOS for such enforcement. In one example, implementations of thedisclosure provide techniques to enforce a use-time policy (i.e., howlong is the tenant uses the PFGA) with help of a trusted source of timeinside the FPGA.

Implementations of the disclosure provide CSPs mechanisms for strongenforcement of use policies for programmable ICs, such as FPGAs, in thepresence of potential system level exploits. Implementations provide atechnical advantage of providing differentiating feature to CSPs thatenables stronger protection of their datacenter resources againstunauthorized or improper use.

Implementations of the disclosure provide a two-prong approachincluding: (1) Binding the use policy to customer code and deliveringthat to the FPGA securely; and (2) Enforcing use policy inside the FPGA.Each of these prongs is described in further detail below.

(1) Binding Use Policy and Delivering it to the FPGA Securely

In implementations of the disclosure, a use policy for a customer (suchas an FPGA customer) may be determined based on business and/orfinancial agreements between the CSP and the customer. In some cases,such agreements may be determined offline. The CSP may also generate usepolicies dynamically and motivated by other datacenter goals (such asload balancing) that may determine, for example, how long the customer'sbitstream can run on a given FPGA.

Conventional approaches to enable loading a CSP-authorized bitstream mayoccur as follows: (1) CSP programs their key into the FPGA securely (onetime). This may happen during manufacturing. (2) Subsequently, anauthorizing entity, owned by the CSP, signs the customer bitstream. Thebitstream may also be encrypted if confidentiality of the bitstream isto be protected. (3) When the customer loads the bitstream, a securedevice manager inside the FPGA verifies the CSP signature to ensure thatthe given bitstream has been authorized by the CSP to run on the FPGA.

Implementations of the disclosure modify the conventional approachdescribed above. Specifically, implementations of the disclosure modifysteps 2 and 3 of the above conventional approach as described below andwith respect to FIG. 43.

FIG. 43 illustrates a network architecture 4300 for enforcement of CSPpolicy for FPGA usage by tenant bitstream, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure. Network architecture 4300 includes acustomer platform 4310 (e.g., client device), a server 4320 (e.g., theCSP), and an FPGA 4330 (e.g., CSP-managed entity) communicably coupledto one another via a network 4370. In some implementations, customerplatform 4310 hosts an application 4315 that utilizes the resources ofthe FPGA 4330 to accelerate a workload of the application 4315. Theserver 4320 of the CSP manages the utilization of the FPGA 4330 foracceleration of the workload of the application 4315.

With respect to step 2 of the conventional approach described above,implementations of the disclosure modify this step as follows. At thetime of signing the bitstream, a CSP-owned authorizing entity 4325 ofthe server 4320 also cryptographically binds a use policy for thecustomer to the customer's bitstream.

With respect to step 3 of the conventional approach described above,implementations of the disclosure modify this step as follows. Thecustomer loads the bitstream and the policy, along with an authorizationcertificate that contains an authentication tag (such as a MAC), forboth the bitstream and the policy. A secure device manager (SDM) 4340,which is the root of trust of the FPGA 4330, verifies the certificate,extracts the policy and stores it. With the help of a policy manager4342 of the FPGA 4330, the SDM 4340 determines if the bitstream isallowed to run and configures a partial reconfiguration (PR) region (ofthe FPGA) (e.g., slot 1 4362, slot 2 4364, slot 3 4366) that is assignedto the bitstream. In one implementation, a PR sequencer 4346 (e.g.,agent in charge of partial reconfiguration) handles the assignment ofbitstreams to slots 4362, 4364, 4366 of the customer region 4360 of theFPGA 4330. The SDM 4340 associates the PR Slot ID slot with the policy(e.g., via table 4344) to enable monitoring and enforcement of executionpolicy on that PR tenant.

(2) Policy Enforcement Inside the FPGA

As mentioned above, the SDM 4340 verifies a signature of thebitstream-policy blob and stores the policy-slot ID pair. A slot (e.g.,slot 1 4362, slot 2 4364, slot 3 4366) herein refers to a region of thecustomer region 4360 in the FPGA 4330 where the bitstream is loaded. TheID is a numerical value given to each slot. The SDM 4340 exposes aninterface to allow FPGA management code to read the policy and Slot ID.

The policy manager 4342 refers to module, inside the FPGA managementregion 4341 (e.g., management code), that reads the policy-slot pairfrom the SDM 4340. The policy manager 4342 parses the policy andconfigures the internal states accordingly to enable enforcement of usepolicy for the tenant running on the specified slot 4362, 4364, 4366.One example of enforcement of a time-based use policy is describedbelow. Other use policies may also be enforced by implementations of thedisclosure.

In one example, a simple form of time-based use policy specifies theduration of how long customer is allowed to use the FPGA. The time-baseduse policy includes a start time and a duration. During this periodidentified by the start time and duration, the customer may load theirbitstreams multiple times if they want. But when the duration expires,the PR tenant should be evicted. The policy manager 4342 enforces thiswith the help of a trusted time service 4350 inside FPGA 4330.

The trusted time service 4350 refers to a service whose source of timeis a protected Real Time Clock (RTC) 4355, also inside the FPGA 4330.The RTC 4355 includes the following properties: it is resistant tophysical tampering; it persists across FPGA resets; an epoch isassociated with it to detect reset or rollover; and enables the trustedtime service 4350 to read RTC 4355 time with integrity. The RTC 4355 isset by the CSP securely and is synchronized with CSP's authorizingentity's 4325 time. The trusted time service 4350 can create multipletimers, rooted in RTC 4355 to support monitoring time-based policy formultiple tenants simultaneously.

In the example, the policy manager 4342 compares the start value withthe current time from the trusted time service 4350 to determine if thecustomer is allowed to program the bitstream. In one implementation, themanagement region 4340 includes a table 4344 that stores the start timeand end time of a time-based use policy for each slot. The current timeis obtained by reading the RTC 4355 value. If the current time is pastthe start time, then the bitstream is not allowed to be programmed. Thepolicy manager 4342 returns a time-out error to the SDM 4340, whichtells the SDM 4340 to not program the bitstream. A corresponding erroris returned to the host software as part of partial reconfiguration (PR)error notification.

If the start time has not expired, then the policy manager 4342 notifiesthe SDM 4340 to proceed with the programming. Upon completion of PRconfiguration, the SDM 4340 provides the slot ID of the PR region to thepolicy manager 4342. The policy manager 4342 then sets a timer using thetrusted time service 4350 for the remaining duration to track when theusage time expires. When the use time expires, the policy manager 4342notifies the host software and then follows up with the SDM 4340 toperform a forced eviction of the tenant at the given slot.

Implementations of the disclosure may provide an initial policyconfiguration flow. One example of such an initial policy configurationflow (with respect to an example time usage policy) is described asfollows:

(1) The customer submits their bitstream to the authorization agent ofthe CSP. The authorization agent binds the ‘Time usage policy’ to thebitstream and signs the bitstream and the policy blob. This can be doneoffline or done during runtime. The signed blob is provided to thecustomer.

(2) Customer submits the bitstream to the FPGA (this maybe over thenetwork or via the local CPU).

(3) SDM within the FPGA verifies the signature of the blob. SDM thenextracts the policy and sends an event to the policy manager to checkthe policy.

(4) The policy manager reads the policy from the SDM and parses it. Fortime-based policy, it verifies that time has not expired by comparingthe start and duration with the time it obtains from the time service.The time service in turn, obtains the time from RTC in a protected way.If the time has not expired, then it notifies the SDM to proceed withthe PR.

(5) The SDM then assigns the bitstream to the empty slot and forwards itto the PR sequencer (agent in charge of partial reconfiguration). Italso informs the policy manager of the slot ID where the PR wasperformed. The policy manager associates the Slot ID with the PR regionand stores that internally.

Implementations of the disclosure may subsequently provide a policyenforcement flow. One example of such a policy enforcement configurationflow is described as follows, continuing from the end of the initialpolicy configuration flow described above:

(6) Policy manager creates a timer using the timer service. It sets theduration for the timer.

(7) The timer increments the time by reading the RTC value. On reachingthe end time, it triggers an event in the policy manager.

(8) The policy monitor issues a slot event to notify the tenant on FPGAof an impending eviction. It also sends an event to the host driverindicating the tenant eviction so the driver can update its resourceinventory and notify the customer application allowing the applicationopportunity to clean up.

(9) The policy manager issues a notification to the SDM to signal tenanteviction.

(10) The SDM evicts the FPGA bitstream, clears tenant specific state andalso clears the tenant related keys.

FIG. 44 is a flow diagram illustrating a method 4400 for enforcement ofCSP policy for FPGA usage by tenant bitstream, in accordance withimplementations of the disclosure. Method 4400 may be performed byprocessing logic that may comprise hardware (e.g., circuitry, dedicatedlogic, programmable logic, etc.), software (such as instructions run ona processing device), or a combination thereof. More particularly, themethod 4400 may be implemented in one or more modules as a set of logicinstructions stored in a machine- or computer-readable storage mediumsuch as RAM, ROM, PROM, firmware, flash memory, etc., in configurablelogic such as, for example, PLAs, FPGAs, CPLDs, in fixed-functionalitylogic hardware using circuit technology such as, for example, ASIC, CMOSor TTL technology, or any combination thereof.

The process of method 4400 is illustrated in linear sequences forbrevity and clarity in presentation; however, it is contemplated thatany number of them can be performed in parallel, asynchronously, or indifferent orders. Further, for brevity, clarity, and ease ofunderstanding, many of the components and processes described withrespect to FIG. 43 may not be repeated or discussed hereafter. In oneimplementation, a programmable IC, such as FPGA 4330 implementing an SMD4340 described with respect to FIG. 43, may perform method 4400.

Method 4400 begins at block 4410 where a programmable IC may receive,from a tenant, a tenant bitstream and a tenant use policy forutilization of a programmable IC via the tenant bitstream. In oneimplementation, the tenant use policy is cryptographically bound to thetenant bitstream by a cloud service provider (CSP) authorizing entityand signed with a signature of the CSP authorizing entity.

At block 4420, the programmable IC may extract, in response tosuccessful verification of the signature of the CSP authorizing entity,the tenant use policy to provide to a policy manager of the programmableIC for verification. Subsequently, at block 4430, the programmable ICmay configure, in response to the policy manager verifying the tenantbitstream based on the tenant use policy, a partial reconfiguration (PR)region of the programmable IC using the tenant bitstream.

Lastly, at block 4440, the programmable IC may associate a slotidentifier (ID) of the PR region with the tenant use policy forenforcement of the tenant use policy on the PR region of the tenant.

The following examples pertain to further embodiments of enforcement ofCSP policy for FPGA usage by tenant bitstream. Example 1 is an apparatusto facilitate enforcement of CSP policy for FPGA usage by tenantbitstream. The apparatus of Example 1 comprises a secure device manager(SDM) to: receive, from a computing device of a tenant, a tenantbitstream and a tenant use policy for utilization of the programmable ICvia the tenant bitstream, wherein the tenant use policy iscryptographically bound to the tenant bitstream by a cloud serviceprovider (CSP) authorizing entity and signed with a signature of the CSPauthorizing entity; in response to successfully verifying the signatureof the CSP authorizing entity, extracting the tenant use policy toprovide to a policy manager of the programmable IC for verification; inresponse to the policy manager verifying the tenant bitstream based onthe tenant use policy, configuring a partial reconfiguration (PR) regionof the programable IC using the tenant bitstream; and associating a slotidentifier (ID) of the PR region with the tenant use policy forenforcement of the tenant use policy on the PR region of the tenant.

In Example 2, the subject matter of Example 1 can optionally includewherein the policy manager is further to enforce the tenant use policyon the PR region of the tenant. In Example 3, the subject matter of anyone of Examples 1-2 can optionally include wherein the tenant use policyis cryptographically bound to the tenant bitstream using a messageauthentication code (MAC) and an authorization certificate comprisingthe signature. In Example 4, the subject matter of any one of Examples1-3 can optionally include wherein the CSP authorizing entity provisionsa key to the FPGA, the key used as the signature of the CSP authorizingentity, and wherein the key is utilized by the SDM to verify thesignature of the CSP authorizing entity.

In Example 5, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-4 canoptionally include wherein the secure device manager comprises a root oftrust of the programmable IC. In Example 6, the subject matter of anyone of Examples 1-5 can optionally include wherein the policy manager ispart of management code of the programmable IC, and wherein the policymanager maintains a data structure in the management code to associatethe tenant use policy with the PR region of the tenant. In Example 7,the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-6 can optionally includewherein the policy manager refers to a trusted time service of theprogrammable IC to enforce the tenant use policy.

In Example 8, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-7 canoptionally include wherein in response to the policy manager determininga violation of the tenant use policy, the policy manager to issues anotification to the SDM to signal eviction of the tenant, and whereinthe SDM performs an eviction process on the tenant in response to thenotification. In Example 9, the subject matter of any one of Examples1-8 can optionally include wherein the programmable IC comprises atleast one of a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmablearray logic (PAL), a programmable logic array (PLA), a fieldprogrammable logic array (FPLA), an electrically programmable logicdevice (EPLD), an electrically erasable programmable logic device(EEPLD), a logic cell array (LCA), or a complex programmable logicdevices (CPLD).

Example 10 is a method for facilitating enforcement of CSP policy forFPGA usage by tenant bitstream. The method of Example 10 can includereceiving, by a secure device manager (SDM) of a programmable integratedcircuit (IC) from a computing device of a tenant, a tenant bitstream anda tenant use policy for utilization of the programmable IC via thetenant bitstream, wherein the tenant use policy is cryptographicallybound to the tenant bitstream by a cloud service provider (CSP)authorizing entity and signed with a signature of the CSP authorizingentity; in response to successfully verifying the signature of the CSPauthorizing entity, extracting, by the SDM, the tenant use policy toprovide to a policy manager of the programmable IC for verification; inresponse to the policy manager verifying the tenant bitstream based onthe tenant use policy, configuring, by the SDM, a partialreconfiguration (PR) region of the programable IC using the tenantbitstream; and associating, by the SDM, a slot identifier (ID) of the PRregion with the tenant use policy for enforcement of the tenant usepolicy on the PR region of the tenant.

In Example 11, the subject matter of Example 10 can optionally includewherein the policy manager is further to enforce the tenant use policyon the PR region of the tenant. In Example 12, the subject matter of anyone of Examples 10-11 can optionally include wherein the tenant usepolicy is cryptographically bound to the tenant bitstream using amessage authentication code (MAC) and an authorization certificatecomprising the signature. In Example 13, the subject matter of any oneof Examples 10-12 can optionally include wherein the CSP authorizingentity provisions a key to the FPGA, the key used as the signature ofthe CSP authorizing entity, and wherein the key is utilized by the SDMto verify the signature of the CSP authorizing entity.

In Example 14, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-13 canoptionally include wherein the secure device manager comprises a root oftrust of the programmable IC. In Example 15, the subject matter of anyone of Examples 10-14 can optionally include wherein the policy manageris part of management code of the programmable IC, and wherein thepolicy manager maintains a data structure in the management code toassociate the tenant use policy with the PR region of the tenant. InExample 16, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-15 canoptionally include wherein the policy manager refers to a trusted timeservice of the programmable IC to enforce the tenant use policy.

In Example 17, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-16 canoptionally include wherein in response to the policy manager determininga violation of the tenant use policy, the policy manager to issues anotification to the SDM to signal eviction of the tenant, and whereinthe SDM performs an eviction process on the tenant in response to thenotification. In Example 18, the subject matter of any one of Examples10-17 can optionally include wherein the programmable IC comprises atleast one of a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmablearray logic (PAL), a programmable logic array (PLA), a fieldprogrammable logic array (FPLA), an electrically programmable logicdevice (EPLD), an electrically erasable programmable logic device(EEPLD), a logic cell array (LCA), or a complex programmable logicdevices (CPLD).

Example 19 is a non-transitory machine readable storage medium forfacilitating enforcement of CSP policy for FPGA usage by tenantbitstream. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium ofExample 19 having stored thereon executable computer programinstructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause theone or more processors to perform operations comprising receiving, by asecure device manager (SDM) of a programmable integrated circuit (IC)from a computing device of a tenant, a tenant bitstream and a tenant usepolicy for utilization of the programmable IC via the tenant bitstream,wherein the tenant use policy is cryptographically bound to the tenantbitstream by a cloud service provider (CSP) authorizing entity andsigned with a signature of the CSP authorizing entity; in response tosuccessfully verifying the signature of the CSP authorizing entity,extracting, by the SDM, the tenant use policy to provide to a policymanager of the programmable IC for verification; in response to thepolicy manager verifying the tenant bitstream based on the tenant usepolicy, configuring, by the SDM, a partial reconfiguration (PR) regionof the programable IC using the tenant bitstream; and associating, bythe SDM, a slot identifier (ID) of the PR region with the tenant usepolicy for enforcement of the tenant use policy on the PR region of thetenant.

In Example 20, the subject matter of Example 19 can optionally includewherein the policy manager is further to enforce the tenant use policyon the PR region of the tenant. In Example 21, the subject matter of anyone of Examples 19-20 can optionally include wherein the tenant usepolicy is cryptographically bound to the tenant bitstream using amessage authentication code (MAC) and an authorization certificatecomprising the signature. In Example 22, the subject matter of any oneof Examples 19-21 can optionally include wherein the CSP authorizingentity provisions a key to the FPGA, the key used as the signature ofthe CSP authorizing entity, and wherein the key is utilized by the SDMto verify the signature of the CSP authorizing entity.

In Example 23, the subject matter of any one of Examples 19-22 canoptionally include wherein the secure device manager comprises a root oftrust of the programmable IC. In Example 24, the subject matter of anyone of Examples 19-23 can optionally include wherein the policy manageris part of management code of the programmable IC, and wherein thepolicy manager maintains a data structure in the management code toassociate the tenant use policy with the PR region of the tenant. InExample 25, the subject matter of any one of Examples 19-24 canoptionally include wherein the policy manager refers to a trusted timeservice of the programmable IC to enforce the tenant use policy.

In Example 26, the subject matter of any one of Examples 19-25 canoptionally include wherein in response to the policy manager determininga violation of the tenant use policy, the policy manager to issues anotification to the SDM to signal eviction of the tenant, and whereinthe SDM performs an eviction process on the tenant in response to thenotification. In Example 27, the subject matter of any one of Examples19-26 can optionally include wherein the programmable IC comprises atleast one of a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmablearray logic (PAL), a programmable logic array (PLA), a fieldprogrammable logic array (FPLA), an electrically programmable logicdevice (EPLD), an electrically erasable programmable logic device(EEPLD), a logic cell array (LCA), or a complex programmable logicdevices (CPLD).

Example 28 is an apparatus for facilitating enforcement of CSP policyfor FPGA usage by tenant bitstream according to implementations of thedisclosure. The apparatus of Example 28 can comprise means forreceiving, by a secure device manager (SDM) of a programmable integratedcircuit (IC) from a computing device of a tenant, a tenant bitstream anda tenant use policy for utilization of the programmable IC via thetenant bitstream, wherein the tenant use policy is cryptographicallybound to the tenant bitstream by a cloud service provider (CSP)authorizing entity and signed with a signature of the CSP authorizingentity; means for in response to successfully verifying the signature ofthe CSP authorizing entity, extracting, by the SDM, the tenant usepolicy to provide to a policy manager of the programmable IC forverification; means for in response to the policy manager verifying thetenant bitstream based on the tenant use policy, configuring, by theSDM, a partial reconfiguration (PR) region of the programable IC usingthe tenant bitstream; and means for associating, by the SDM, a slotidentifier (ID) of the PR region with the tenant use policy forenforcement of the tenant use policy on the PR region of the tenant. InExample 29, the subject matter of Example 28 can optionally include theapparatus further configured to perform the method of any one of theExamples 11 to 18.

Example 30 is a system for facilitating enforcement of CSP policy forFPGA usage by tenant bitstream, configured to perform the method of anyone of Examples 10-18. Example 31 is an apparatus for facilitatingenforcement of CSP policy for FPGA usage by tenant bitstream comprisingmeans for performing the method of any one of claims 10 to 18. Specificsin the Examples may be used anywhere in one or more embodiments.

Autonomous (Self-Managed) FPGAS

In some embodiments, an apparatus, system, or process is to provideautonomous (self-managed) FPGAs. In one implementation, autonomous FPGAcomponent 906 described with respect to FIG. 9 provides the autonomous(self-managed) FPGAs.

In implementations of the disclosure, an FPGA is specifically discussed.However, any type of programmable logic integrated circuit (IC) (alsoreferred to as a programmable IC) may utilize implementations of thedisclosure and implements are not specifically limited to utilization inan FPGA environment. Examples of programmable logic ICs include PALs,PLAs, FPLAs, EPLDs, EEPLDs, LCAs, CPLDs, FPGAs, just to name a few.However, for ease of discussion and illustration, the specific exampleof an FPGA is described herein.

Use of FPGAs in datacenters is increasing. FPGAs can be used indatacenters for accelerating applications, such as AI/ML, analytics,browser search, and database, to name a few examples. For efficient useof resources, FPGAs are shared among the applications across the datacenter and applications send acceleration workloads to FPGAs over anetwork. As FPGAs become peers to CPUs, there is a shift to move thecontrol and management of the FPGA inside of the FPGA, moving away fromthe conventional model where the CPU performs the device management,workload scheduling, device resource allocation, etc. for the FPGA.

In conventional systems, FPGAs are attached to a host CPU via PCIe orother physical connection and are managed by an OS and the drivers onthe host CPU. The drivers are responsible for tasks such as enumeratingthe FPGA features, managing device resource allocation for local andremote apps, enforcing FPGA use policy, monitoring device health, andperforming recovery, for example.

FIG. 45 illustrates a conventional network environment 4500 for FPGAmanagement. In network environment 4500, a remote application 4515running on a host CPU 4510 of a client platform 4502 sends data directlyto a network-capable FPGA 4550. However, the FPGA 4550 is connected to alocal host CPU 4540 of a server platform 4504 via a direct connection4560, such as PCIe. As such, the FPGA 4550 is being managed by the localhost CPU 4540 of server platform 4504 using management server 4542 anddrivers 4544 of the local host CPU 4540. All control and commands fromremote application 4515 go through the local host CPU 4540 via a controlpath 4532 of network 4530 using NICs 4520, 4554. Data from application4515 may go directly to the FPGA 4550 via data path 4534 of network 4530using NICs 4520, 4552.

Another conventional system for FPGA management involves offering aplatform as a service (PaaS) where the PaaS has a locally attached FPGA.In this case, FPGA does not have a networking capability and thecustomer deploys the application on the rented platform of the PaaS.Accordingly, both control and data transfer to the FPGA occur via alocal PCIe connection. As in the previous conventional solutiondescribed with respect to FIG. 45, drivers running on the CPU manage theFPGA in the PaaS-based conventional system.

Conventional approaches to FPGA management have the followingdisadvantages. First, a device's resource and management are exposed tohost system which increases the potential threat surface for offloadedworkload. Furthermore, for offload to network-pooled FPGAs, goingthrough the local host for control messages for device configuration,device control, monitoring execution, and so on, creates inefficienciesin the control plane. This adds latencies with large scale out. Anotherdisadvantage of the conventional systems is a higher cost as each rackof FPGA uses a CPU whose role may be to perform device management.

As a background, here are the main management functions performed by thehost device drivers in conventional systems:

Enumeration: Read the device registers to enumerate the devicecapabilities.

Configuration: Configure the registers for stable and correctfunctioning of FPGA.

Monitoring: Monitor status and indicators such as temperature, powerconsumption, performance counters as well as other kind of events andinterrupts.

Resource assignment: Assigning the FPGA resource to a specificapplication or virtual machine instance, providing information regardingthe current state (busy/available) to requesting software or a centralorchestrator service.

Device Recovery and reset: Reset the device and recover it if it is badstate or if it requests to take it back from the tenant for some reason.

Network configuration: Facilitate session setup with the remoteapplication by configuring network registers, such as programming FPGA'sRDMA interface.

Partial reconfiguration and debug: Enable application to do partialreconfiguration of the FPGA by loading customer's bitstream. Providedebug interface for application to manage the execution of theirbitstream.

Firmware updates: The driver performs firmware updates of the FPGA. Thismay include for example the management bitstream in the FPGA or firmwareassociated with any on-board processors.

Implementations of the disclosure provide for an autonomous (i.e.,self-managed) FPGA that can be accessed and used by a remote applicationdirectly without utilizing a local CPU for a control plane. Theautonomous FPGA of implementations of the disclosure is capable ofproviding the main management functions performed by the host devicedrivers in conventional systems as detailed above.

FIG. 46 illustrates a network environment 4600 for sharing FPGAs onvarious servers without a local CPU managing the FPGAs, in accordancewith implementations of the disclosure. Network environment 4600includes rack(s) 4650 of FPGAs 4640 that are shared among theapplications on various servers 4610 without a local CPU in the rack(s)4650 for managing the FPGAs 4640. The FPGAs 4640 may be communicablycoupled over a network 4605 to the server(s) 4610 via switches 4630 andNICs 4620. CPUs 4615 at server(s) 4610 may be run the application(s)utilizing the FPGAs 4640.

Implementations of the disclosure define a management component insidethe FPGA referred to as the FPGA System Manager (FSM). In someimplementations, the FSM is also referred to as a programmable IC SystemManager (PIC SM) or as simply a system manager. The FSM is designed toperform the management of FPGA, such as feature enumeration,device/resource assignments, resource management, scheduling,monitoring, recovery and device reset (performed by host CPU drivers intoday's solutions). The FPGA exposes a message-based network interfaceto remote software that allow querying for information regarding FPGAcapability and its configuration and for deploying workload directly tothe FPGA. The interface also provides a mechanism to the remote softwarefor managing and monitoring execution of its bitstream directly, whichis facilitated by the FSM module inside the FPGA. Implementations of thedisclosure define methods for authorization checks, usage policyenforcement, and secure session for both the control and data plane.

The autonomous FPGA of implementations of the disclosure provides anumber of technical advantages. The autonomous FPGA offers improvedsecurity as the remote application does not have to rely on an untrustedhost driver for FPGA management. The autonomous FPGA provides for lowerlatencies in management of remote FPGA. Furthermore, CSPs also benefitfrom lower infrastructure cost as they do not have to dedicate a CPU tomanage the network connected FPGA. CSPs can also provide strongersecurity assurance to their customers as their management code can nowreside outside of a customer's trust code base (TCB).

FIG. 47 illustrates a network environment 4700 for an autonomous FPGA inaccordance with implementations of the disclosure. Network environment4700 depicts authorization and policy enforcement aspects of runningcustomer code (i.e., a bitstream) on an autonomous FPGA, such asautonomous FPGA 4730. Network environment 4700 include an authorizationand policy server 4710, a remote application 4720, and an autonomousFPGA 4730 communicably coupled to one another via one or more networks(not shown).

In one implementation, the authorization and policy server 4710 may beowned by a CSP. The authorization and policy server 4710 is responsiblefor authorizing a customer's code (i.e., bitstream) to run on theautonomous FPGA 4730. The authorization and policy server 4710 is alsoresponsible for defining a usage policy associated with a customer(e.g., how long the customer can use the FPGA, what resources thecustomer is allowed to use, etc.) and binding that policy to theworkload.

The remote application 4720 is a customer application that seeks tooffload its workload to the network-connected, autonomous FPGA 4730. Theremote application 4720 can obtain an authorization and policy for itsworkload from the authorization and policy server 4710 and submit thatto the FPGA 4730 over the network. The remote application 4720 may beowned by the CSP or it may belong to a third-party customer.

The autonomous FPGA 4730 is responsible for checking the authorizationwhen the remote application 4720 sends a bitstream for execution on theFPGA 4730.

An example flow of implementations of the disclosure with reference tonetwork environment 4700 of FIG. 47 is as follows:

(1) In a first step 4701, the FPGA owner (e.g., CSP) keys areprovisioned into the FPGA 4730 securely. There are existing solutionthat enable this. An example of such a solution is on Intel® Stratix 10devices, where the Secure Device Manager is the root of trust andenables secure provisioning of owner keys during manufacturing inpresence of an untrusted original device manufacturer (ODM).

(2) In a second step 4702, a customer's remote application 4720 sends arequest to the authorization and policy server 4710 (including theapplication's encrypted workload (bitstream) 4715) for using the CSP'sautonomous FPGA 4730.

(3) In a third step 4703, the authorization and policy server 4710 canauthorize the use and bind a use policy to the workload 4715. It canreturn an authorization certificate signed by CSP's keys to the remoteapplication 4720.

(4) In a fourth step 4704, the remote application 4720 discovers thenetwork-connected, autonomous FPGA 4730 using standard network discoverymethods. The remote application 4720 asks the autonomous FPGA 4730 if ithas available resources. If the autonomous FPGA 4730 does have availableresources, then the remote application 4720 uses the message-basednetwork interface to load the bitstream directly into the autonomousFPGA 4730. The remote application 4720 sends both the encryptedbitstream 4715 and the authorization certificate to the autonomous FPGA4730.

(5) In a fifth step 4705, the autonomous FPGA 4730 verifies theauthorization certificate using the CSP's key that was programmed in theFPGA (in the first step 4701). The autonomous FPGA 4730 also enforcesthe usage policy for use of the autonomous FPGA 4730. If all is good,the autonomous FPGA 4730 runs the workload and returns the encryptedresult 4725 to the remote application 4720.

In one implementation, after loading the bitstream, the remoteapplication 4720 may establish a connection with the autonomous FPGA4730 and perform attestation to establish secure session for subsequentdata and control transfer. In some implementations, there can be acentral orchestration service that is responsible for performingattestation on behalf of all remote applications 4720, establishingsession with the FPGAs 4730, and providing a session keys (also referredto as tokens in the IDF) to the remote application 4720.

FIG. 48 illustrates a network environment 4800 for an autonomous FPGAusing an orchestration server to facilitate attestation and sessionsetup, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure. Networkenvironment 4800 depicts an autonomous FPGA 4830 using a centralorchestration server 4810 to facilitate attestation and session setupand provide a session key to a remote application 4820 over a securechannel. As shown, network environment 4800 include an orchestrationserver 4710, one or more remote applications 4820, and an autonomousFPGA 4830 communicably coupled to one another via one or more networks(not shown).

An example flow of implementations of the disclosure with reference tonetwork environment 4800 of FIG. 48 is as follows:

(1) In a first step 4801, remote application 4820 requests orchestrationserver 4810 to attest the FPGA 4830 to which it has offloaded itsbitstream to and request a session key.

(2) In a second step 4802, the orchestration server 4810 uses standardattestation and key setup protocol, such as Diffie Hellman or SPDM 1.1,to verify the device, its configuration, and the bitstream loaded on theautonomous FPGA 4830, and establishes a shared secret key with theautonomous FPGA 4830.

(3) In a third step 4803, the orchestration server 4810 sends thesession key to the remote application 4820 over a secure channel. Thischannel may be established using standard protocols such as DiffieHellman, TLS, SIGMA variation.

(4) In a fourth step 4804, the remote application 4820 derives data keysand wraps the data keys with session keys. The remote application 4820sends the data keys wrapped in the session keys to the autonomous FPGA4830.

(5) In a fifth step 4805, the autonomous FPGA 4830 unwraps the data keysusing the session keys it had stored at the end of Diffie Hellmanprotocol (e.g., at the second step 4802). These data keys are then usedto protect all messages and data transferred between the remoteapplication 4820 and the autonomous FPGA 4830.

In some implementations, the orchestration server 4810 may optionallyalso manage autonomous FPGA 4830 assignment to achieve load balancing orother performance goals at the data center. If the orchestration server4810 manages FPGA assignment, the remote application 4820 can go throughthe orchestration server 4810 to get an autonomous FPGA 4830 assignedfor its use instead of discovering available FPGA itself and programingit with its bitstream. In this model, the orchestration server 4810determines which autonomous FPGAs 4830 are available and then, based ondetermined heuristics, determines which autonomous FPGA 4830 to assignto a given remote application 4820. The orchestration server 4810provides the remote application 4820 with the IP address of the assignedautonomous FPGA 4830 along with the session key (token) for establishingsecure communication channel as described in the flow above.

In some implementations, the orchestration server 4810 described withrespect to FIG. 48 and the authorization & policy server 4710 describedwith respect to FIG. 47 may be implemented on the same server. However,the servers may also be implemented on separate servers. Both of thesecomponents may be owned by the CSP.

FIG. 49 illustrates a high-level architecture 4900 for an autonomousFPGA, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure. Thearchitecture 4900 may include a client machine 4902 communicably coupledto an autonomous FPGA 4904 over a network fabric 4970. The clientmachine 4902 may operate on an OS/VMM 4940 and host components of a userspace stack for performing an FPGA transaction. The components of theuser space stack for the FPGA transaction may include, but are notlimited to, an application 4910, an RT/UMD 4920. The components of theuser space stack may communicate with the autonomous FPGA 4904 via atransport layer 4935 a, 4935 b. The transport layer 4935 a, 4935 b canutilize a message passing interface 4980 to pass control and commandscorresponding to the FPGA transaction between the client machine 4902and the autonomous FPGA 4904. Data for the FPGA transaction may bepassed between the client machine 4902 and the autonomous FPGA 4904 viaNICs 4950 a, 4950 b via fabric 4970.

In one implementation, an FSM 4960 is instantiated on the autonomousFPGA 4904 to handle the management of the autonomous FPGA 4904 andexpose the message-based interface 4980 to a remote software (e.g.,application 4910) for configuration, monitoring and debugging, datatransfer, and so on. In some implementations, the FSM 4960 is alsoreferred to as a PIC SM 4960 or system manager 4960. The FSM 4960validates all incoming messages for correctness and verifies if therequester is allowed to perform the action requested before updating itsinternal state as per the request or responding back with requesteddata.

The following description discusses the main interfaces that the FSM4960 exposes to the remote software (e.g., application 4910):

-   -   Attestation and key setup interfaces: The FSM 4960 should        support the following two interfaces:

(1) A mechanism for platform owner to provision its keys into theautonomous FPGA 4904. This key is used later, at runtime, to enforce CSPdefined access control and policies. For example, CSP would signcustomer code (bitstream) with this key to allow authorized bitstreamsto get loaded on the autonomous FPGA 4904. The autonomous FPGA 4904 canverify the authorization before allowing it to be loaded.

(2) Dynamic attestation and session setup: Allow a remote software toverify that it is good FPGA with expected configurations and establish asecure session bound to the PR persona. This may be done via standardattestation and key exchange protocols such as SPDM 1.1 or TLShandshake. Subsequently, the remote application 4910 would generate dataencryption keys, wrap it in session key and program them into theautonomous FPGA 4904 to protect all messages to/from the autonomous FPGA4904.

-   -   Enumeration: Reporting an autonomous FPGA 4904 identity. This        would provide information such as device vendor, device id,        device family etc. Enumeration of capabilities or functions        supported by the autonomous FPGA 4904 and available resources        such as number of PR regions, availability, etc.    -   Remote Partial Reconfiguration: A mechanism for the remote        application 4910 to directly do partially reconfiguring of the        autonomous FPGA 4904 over network. This should support        confidentially and integrity by allowing loading encrypted and        signed FPGA bitstream.    -   Control Plane: This enables remote software to manage        configuration of customer's logic (e.g., compute kernel),        monitor execution and perform debug and instrumentation by        remote application. For functionalities such as debug, event        monitoring, etc., customers construct their own decoder scheme        or addressing mechanism in their FPGA design. Details of how        such management works is described in the memory management        section below.    -   Data Plane: The FSM 4960 exposes an interface to the remote        application 4910 for configuring the network interface        correctly. For efficient data protocols, such as RDMA, the FSM        4960 may not have any further role in this kind of data        transfer. For other protocols, the FSM 4960 may have additional        role in routing.    -   Firmware update by an authorized entity.    -   Device Recovery: An interface to allow an authorized entity to        reset or recover the device remotely. The FSM 4960 should clear        any state associated with the customer application. This        interface may be used for forced recovery of the autonomous FPGA        4904 if it is in unresponsive state. The FSM 4960 can clear any        state associated with the remote application's 4910 session or        state for the entire autonomous FPGA 4904 if a device level        reset is performed.    -   (Optional) Authorization & resource assignment: An interface for        an authorized entity to assign a FPGA tenant to a remote        application 4910 by means of establishing a shared session token        between these two entities. This is described in further detail        below.

The authorized entity herein refers to CSP software or CSP authorizedsoftware that is allowed to do remote management of the autonomous FPGA4904 or authorize who is allowed to use the autonomous FPGA 4904, etc.It can be a combination of orchestrator and authorization serverdescribed earlier with respect to FIGS. 47 and 48. The authorized entityshould establish an authenticated session with the FPGA which maypersist until the next FPGA reset.

The following discussion provides details of functionality of the FSM4960 in implementations of the disclosure.

With respect to parsing and validation of messages, the FSM 4960 canexpose a protected message passing interface for the remote applicationto interact with the autonomous FPGA 4904. In this case, none of theinternal configuration registers are exposed directly to a remoteentity. The message includes a message header and payload. The FSMparses and validates the message header parameters before performing anyof the actions utilized by the respective messages. The FSM alsoverifies if the requester is allowed to perform the action requestedbefore updating its internal state as per the request or responding backwith requested data. For example, for a message consisting of datatransfer to FPGA memory address 0x100, the FSM 4960 may determine if theremote application is allowed to access 0x100.

With respect to resource management, scheduling, and usage policy, theFSM 4960 can provide for such functionality. Resource assignment refersto mapping of the autonomous FPGA 4904 resources for use by a tenant. Aspart of resource management, the FSM 4960 determines how many availablePR regions it has for remote application 4910 use. Allocation to theremote application 4910 may be done directly, in which case the FSM 4960determines which PR region to assign to the remote application 4910.Optionally, this may be managed by authorized software, such as theorchestrator discussed with respect to FIG. 48. In this case, the FSM4960 allocates the PR region to the customer as specified by theorchestrator.

The FSM 4960 also manages allocation of other resources such as hard IPs(e.g., decoder), available memory, networking port and such to thetenant logic (e.g., compute kernel 4980) that is being programmed.

The FSM 4960 is responsible for scheduling of tenants which may be donebased on things like usage policy (e.g., how long it is allowed to run),or time-slice based on workload demand or based on the priority valuespecified in the tenant's policy.

Authorization regarding resource assignment is done by an authorizationand policy sever such as described with respect to FIG. 47. It isverified and enforced by the FSM 4960. The policy can, for example,state attributes such as, when and how long the autonomous FPGA 4904 isallowed to be accessed by the remote application 4910, the number oftenants that the remote application 4910 is allowed to configure or thesize of the autonomous FPGA 4904 memory that can be accessed. It mayalso assign a priority number to the remote application 4910.

The actual assignment request may come directly from the remoteapplication 4910 or it may be facilitated by an orchestrator (such asdescribed in FIG. 48). If the orchestration server does FPGA allocationand scheduling, then it may also establish a shared session token withthe autonomous FPGA 4904 and provide that to the remote application 4910securely. An authorization & resource assignment interface allows, forexample, an orchestrator server to authorize the remote application 4910to configure and access a FPGA tenant.

With respect to memory management, the FSM 4960 message interfacesupports various types of data transfers from the remote application4910 to the autonomous FPGA 4904. The data transfer type can be includedin the message header. Based on that information, the FSM 4960determines the routing.

FIG. 50 illustrates an autonomous FPGA 5000 with a data and control pathinternal interface from an FSM 5040, in accordance with implementationsof the disclosure. The FSM 5040 includes a router 5042, a controller5044, and a memory manager 5046 that work in conjunction to provide thedata and control path internal interface for the FSM 5040. In oneimplementation, the FSM 5040 is the same as FSM 4960 described withrespect to FIG. 49. The FSM 5040 may also be referred to herein as aPICSM or a system manager.

In some implementation, two types of data transfers supported by the FSM5040 (e.g., using the data and control path internal interface of theFSM 5040) are:

(1) Transfer of data from remote application to tenant (customer logic)via a streaming interface, such as AXI4-Stream. The tenant design seeksto implement its own local decoder mechanisms to route this data toappropriate location within the tenant. This data may target internalblock RAM memory or custom registers defined by the customer. FSM'spacket router ensures that the data is sent to the correct tenant asshown in FIG. 50 (e.g., if there are multiple tenants—multitenancy).

(2) Transfer of data to FPGA DRAM in PR region 5004. This allows aremote application to transfer data directly to the FPGA DRAM. The FSM5040 also allows a DMA engine instantiated within the tenant to read andwrite to the allotted memory region in the FPGA DRAM via a standardmemory bus interface.

In some implementations, the memory management in the FPGA 5000 may bestatic.

For example, if there are multiple PR slots, each one receives a fixedamount of memory that is pre-configured. In some implementations, memorymay be dynamically assigned and managed via standard mechanisms, such asuse page tables. For dynamic assignment, the FSM 5040 can be responsiblefor managing the page tables. In the case of static assignment, theremay be a simpler approach, such as use of range registers configured byFSM 5040 to manage isolation of memory available to each tenant.

In one example of how memory access is controlled for a remoteapplication in case of RDMA, the remote application utilizes data planeinterfaces to request for a specific buffer in FPGA DRAM to be pinned,as well as to perform the standard RDMA configuration steps. The FSM5040 checks if the buffer requested falls within the range registers ofthe tenant. The FSM 5040 proceeds with NIC configuration and RDMAconfiguration when the access is validated.

With respect to secure connection management, the FSM assists in secureconnection setup between a remote application and the FPGA. It performscryptographic functions utilized to maintain confidentiality andintegrity of messages. This connection maybe in the form of a standardnetwork protocol such as TLS or via custom protocols that utilize acombination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography.

The actual implementation of the FSM can be as firmware running on anembedded CPU or implemented using a state machine. The FSM has tointerface with different IPs, such as networking IP 5010, memorycontroller 5020, and PR sequencer 5030, instantiated on the FPGAresponsible for different management actions. This is shown in FIG. 50.Each of the FPGA IPs 5010, 5020, 5030, have their configuration andstatus register set (CSR) 5015, 5025, 5035, that can be addressed by theFSM controller 5044 via an internal bus such as, for example, AXI. Thisallows the FSM 5040 to configure and monitor status of different IPs5010, 5020, 5030.

In an example flow of a PR message by a remote application, the stepstaken by an SDM 5050 may include (assuming secure connectionestablishment has already taken place and client has been authorized toaccess the FPGA):

(1) Message received from host (e.g., via network connection such asEthernet 5002), decrypted and verified as part secure connection setup.

(2) Message is then parsed and the FPGA encrypted bitstream from thepayload is provided to the SDM 5050 (e.g., a trusted processor on FPGAthat handles secure boot-up of device as well as performs other cryptorelated functions), which decrypts it and verifies the signature.

(3) FSM 5040 then resets the tenant port, which brings the port CSRs5075 to the initial correct state.

(4) FSM 5040 then triggers PR by setting the corresponding PR CSR 5075.

(5) FSM 5040 provides the PR bitstream 5070 to the PR sequencer 5030 bypushing data using the CSRs 5035, 5075 until complete.

(6) FSM 5040 poll the status from PR CSR's 5075 to see if PR wassuccessful.

FIG. 51 is a flow diagram illustrating a method 5100 for autonomousFPGAs, in accordance with implementations of the disclosure. Method 5100may be performed by processing logic that may comprise hardware (e.g.,circuitry, dedicated logic, programmable logic, etc.), software (such asinstructions run on a processing device), or a combination thereof. Moreparticularly, the method 4400 may be implemented in one or more modulesas a set of logic instructions stored in a machine- or computer-readablestorage medium such as RAM, ROM, PROM, firmware, flash memory, etc., inconfigurable logic such as, for example, PLAs, FPGAs, CPLDs, infixed-functionality logic hardware using circuit technology such as, forexample, ASIC, CMOS or TTL technology, or any combination thereof.

The process of method 5100 is illustrated in linear sequences forbrevity and clarity in presentation; however, it is contemplated thatany number of them can be performed in parallel, asynchronously, or indifferent orders. Further, for brevity, clarity, and ease ofunderstanding, many of the components and processes described withrespect to FIGS. 45-50 may not be repeated or discussed hereafter. Inone implementation, a programmable IC implementing a system manager,such as autonomous FPGA 4904 implementing an FSM/PICSM 4960 describedwith respect to FIG. 49 or autonomous FPGA 5000 implementing anFSM/PICSM 5040 described with respect to FIG. 50, may perform method5100.

Method 5100 begins at block 5110 where a programmable IC may Interface,by a system manager of a programmable IC over a network, with a remoteapplication of a client platform, the system manager to interface withthe remote application using a message-based interface. At block 5120,the programmable IC may perform, by the system manager, resourcemanagement of resources of the programmable IC.

Subsequently, at block 5130, the programmable IC may validate, by thesystem manager, incoming messages to the programmable IC. At block 5140,the programmable IC may verify, by the system manager, whether arequester is allowed to perform requested actions of the incomingmessages that are successfully validated. Lastly, at block 5150, theprogrammable IC may manage, by the system manager, transfer of databetween the programmable IC and the remote application based onsuccessfully verifying the requester.

The following examples pertain to further embodiments of autonomous(self-managed) FPGAs. Example 1 is an apparatus to facilitate autonomous(self-managed) FPGAs. The apparatus of Example 1 comprises a systemmanager to: interface, over a network, with a remote application of aclient platform, the system manager to interface with the remoteapplication using a message-based interface; perform resource managementof resources of the programmable IC; validate incoming messages to theprogrammable IC; verify whether a requester is allowed to performrequested actions of the incoming messages that are successfullyvalidated; and manage transfer of data between the programmable IC andthe remote application based on successfully verifying the requester.

In Example 2, the subject matter of Example 1 can optionally includewherein the system manager is further to: establish a secure connectionbetween the client platform and the programmable IC; schedule theresources of the programmable IC; and enforce a usage policy directingusage by the remote application of the resources of the programmable IC.In Example 3, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-2 canoptionally include wherein the resource management of the resourcescomprises at least one of enumeration, configuration, monitoring,resource assignment, device recovery and reset, network configuration,partial reconfiguration and debugging, or firmware updates.

In Example 4, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-3 canoptionally include wherein the system manager to schedule the resourcesof the programmable IC further comprises the system manager to determineavailable partial reconfiguration (PR) regions of the programmable ICand allocate a least one of available PR regions to a tenant of theprogrammable IC. In Example 5, the subject matter of any one of Examples1-4 can optionally include wherein the system manager is further toexpose a plurality of interfaces to the remote application, theplurality of interfaces comprising at least one of an attestation andkey setup interface, an enumeration interface, a remote partialreconfiguration (PR) interface, a control plane interface, a data planeinterface, a firmware update interface, a device recovery interface, oran authorization and resource assignment interface.

In Example 6, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-5 canoptionally include wherein the attestation and key setup interface toallow an authorized entity associated with the programmable IC toprovision one or more keys to the programmable IC, the one or more keysused to validate the incoming messages. In Example 7, the subject matterof any one of Examples 1-6 can optionally include wherein the systemmanager further comprises a router, a controller, and a memory managerto work in conjunction to provide a data and control path internalinterface for the system manager.

In Example 8, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-7 canoptionally include wherein the system manager to perform cryptographicfunctions to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the incomingmessages. In Example 9, the subject matter of any one of Examples 1-8can optionally include wherein the programmable IC comprises at leastone of a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmable arraylogic (PAL), a programmable logic array (PLA), a field programmablelogic array (FPLA), an electrically programmable logic device (EPLD), anelectrically erasable programmable logic device (EEPLD), a logic cellarray (LCA), or a complex programmable logic devices (CPLD).

Example 10 is a method for facilitating autonomous (self-managed) FPGAs.The method of Example 10 can include interfacing, by a system manager ofa programmable integrated circuit (IC) over a network, with a remoteapplication of a client platform, the system manager to interface withthe remote application using a message-based interface; performing, bythe system manager, resource management of resources of the programmableIC; validating, by the system manager, incoming messages to theprogrammable IC; verifying, by the system manager, whether a requesteris allowed to perform requested actions of the incoming messages thatare successfully validated; and managing, by the system manager,transfer of data between the programmable IC and the remote applicationbased on successfully verifying the requester.

In Example 11, the subject matter of Example 10 can optionally includewherein the system manager is further to: establish a secure connectionbetween the client platform and the programmable IC; schedule theresources of the programmable IC; and enforce a usage policy directingusage by the remote application of the resources of the programmable IC.In Example 12, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-11 canoptionally include wherein the resource management of the resourcescomprises at least one of enumeration, configuration, monitoring,resource assignment, device recovery and reset, network configuration,partial reconfiguration and debugging, or firmware updates.

In Example 13, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-12 canoptionally include wherein the system manager to schedule the resourcesof the programmable IC further comprises the system manager to determineavailable partial reconfiguration (PR) regions of the programmable ICand allocate a least one of available PR regions to a tenant of theprogrammable IC. In Example 14, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 10-13 can optionally include wherein the system manager isfurther to expose a plurality of interfaces to the remote application,the plurality of interfaces comprising at least one of an attestationand key setup interface, an enumeration interface, a remote partialreconfiguration (PR) interface, a control plane interface, a data planeinterface, a firmware update interface, a device recovery interface, oran authorization and resource assignment interface.

In Example 15, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-14 canoptionally include wherein the attestation and key setup interface toallow an authorized entity associated with the programmable IC toprovision one or more keys to the programmable IC, the one or more keysused to validate the incoming messages. In Example 16, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 10-15 can optionally include wherein thesystem manager further comprises a router, a controller, and a memorymanager to work in conjunction to provide a data and control pathinternal interface for the system manager.

In Example 17, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-16 canoptionally include wherein the system manager to perform cryptographicfunctions to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the incomingmessages. In Example 18, the subject matter of any one of Examples 10-17can optionally include wherein the programmable IC comprises at leastone of a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmable arraylogic (PAL), a programmable logic array (PLA), a field programmablelogic array (FPLA), an electrically programmable logic device (EPLD), anelectrically erasable programmable logic device (EEPLD), a logic cellarray (LCA), or a complex programmable logic devices (CPLD).

Example 19 is a non-transitory machine readable storage medium forfacilitating autonomous (self-managed) FPGAs. The non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium of Example 19 having stored thereonexecutable computer program instructions that, when executed by one ormore processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operationscomprising interfacing, by a system manager of a programmable integratedcircuit (IC) over a network, with a remote application of a clientplatform, the system manager to interface with the remote applicationusing a message-based interface; performing, by the system manager,resource management of resources of the programmable IC; validating, bythe system manager, incoming messages to the programmable IC; verifying,by the system manager, whether a requester is allowed to performrequested actions of the incoming messages that are successfullyvalidated; and managing, by the system manager, transfer of data betweenthe programmable IC and the remote application based on successfullyverifying the requester.

In Example 20, the subject matter of Example 19 can optionally includewherein the system manager is further to: establish a secure connectionbetween the client platform and the programmable IC; schedule theresources of the programmable IC; and enforce a usage policy directingusage by the remote application of the resources of the programmable IC.In Example 21, the subject matter of any one of Examples 19-20 canoptionally include wherein the resource management of the resourcescomprises at least one of enumeration, configuration, monitoring,resource assignment, device recovery and reset, network configuration,partial reconfiguration and debugging, or firmware updates.

In Example 22, the subject matter of any one of Examples 19-21 canoptionally include wherein the system manager to schedule the resourcesof the programmable IC further comprises the system manager to determineavailable partial reconfiguration (PR) regions of the programmable ICand allocate a least one of available PR regions to a tenant of theprogrammable IC. In Example 23, the subject matter of any one ofExamples 19-22 can optionally include wherein the system manager isfurther to expose a plurality of interfaces to the remote application,the plurality of interfaces comprising at least one of an attestationand key setup interface, an enumeration interface, a remote partialreconfiguration (PR) interface, a control plane interface, a data planeinterface, a firmware update interface, a device recovery interface, oran authorization and resource assignment interface.

In Example 24, the subject matter of any one of Examples 19-23 canoptionally include wherein the attestation and key setup interface toallow an authorized entity associated with the programmable IC toprovision one or more keys to the programmable IC, the one or more keysused to validate the incoming messages. In Example 25, the subjectmatter of any one of Examples 19-24 can optionally include wherein thesystem manager further comprises a router, a controller, and a memorymanager to work in conjunction to provide a data and control pathinternal interface for the system manager.

In Example 26, the subject matter of any one of Examples 19-25 canoptionally include wherein the system manager to perform cryptographicfunctions to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the incomingmessages. In Example 27, the subject matter of any one of Examples 19-26can optionally include wherein the programmable IC comprises at leastone of a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmable arraylogic (PAL), a programmable logic array (PLA), a field programmablelogic array (FPLA), an electrically programmable logic device (EPLD), anelectrically erasable programmable logic device (EEPLD), a logic cellarray (LCA), or a complex programmable logic devices (CPLD).

Example 28 is an apparatus for facilitating autonomous (self-managed)FPGAs according to implementations of the disclosure. The apparatus ofExample 28 can comprise means for interfacing, by a system manager of aprogrammable integrated circuit (IC) over a network, with a remoteapplication of a client platform, the system manager to interface withthe remote application using a message-based interface; means forperforming, by the system manager, resource management of resources ofthe programmable IC; means for validating, by the system manager,incoming messages to the programmable IC; means for verifying, by thesystem manager, whether a requester is allowed to perform requestedactions of the incoming messages that are successfully validated; andmeans for managing, by the system manager, transfer of data between theprogrammable IC and the remote application based on successfullyverifying the requester. In Example 29, the subject matter of Example 28can optionally include the apparatus further configured to perform themethod of any one of the Examples 11 to 18.

Example 30 is a system for facilitating autonomous (self-managed) FPGAs,configured to perform the method of any one of Examples 10-18. Example31 is an apparatus for facilitating autonomous (self-managed) FPGAscomprising means for performing the method of any one of claims 10 to18. Specifics in the Examples may be used anywhere in one or moreembodiments.

Flowcharts representative of example hardware logic, machine readableinstructions, hardware implemented state machines, and/or anycombination thereof for implementing the systems, already discussed. Themachine readable instructions may be one or more executable programs orportion(s) of an executable program for execution by a computerprocessor. The program may be embodied in software stored on anon-transitory computer readable storage medium such as a CD-ROM, afloppy disk, a hard drive, a DVD, a Blu-ray disk, or a memory associatedwith the processor, but the whole program and/or parts thereof couldalternatively be executed by a device other than the processor and/orembodied in firmware or dedicated hardware. Further, although theexample program is described with reference to the flowchartsillustrated in the various figures herein, many other methods ofimplementing the example computing system may alternatively be used. Forexample, the order of execution of the blocks may be changed, and/orsome of the blocks described may be changed, eliminated, or combined.Additionally, or alternatively, any or all of the blocks may beimplemented by one or more hardware circuits (e.g., discrete and/orintegrated analog and/or digital circuitry, an FPGA, an ASIC, acomparator, an operational-amplifier (op-amp), a logic circuit, etc.)structured to perform the corresponding operation without executingsoftware or firmware.

The machine readable instructions described herein may be stored in oneor more of a compressed format, an encrypted format, a fragmentedformat, a compiled format, an executable format, a packaged format, etc.Machine readable instructions as described herein may be stored as data(e.g., portions of instructions, code, representations of code, etc.)that may be utilized to create, manufacture, and/or produce machineexecutable instructions. For example, the machine readable instructionsmay be fragmented and stored on one or more storage devices and/orcomputing devices (e.g., servers). The machine readable instructions mayutilize one or more of installation, modification, adaptation, updating,combining, supplementing, configuring, decryption, decompression,unpacking, distribution, reassignment, compilation, etc. in order tomake them directly readable, interpretable, and/or executable by acomputing device and/or other machine. For example, the machine readableinstructions may be stored in multiple parts, which are individuallycompressed, encrypted, and stored on separate computing devices, whereinthe parts when decrypted, decompressed, and combined form a set ofexecutable instructions that implement a program such as that describedherein.

In another example, the machine readable instructions may be stored in astate in which they may be read by a computer, but utilize addition of alibrary (e.g., a dynamic link library (DLL)), a software development kit(SDK), an application programming interface (API), etc. in order toexecute the instructions on a particular computing device or otherdevice. In another example, the machine readable instructions may beconfigured (e.g., settings stored, data input, network addressesrecorded, etc.) before the machine readable instructions and/or thecorresponding program(s) can be executed in whole or in part. Thus, thedisclosed machine readable instructions and/or corresponding program(s)are intended to encompass such machine readable instructions and/orprogram(s) regardless of the particular format or state of the machinereadable instructions and/or program(s) when stored or otherwise at restor in transit.

The machine readable instructions described herein can be represented byany past, present, or future instruction language, scripting language,programming language, etc. For example, the machine readableinstructions may be represented using any of the following languages: C,C++, Java, C#, Perl, Python, JavaScript, HyperText Markup Language(HTML), Structured Query Language (SQL), Swift, etc.

As mentioned above, the example processes of FIGS. 5 and/or 6 may beimplemented using executable instructions (e.g., computer and/or machinereadable instructions) stored on a non-transitory computer and/ormachine readable medium such as a hard disk drive, a flash memory, aread-only memory, a compact disk, a digital versatile disk, a cache, arandom-access memory and/or any other storage device or storage disk inwhich information is stored for any duration (e.g., for extended timeperiods, permanently, for brief instances, for temporarily buffering,and/or for caching of the information). As used herein, the termnon-transitory computer readable medium is expressly defined to includeany type of computer readable storage device and/or storage disk and toexclude propagating signals and to exclude transmission media.

“Including” and “comprising” (and all forms and tenses thereof) are usedherein to be open ended terms. Thus, whenever a claim employs any formof “include” or “comprise” (e.g., comprises, includes, comprising,including, having, etc.) as a preamble or within a claim recitation ofany kind, it is to be understood that additional elements, terms, etc.may be present without falling outside the scope of the correspondingclaim or recitation. As used herein, when the phrase “at least” is usedas the transition term in, for example, a preamble of a claim, it isopen-ended in the same manner as the term “comprising” and “including”are open ended.

The term “and/or” when used, for example, in a form such as A, B, and/orC refers to any combination or subset of A, B, C such as (1) A alone,(2) B alone, (3) C alone, (4) A with B, (5) A with C, (6) B with C, and(7) A with B and with C. As used herein in the context of describingstructures, components, items, objects and/or things, the phrase “atleast one of A and B” is intended to refer to implementations includingany of (1) at least one A, (2) at least one B, and (3) at least one Aand at least one B. Similarly, as used herein in the context ofdescribing structures, components, items, objects and/or things, thephrase “at least one of A or B” is intended to refer to implementationsincluding any of (1) at least one A, (2) at least one B, and (3) atleast one A and at least one B. As used herein in the context ofdescribing the performance or execution of processes, instructions,actions, activities and/or steps, the phrase “at least one of A and B”is intended to refer to implementations including any of (1) at leastone A, (2) at least one B, and (3) at least one A and at least one B.Similarly, as used herein in the context of describing the performanceor execution of processes, instructions, actions, activities and/orsteps, the phrase “at least one of A or B” is intended to refer toimplementations including any of (1) at least one A, (2) at least one B,and (3) at least one A and at least one B.

As used herein, singular references (e.g., “a”, “an”, “first”, “second”,etc.) do not exclude a plurality. The term “a” or “an” entity, as usedherein, refers to one or more of that entity. The terms “a” (or “an”),“one or more”, and “at least one” can be used interchangeably herein.Furthermore, although individually listed, a plurality of means,elements or method actions may be implemented by, e.g., a single unit orprocessor. Additionally, although individual features may be included indifferent examples or claims, these may possibly be combined, and theinclusion in different examples or claims does not imply that acombination of features is not feasible and/or advantageous.

Descriptors “first,” “second,” “third,” etc. are used herein whenidentifying multiple elements or components which may be referred toseparately. Unless otherwise specified or understood based on theircontext of use, such descriptors are not intended to impute any meaningof priority, physical order or arrangement in a list, or ordering intime but are merely used as labels for referring to multiple elements orcomponents separately for ease of understanding the disclosed examples.In some examples, the descriptor “first” may be used to refer to anelement in the detailed description, while the same element may bereferred to in a claim with a different descriptor such as “second” or“third.” In such instances, it should be understood that suchdescriptors are used merely for ease of referencing multiple elements orcomponents.

The foregoing description and drawings are to be regarded in anillustrative rather than a restrictive sense. Persons skilled in the artcan understand that various modifications and changes may be made to theembodiments described herein without departing from the broader spiritand scope of the features set forth in the appended claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. An apparatus comprising: a programmableintegrated circuit (IC) comprising system manager hardware circuitry to:interface, over a network, with a remote application of a clientplatform, the system manager hardware circuitry to interface with theremote application using a message-based interface; perform resourcemanagement of resources of the programmable IC; validate incomingmessages to the programmable IC; verify whether a requester is allowedto perform requested actions of the incoming messages that aresuccessfully validated; and manage transfer of data between theprogrammable IC and the remote application based on successfullyverifying the requester.
 2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the systemmanager hardware circuitry is further to: establish a secure connectionbetween the client platform and the programmable IC; schedule theresources of the programmable IC; and enforce a usage policy directingusage by the remote application of the resources of the programmable IC.3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the resource management of theresources comprises at least one of enumeration, configuration,monitoring, resource assignment, device recovery and reset, networkconfiguration, partial reconfiguration and debugging, or firmwareupdates.
 4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the system managerhardware circuitry to schedule the resources of the programmable ICfurther comprises the system manager hardware circuitry to determineavailable partial reconfiguration (PR) regions of the programmable ICand allocate at least one of the available PR regions to a tenant of theprogrammable IC.
 5. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the system managerhardware circuitry is further to expose a plurality of interfaces to theremote application, the plurality of interfaces comprising at least oneof an attestation and key setup interface, an enumeration interface, aremote partial reconfiguration (PR) interface, a control planeinterface, a data plane interface, a firmware update interface, a devicerecovery interface, or an authorization and resource assignmentinterface.
 6. The apparatus of claim 5, wherein the attestation and keysetup interface is to allow an authorized entity associated with theprogrammable IC to provision one or more keys to the programmable IC,the one or more keys used to validate the incoming messages.
 7. Theapparatus of claim 1, wherein the system manager hardware circuitryfurther comprises a router, a controller, and a memory manager to workin conjunction to provide a data and control path internal interface forthe system manager hardware circuitry.
 8. The apparatus of claim 1,wherein the system manager hardware circuitry to perform cryptographicfunctions to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the incomingmessages.
 9. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the programmable ICcomprises at least one of a field programmable gate array (FPGA), aprogrammable array logic (PAL), a programmable logic array (PLA), afield programmable logic array (FPLA), an electrically programmablelogic device (EPLD), an electrically erasable programmable logic device(EEPLD), a logic cell array (LCA), or a complex programmable logicdevices (CPLD).
 10. A method comprising: interfacing, by system managerhardware circuitry of a programmable integrated circuit (IC) over anetwork, with a remote application of a client platform, the systemmanager to interface with the remote application using a message-basedinterface; performing, by the system manager hardware circuitry,resource management of resources of the programmable IC; validating, bythe system manager hardware circuitry, incoming messages to theprogrammable IC; verifying, by the system manager hardware circuitry,whether a requester is allowed to perform requested actions of theincoming messages that are successfully validated; and managing, by thesystem manager hardware circuitry, transfer of data between theprogrammable IC and the remote application based on successfullyverifying the requester.
 11. The method of claim 10, further comprisingestablishing, by the system manager hardware circuitry, a secureconnection between the client platform and the programmable IC;scheduling, by the system manager hardware circuitry, the resources ofthe programmable IC; and enforcing, by the system manager hardwarecircuitry, a usage policy directing usage by the remote application ofthe resources of the programmable IC.
 12. The method of claim 10,wherein the resource management of the resources comprises at least oneof enumeration, configuration, monitoring, resource assignment, devicerecovery and reset, network configuration, partial reconfiguration anddebugging, or firmware updates.
 13. The method of claim 10, whereinscheduling the resources of the programmable IC further comprises:determining, by the system manager hardware circuitry, available partialreconfiguration (PR) regions of the programmable IC; and allocating, bythe system manager hardware circuitry, at least one of available PRregions to a tenant of the programmable IC.
 14. The method of claim 10,further comprising exposing, by the system manager hardware circuitry, aplurality of interfaces to the remote application, the plurality ofinterfaces comprising at least one of an attestation and key setupinterface, an enumeration interface, a remote partial reconfiguration(PR) interface, a control plane interface, a data plane interface, afirmware update interface, a device recovery interface, or anauthorization and resource assignment interface.
 15. The method of claim10, wherein the system manager hardware circuitry further comprises arouter, a controller, and a memory manager to work in conjunction toprovide a data and control path internal interface for the systemmanager hardware circuitry.
 16. A non-transitory machine readablestorage medium having stored thereon executable computer programinstructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause theone or more processors to perform operations to: interface, by systemmanager hardware circuitry of a programmable integrated circuit (IC)over a network, with a remote application of a client platform, thesystem manager to interface with the remote application using amessage-based interface; perform, by the system manager hardwarecircuitry, resource management of resources of the programmable IC;validate, by the system manager hardware circuitry, incoming messages tothe programmable IC; verify, by the system manager hardware circuitry,whether a requester is allowed to perform requested actions of theincoming messages that are successfully validated; and manage, by thesystem manager hardware circuitry, transfer of data between theprogrammable IC and the remote application based on successfullyverifying the requester.
 17. The non-transitory machine readable storagemedium of claim 16, wherein the operations are further to: establish, bythe system manager hardware circuitry, a secure connection between theclient platform and the programmable IC; schedule, by the system managerhardware circuitry, the resources of the programmable IC; and enforce,by the system manager hardware circuitry, a usage policy directing usageby the remote application of the resources of the programmable IC. 18.The non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 16, whereinthe resource management of the resources comprises at least one ofenumeration, configuration, monitoring, resource assignment, devicerecovery and reset, network configuration, partial reconfiguration anddebugging, or firmware updates.
 19. The non-transitory machine readablestorage medium of claim 16, wherein the system manager hardwarecircuitry to schedule the resources of the programmable IC furthercomprises the system manager hardware circuitry to determine availablepartial reconfiguration (PR) regions of the programmable IC and allocatea least one of available PR regions to a tenant of the programmable IC.20. The non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 16,wherein the operations are further to expose, by the system managerhardware circuitry, a plurality of interfaces to the remote application,the plurality of interfaces comprising at least one of an attestationand key setup interface, an enumeration interface, a remote partialreconfiguration (PR) interface, a control plane interface, a data planeinterface, a firmware update interface, a device recovery interface, oran authorization and resource assignment interface.